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Abstract 
 
This study is in two parts: a collection of poetry with a commentary, followed 
by a critical dissertation. The dissertation examines how language can be used 
to represent our experience of the perceptions derived via our senses; how to 
‘tell the truth about things’ (Randall Jarrell). This in turn forces the poet to 
identify what those ‘things’ mean to the observer: the nature of our 
perceptions and the status of objects in the external world. My own poetry 
explores how I understand my own sense perceptions, what relation I find 
between my experience of those perceptions and the world from which they 
are derived, and how I can represent this knowledge in poetry. 
 This issue relates to the same concerns surrounding the dispute 
between the Movement and counter-culture poets and the poetry wars of the 
1970s. A brief survey of this period reveals an interesting paradox related to 
the notion of origins, authenticity and transcendence in the work of J. H. 
Prynne. I take this paradox as the starting point for my examination of the 
work of Elizabeth Bishop, Roy Fisher and Paul Muldoon’s collection, Why 
Brownlee Left. 
 My study reveals the role that imagination plays, in combination with 
sense perceptions, in fashioning the worldview of these poets. Factual or 
scientific information alone will not provide the means to achieve this. 
Imagination, operating through the exercise of choice, creates meaning and 
presence in the poetic text, which is not a reflection of the world but a new 
object existing within it. This conclusion coincides very closely with William 
Carlos Williams’s observations on imagination and creativity. In addition, my 
	   3 
examination reveals the extent to which ecocritical thinking regarding the 
inter-relatedness of human and non-human worlds is relevant to these issues. 
My findings apply to all three poets in this study, as well as to Prynne, but 
with differences in the form in which this imaginative exercise of choice is 
manifested. 
 
Key words: perception, imagination, representation, origins, authenticity, 
transcendence, ecocriticism. 
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Lapidary 
 
Riverside Drive was looking like a mistake: 
nothing but concrete, cars, asphalt. 
The day was sultry, curtains  
mostly drawn. 
 
My shirt was slightly soiled 
and stuck to my back 
but after two hours and 
four cardboard mugs of coffee 
I’d got one of those Jap 
sports cars in my sights. 
It was sporting my lucky number. 
 
Simple as tagging along; 
nothing to it. 
We drift into a car park; 
no more than a patch of grass, really. 
 
Outside, I’m getting smells 
like green stuff and water. 
I reckon, what dazzles me, 
dazzles others, too. 
 
Under the bridge, where shade 
looks almost as solid as stone, 
I search for the cracks 
between Joe loves Fran, 
where seed might fall, 
shoots cling and thrive. 
 
If I’d scratched my own motto 
there it would read: 
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He was always in spaces. 
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Departure 
 
In the children’s encyclopedia 
a door-to-door salesman talked my dad 
into buying when I’d just started school, 
there was a series of simple, line drawings 
to illustrate the curve of the earth’s surface. 
 
A ship steamed out of harbour, diminishing 
as it neared the horizon, then dropped 
out of sight: first just the funnels visible; 
finally, nothing but a trail of smoke. 
 
My dad didn’t want me to miss the boat 
for lack of information. 
 
I was left regretting that departure, unsure 
if it was the passengers’ homesickness I sensed  
or my own loneliness, 
standing on the quay,  
gazing out to sea 
with the peppery smell 
of the book’s binding 
lingering  
in the air. 
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Origins 
 
Beneath the foundations, for me, of the word holiday 
lies Swanage, my first remembered beach; 
holiday’s Jurassic level, on which 
all other resorts and cities worth a visit 
rest. So waves rib the tidal sands 
beneath Prague and Gstaad. 
 
And behind the word beach, the chalk cliff 
barrier of the northern headland rears up 
like the hump back of some prehistoric beast. 
Rollers gnaw at its base and crunch pebbles. 
The deserted, desolate end of Swanage 
drew my wandering steps as close as I dared go. 
 
Back at the family base of towels and deckchairs, 
I gazed past the high-tide line of dried out bladderwrack, 
over wet sand and dazzle of sun rays 
cast off the moving sea, to the distant cape, 
remote as the li-lo I was never allowed 
because it might carry me too far out. 
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Boats 
 
Three small boys on the seashore 
sailed their model boats. 
 
They balanced on the rocks in the shallows; 
one crouched down, wavering, and reached out to prod 
a boat with a stick 
and guide it the way he wanted. 
 
They stepped from stone to stone 
and leapt across the wider gaps, 
shouting orders about route and direction. 
 
On a smaller rock, one would teeter, 
toes curled to grip the sloping sides. 
 
Another might wobble and hesitate when his base 
shifted under his weight, choosing 
the moment to hop off. 
 
A container ship crossed the gulf 
on its way to the port along the coast 
but the boys had their backs to it, 
intent on their own game. 
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Arrival In Finland 
 
That day I got lost in Hampton Court maze, 
the tall hedges leaned closer above me 
as I retraced my footsteps, revised 
my turnings, and suddenly ran 
into my aunt’s arms. It all came back to me 
 
when we entered Finland by ferry 
from Stockholm, passing Åland, 
which the English invaded in 1854, 
with the unlikely consequence 
of guaranteeing the Finns their own coinage. 
 
As we approached, 
Finland rose piecemeal out of the water, 
starting with scattered reefs, 
bare rocks just breaking the surface, 
skerries with patches of sea grass, 
a stunted tree, a string of small islands, 
then larger ones, close-packed and wooded. 
 
The sea contracted to a network of channels 
weaving in and out of encroaching stone and forest. 
Impossible to separate archipelago 
from mainland; Finland stepping forward 
to greet us with outspread arms. 
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Two Crabs 
 
Onto a shelf of rock 
cracked and tilted 
by the ages; 
a step up, a step down; 
 
each slap, suck 
and gurgle 
will drain a little lower 
for the next 37 minutes; 
 
a pause to peer 
at a ruched, emerald curtain – 
delicate as silk – that sways and lifts 
where pincers strain to snap a leg; 
 
then skirting an inlet, 
its surface solid 
with yellow-brown weed 
like a water-logged carpet – 
 
to the outermost edge, 
a few inches above 
the waving kelp, and sheen 
of the cold Easter sea. 
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Points Of Reference 
 
While the high ridge of the island 
thirty miles to the south 
just hangs there 
like something that happened long ago, 
the tree is being buried 
deeper in the creeper’s leaves 
with each year that passes 
and the gnats in the forest 
remain as insignificant 
as my daily self-deceptions, 
except when they bite. 
 
And having watched the sun 
set off the cape, accelerating 
as the gap between it and the sea closes, 
firing the scattered clouds 
with shifting reds and orange, 
I turn to face the other way 
to see rose-pink cumulus 
slowly lose their colour 
as the earth’s shadow rides higher up the sky 
and a ship balanced on the horizon 
is lacking one dimension. 
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Seashell 
 
Venus is about to set behind the hill; 
  dusk closing in. Dark blue, 
    it’s the colour of her eyes. 
 
Waves suck at the shoreline with a shush; 
  the shallows are greenish 
    and speckled with foam. 
 
Online, I search for dishes with shellfish, 
  ginger and chilli. It’s hard to stop 
    watching her. The screen glows 
 
as the room darkens and inside the seashell 
  the rush of my blood through the veins 
    echoes with a far-off roar. 
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Home Boy 
 
There can’t have been much traffic 
on the seaways off Swanage 
because I never saw a real ship on the horizon 
and my thoughts of voyaging 
were limited to the end-point 
of the northern headland. 
 
But during an out-of-season visit 
to Lulworth Cove, the boom 
of blank-fire from naval manoeuvres 
had me ducking and scrambling 
over the rocks, heading for our car 
and safety, longing for home. 
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Out There 
 
… and that air is always redder than it should be, 
flowing through a slit between the trees 
where several birches have been cut down in a line. 
Looking through the opening, into a glowing distance, 
feels like setting an eye to the crack between door 
and jamb, squinting, lips puckered up 
in the effort to get whatever it is, 
out there, into some kind of focus. 
 
But I’m readier now than I’ll ever be, 
pumped up and flushed, 
set to take the forest path at a lick. 
The same trees that flash by on either side 
 
sway their tops late at night 
black against the aftermath of city light. 
 
 
  …………………………… 
 
 
… or then air is always bluer than it should be, 
giving cliffs of chalk the shade that prompts a sighed, 
ethereal, on board ships approaching harbour 
in the morning, from the south. 
An hour, or 90 minutes, later and docked, 
those same voyagers stare into glassy water, 
noting how the silkweed seems more solid 
than the shimmering quayside granite it coats. 
 
But today the weather’s blowier than usual. 
It’s 5 p.m., March in Finland 
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and I’m in no mood to confuse what I see 
with the medium I see it through. 
 
Don’t give me that disembodied tone. 
Give me air, cold as ice. Give me stone. 
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A Deep Breath 
 
On page 49 of my autobiography 
there’s a list of names: 
all the people whose influence 
has been important to me; 
 
and later, a reference to my habit 
of singing 2,000 light years 
from home in my head 
while running the stony forest paths – 
 
on a lung trip, I call it. 
It can be very lonely. 
 
The expression ‘a retirement home’ 
should be quite clear. 
It appears on page four hundred and something 
but I haven’t got there yet 
 
so thinking about it 
gives me a feeling of absence. 
Or do I mean, of something being absent? 
Is that it? 
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Night And Day 
 
The night sky is a diagram 
of hectic attraction and absence. 
I’ve tracked these heavenly bodies 
across bleak space, 
 
until day breaks with a fleck of red 
that expands. Below my ribs 
cells flutter like sand grains 
tumbled in a current. 
 
The borderline along which we’ve folded 
our lives in half 
slides further round the Earth. 
 
The woodland brightens, 
gilded beech trunks sleek as skin. 
 
I feel desire in the empty spaces 
between the trees 
where sunlight daubs the forest floor, 
blotched by the swaying shadows of leaves; 
light and dark constantly 
trying to enter each other. 
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Liminal 
 
Lying on shingle that sloped into the sea, 
I wanted to find the exact point 
where my body weight held me 
 
at rest in the trough 
but the dying pulse  
of the incoming crest 
 
would be just enough to support me  
for one half of the beat  
of my heart. 
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Dedication 
 
He was well known the length of the beach 
and all over town as a daft old codger. 
At least once a week you’d see him, stumbling 
over the shingle and stones, bent almost double. 
 
I’ve met people who collect small stones 
with attractive markings. They polish them 
and use them in self-made jewellery. 
The first time, I thought that’s what he was at, 
 
but he was empty-handed when we spoke 
and explained he was looking for one particular 
pebble. I thought he must be soft in the head 
and the thought must’ve shown on my face 
 
because he gave me the story behind his search. 
As a lad, he said, he’d found this stone, 
a delicate pink, veined with a vivid crimson oval 
that had a jet black centre. 
 
‘Unusual,’ I remarked, for something to say 
and to humour him. ‘Gorgeous,’ 
he replied. ‘I wanted to keep it, 
but my friends were calling from the sea 
 
and having no pocket in my trunks, I placed it 
on a large flat stone, where I’d find it again. 
But our games and swimming took us along the beach. 
I lost my bearings and I lost my stone.’ 
 
And that’s it. For thirty years he’s been sliding 
about on the piles of shingle tossed up 
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by the sea, a pointless task in search 
of the pebble he once had in his hand and then lost. 
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The New Sisyphus 
 
Each day I take a stone with me 
wherever I go: from home to work, 
around the town, to shops, on bus or train. 
Each morning I begin the round again. 
 
I’m conscious of its tap against my thigh 
as I walk. My fingers touch 
its cool surface when I rummage 
in my pocket after keys or change. 
 
Carried by ice age glaciers that crushed 
mountain ranges and left the outcrops 
on the hills, smoothed by the rubbing 
of sands and the action of running 
 
water, it’s just contained 
inside my clenched hand. 
If I squeeze, the pressure 
bruises the tendons in my palm, 
 
leaving a dull ache the next day, 
that feels like a solid presence 
as if the pebble has permanently 
lodged in my flesh. 
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This Neck Of The Woods 
 
suggests a scrawny sparseness 
that doesn’t fit the bill. 
Something fuller and fatter is needed, 
with more weight and density. 
The wood’s burgeoning thigh? 
Its bulging flank? Truly, 
branches and foliage overhang 
its border like Falstaff’s gut, 
altogether ungoverned, trying to 
burst across the field, 
 
while I’m getting my breath back and letting 
my mind weave its way through medieval forests – 
wild boar crash through the undergrowth; 
a deer lifts its head in the gloom, swivels an ear. 
 
But I shouldn’t have come up that hill 
so fast, setting off my bad knee 
and the heart pumping blood 
through thin wrists. Below my jaw 
there’s a tender spot, but hard, like a pebble, 
that I dab with a fingertip. 
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Talking To Edith Södergran 
 
This is as much as I can manage: 
three quarters of the way up a hill in Karelia 
where, from an outcrop of rock, 
I look to the distant ridgeback, 
across a stretch of silvery water 
that must be an inlet of a lake to the east; 
the illusion that one stride 
could carry me over to the other side. 
 
My instinct is to find an explanation 
in my elevation, perspective, 
some vagary of human perception. 
Yours, Edith, was to see your body is a mystery, 
leading you on the path to the land that is not 
where your beloved walks with sparkling crown. 
Destiny, you say – and promptly 
 
step out of it; at the same time proclaiming 
it’s written on your forehead – 
a sign from the gods. 
It’s as much as I can manage to wonder 
‘if’, ‘what’, ‘but then’, 
while you’re the human child, all certainty 
stretching its arms higher than heaven. 
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At The Photograph Exhibition 
 
I felt diminished 
by that shot of a piece of stone 
that from a distance 
I’d taken to be palm-sized: 
zoom-lensed, blown up – every nick, line 
and blotch on its surface larger than life. 
 
Close-to I was peering at six guys 
roped together across a rock-face. 
Those hairline cracks were gaping fissures. 
One fair head, the size of a salt crystal. 
Me, towering over the canyon landscape. 
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Canoe Trip 
 
The force on blades fighting the rapids 
and the burn in stomach muscles, 
shoulders, forearms. Events are 
 
current, rocks, gravel banks, 
only these exist in the moments 
the stream rushes us towards them, 
 
cease to exist as we tumble past 
intent on steering the safe course ahead. 
Speech is white foam flecking the surface. 
 
At our riverside camp I recognise 
a pine sapling  with a kink at the top: 
the same that two summers earlier had been 
 
keeling over in too-soft earth 
so I’d propped it up 
with a forked stick. 
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Without An Aim 
 
The bed was a chaos of tangled 
roots, rocks and fallen branches. 
 
The surface used to ripple and splash 
over the shallows, run smooth and black 
through the deep pools.  
I knew its underground stretches  
where the air would be damp and cold 
as a clammy hand. 
 
I’d grown as familiar with its ways – its rises 
and falls in different seasons – 
as I was with the flow of my own blood 
through my own veins; 
until the morning I turned up to find 
its course diverted and those black rocks, 
rotting branches, gravel and muck exposed; 
dry banks winding aimlessly through the trees. 
 
For days I was casting about aimlessly 
then washed up here; 
I almost said ‘found myself’ but 
I don’t want to exaggerate. 
 
I keep wondering if I should’ve 
heard something in the water’s voice, 
seen something in its reflection: 
some sign emerging from its surroundings. 
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Comparative Studies 
 
Even with its beak crammed 
with worms collected to feed 
its young, the thrush is able 
to produce its ratchet-like call, 
 
while I’m able to use my teeth 
so delicately I can bite the skin 
inside my mouth one cell deep 
and tease a piece off. 
 
I plan to devote my middle years 
to wildlife research, camp 
in the woods, live on berries 
and whatnot, record the first 
known case of an animal 
urging itself on with a willow switch. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   35 
Learning To Fly 
 
I’d like to chart an airbourne course 
between the trunks and boughs 
to represent unimpeded progress. 
The birds can do it, gliding 
and veering without making 
contact, only the draught 
leaves a rocking in their wake. 
 
My best attempt takes me 
as far as the sixth tree in, 
then traps me in a tangle 
of branches without exit space, 
grateful my flight is virtual 
and finally aware that success 
depends on how fast 
we get the world in focus. 
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Sweeney 
 
I’ve been sitting in this tree for some time now, 
observing the arrangement of house roofs, 
the pattern of surrounding streets. 
Houses are flatter than I remember 
 
from the time before I was able to fly, 
their walls occupy less of my attention 
but, as I glide in a smooth arc, 
holding my arms straight and slightly wide 
 
of my body, pulling my shoulders back 
and my head up to achieve the lift that carries me clear, 
I judge the area each building covers 
by the extent of its roof. 
 
Steady rain covers the neighbourhood with pools and streams; 
the glint leads me to wild watercress and sedge. 
The residents don’t recognise the return of the bog 
they don’t know their homes are built on. 
 
And though my hopping on this branch lacks grace, 
I feel the birds have come to accept me. 
I haven’t decided yet 
what to do when winter arrives. 
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Sanctuary 
 
The pile of branches I’d cut 
from the overgrown silver willow 
has become a refuge for beetles, woodlice 
and worms that surface where soil remains damp. 
 
All day the sun shines. 
Leaves on the shrubs tremble 
but the blue tits ignore the untidy 
stack in the shade. 
 
Not so the hedgehog that’s found out the pile. 
Each evening he trundles over the grass, 
little warrior, circles and detours, 
but always with the one goal; 
bent on surprising the hard-shelled 
and soft-skinned at home. 
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The Mud Poems 
 
1. Close Up 
 
With my eye on the level 
of a seeded bald patch in the lawn 
I’m considering mud, close up. 
There’s the smell of peat and chicken shit 
and damp air chill on my cheek. 
Newly sprouted grass is fine as hair. 
 
The drainpipe drips. The garden´s drenched 
and half in shade. Along its border 
sunlight shines on rich blades plump 
with rain, crushed and trampled 
into soft, dark earth. 
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2. Sinking 
 
Nothing but bubbles in brown water 
where Venice once was; 
gilded palaces and golden dinner plates 
all sucked down into the ooze. 
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3. Underwater 
 
The sun is out and the Thames looks blue 
but I’m deep below its surface 
in the slime with bent bicycle wheels, 
prams and blackened cans. 
 
When river mud squeezes between toes 
broken glass slits white flesh, 
blood beads and spreads across skin in threads. 
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4. Bird’s Eye View 
 
From the air, the Somme battlefield’s 
a brown scar only two miles wide 
snaking across a green land. 
 
Soldiers slip and splash 
in the trenches like homunculi, 
driven by a force they cannot know. 
 
They don’t see the faint day moon 
because they don’t look up. 
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Moon 
 
A not-quite-full moon, 
its lop-sided shape implying 
the wholeness it lacks. 
 
For thirty minutes it moves 
across the space between the church wall 
and colonnade; 
the stone of the piazza 
faintly reflects its silver. 
 
It inches behind the building, 
taking its deficiency with it. 
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In Front Of A Large Department Store 
 
Pigeons are more aerobatic than you might think 
watching them on a pavement 
in front of a large department store 
where people pass in and out 
continuously, 
ride the silver escalators 
up and down; 
gather in a cluster 
round a glass counter, 
then move apart and squeeze past 
the next knot that blocks the shining aisle, 
or bind with it. 
 
The assistants are adept at appearing 
by the side of potential buyers, 
coaxing those who are wavering. 
They avoid stepping on toes 
or having their own stepped on. 
The job requires delicacy. 
 
At the sliding doors the pigeons scuttle away  
as if they just manage to escape  
being trodden on, 
but it’s with the same fine judgement 
that they’ll skim your shoulder or hair. 
They’ll drop from a roof, twist 
below a third floor ledge 
and settle their claws beside a mate 
who isn’t, who jabs an unwelcoming beak 
so they fall back, flick round, swing about, 
skim your hair and land 
right in front of your shoe 
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as if nothing had happened, 
nothing at all. 
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On Doing Jig-Saw Puzzles 
 
I tip the open box; 
the puzzle tumbles onto the mat. 
I glide my palm across the pile 
and back. The shiny surfaces slide over 
each other, or lodge together 
in a lump that’s oddly satisfying 
to the touch. It yields to a little pressure. 
 
Spread out, the variegated colours 
look like the scarves and jackets 
of a football crowd seen from a distance, 
their wearers waiting to be recognised; 
or the pieces of a smashed mirror, each 
magically retaining its last reflected image. 
 
The most trying I ever completed 
was a picture of a stone wall: five hundred 
fragments of rock stared at me. 
Precious little to distinguish 
one piece from any other. 
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How To Grow A Crystal 
 
So these particles are whizzing about 
in their solution, the way planets do in space, 
or memory does in time, only you can’t see them. 
 
When particles collide they stick together 
in a Bravais lattice to form a sub-unit 
but, only if each particle is correctly positioned 
 
and oriented. At this point nucleation begins. 
Now, your sub-unit is bigger than a particle; 
you still can’t see it but it’s hooking up 
 
with more particles and growing. 
You’ve got a metastable situation 
where your nucleus crystal is submersed 
 
in its environment. The structure 
would be flawless, but at this rate 
it’ll take an age to form. 
 
Instead, imperfections start to occur, 
and so the process accelerates. That 
which you couldn’t see before has crystalized 
 
and suddenly falls out of the solution. 
This is called the fallout. 
Some crystals are so hard they’re called rocks. 
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Antiquities 
 
It’s easy to think that this collection 
of relics from the past – Roman coins, 
rococo china, silver snuff box 
and nineteenth-century prints – 
has arrived at its own destination 
here in our present, like time travellers 
that have materialised 
out of the mists of antiquity. 
Easy to believe that reality 
is conferred on them by our eyes. 
 
In fact, our present is just a railway station 
these pieces are rushing through 
and our faces, half glimpsed on the platform, 
will soon be history, as the Roman coins, 
rococo china, silver snuff box 
and nineteenth-century prints 
disembark in some other future. 
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Three Clementines 
 
Against the skins of the clementines 
the dining room table’s wood looks muddy. 
The clash has done something 
to the clementines, too. 
 
On their pile in the shop, they glowed 
like coals in a barbecue when the lid’s ajar 
and my mouth at the crack blows up 
a deep orange in the dark interior. 
 
The brown wood’s smothered their fire 
to a dull, lifeless tone that’s somehow 
synthetic, like a colour 
fabricated in a chemical plant, 
 
not one that’s been nourished by rain, soil and sun, 
through the roots and leaves of the tree 
they grew on, in a line of trees, 
on a hillside turning its face to a blue sky. 
 
There’s the farm worker with a sack 
of fertilizer and canister of insecticide spray 
who walked beneath the branch, 
looked up and saw my clementines 
 
and sunlight falling through leaves, 
then went home to a white-washed house 
with a well in the garden, ditches 
carrying water to a few rows of vegetables. 
 
Small windows in the white walls 
show nothing of the interior, 
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just darkness, like the darkness 
under the barbecue lid. 
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Oranges 
 
James McAlpine lives 
ten streets in and six floors up 
on the Hollywell Estate, 
beside the tower blocks 
and motorway across 
a nameless conurbation. 
 
Each morning James focuses 
attention on maintaining 
his grip on the knife that spreads 
orange marmalade on hot toast. 
And as he lets the melt 
ooze salt and sweet 
across his tongue, 
thinks of the leap the tree must make 
to fruit the neighbouring flats. 
 
If there ever was a man 
I’d put my arm around 
to ease the moment his eyes closed 
the last time and help him think 
of God and peaceful scenes, 
it’s James McAlpine, 
struggling with the jar lid 
between the cupboard and coffin. 
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Bobby Shaftoe 
 
Is it the triviality of silver buckles 
as the detail that desire focuses on, 
or her confidence that he will fulfil 
his promise of marriage, 
or the belief they share 
in the certainty of his return 
that lends the plangent tone 
an intensity I can’t forget? 
 
The boy’s vanity? 
Her gullibility? 
Or a more pervasive innocence 
and the way it always gets used? 
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Attack 
 
Today, for the first time in my life 
I watched a life being extinguished. 
 
Four thrushes dive-bombed the magpie. 
 
I’ve squashed ants and fruit flies 
but I’ve never watched them die. 
I’ve used those spray cans of fly killer. 
Theirs were casual deaths. 
 
The swooping thrushes almost hit the window. 
They made a noise like a ratchet running. 
Air strikes are not precision events. 
 
There were the familiar fruit trees, 
garden furniture, neat lawn. 
On the kitchen table, the front page 
reported blue on blue in Kandahar. 
 
The juvenile thrush lay on its breast 
on the neat lawn. 
Each time it raised its head 
it strained its beak wide three times, 
soundlessly. Its head dropped, 
then lifted; 
again, beak open three times, 
as if gasping, 
and its head dropped. 
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Footnote 
 
Friendly fire’s a failed euphemism, 
too easily converted to irony. 
Blue on blue, being code 
and essentially meaningless, 
serves the purpose better. 
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Foreign Aid 
 
… and in these pictures we see local troops 
who will fight beside our own 
against the common enemy, ours 
and theirs. 
 
You will notice their uniforms are new, 
supplied by us. The design is simple, 
the material cheap, but you should have seen 
what they wore before. 
 
They carry their own equipment, 
mainly weapons of somewhat antiquated make 
but in good working order. I’d like to 
stress that. 
 
For several weeks these soldiers were trained by us 
in special camps. We’ve given them the basic skills; 
nothing hi-tech, you understand, just enough to make 
a fighting force. 
 
Being native, these men have knowledge, vital to us, 
of the local terrain and conditions. 
I should add, they sustain casualties at a somewhat 
higher rate. 
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Answering William Carlos Williams 
 
So little depends 
upon 
 
that wheelbarrow 
those chickens 
 
so much 
upon 
 
where you live 
where you were born 
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Speechless 
 
There are different kinds of wordlessness: 
the click and tap of knife and fork, 
the clack of cutlery laid on the plate 
punctuating the silence; 
 
or wordlessness that is clamped 
tight in a vice to be worked over, 
and over; or when words get locked 
in a chest and buried deep in the sand. 
 
There are different kinds of last meal, too, 
as there are partings that follow them. 
 
Distracted at the airport the next day, 
that late dinner weighed heavily. 
The muscles round my lips tensed 
with the stress of retention. 
 
And then I was off across the shining tiles 
like someone walking on ice, 
confident I’d let nothing slip. 
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At The Airport 
 
I was flying to Heathrow that day 
and followed him through the security check. 
I’d noticed him earlier – observed him, 
I should say, in my habitual way – 
in the check-in hall. 
 
His girlfriend or wife had come to see him off 
and I’d watched as they waited together, 
seen how his attention was always 
elsewhere, on information display screens, 
or passengers milling through the hall, 
or focused on something he had in his mind, 
while she touched his arm, brushed 
a speck from his shirt and spoke softly. 
 
Through security, I saw her behind the glass partition, 
saw him step over and put his lips to glass 
like a mirror, his reflection hiding her face 
so he seemed to kiss himself. 
 
He turned away, glancing along the partition 
and for an instant I think our eyes may have met. 
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Her Son 
 
A whole afternoon at the retirement home, 
followed by the congested drive back 
in the heat of the declining sun, 
the side-on glare knifing my eye. 
 
Home at last, to sit on the parched grass, 
glass of wine on the garden table at my elbow, 
while overhead the jets are queuing up 
for their landing slot at Heathrow 
 
like the wasps that arrive in a constant stream each evening 
to disappear under the roof of the tool shed 
where they must have built a nest, reminding me 
I should poison them. 
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Monologue 
 
I live on a quiet street. Small children 
play in sunlit front gardens. 
The pavements are so clean 
they look like they’ve been washed. 
 
The rooms in my home are airy. 
There are parquet floors because 
they are dust-free, bright mats, 
and plants in the living room 
 
which do well because of the light. 
I have to consider concealment. 
In the kitchen basil and thyme 
grow in pots on the window sill. 
 
The walls are painted pale cream throughout. 
I have said some dreadful things. 
The cupboards are overflowing with shoes, 
few of them mine. Most are unworn. 
 
I can always find a clean shirt. 
I visit my billiards club often; 
a game that requires space 
and suitable attire. 
 
The kitchen is fitted with new marble worktops. 
I like to watch birds in my garden 
while drinking my morning tea. 
Or take it outside in summer. 
 
I have always been squeamish 
and cannot watch someone chewing 
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with an open mouth, gathering 
the bolus on a purplish tongue. 
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Seed 
 
I’m standing in shadow, invisible, 
I think, with the sunglare behind me. 
 
My neighbour across the street is out 
in his Italia football shirt, shorts, 
 
fluorescent green clogs, cleaning his car. 
He’s over seventy but stout, 
 
considering his heart condition. He felled 
and cut up the overgrown elm in our garden 
 
and has promised to extract the stump – 
like a rotten tooth – when the weather’s right. 
 
The land rises on his side. The windows 
of his living room look directly 
 
into the room occupied by the daughter 
of the previous owners of our place. 
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The Bog Fire 
 
The peat’s surface showed no sign 
but deep in its heart 
the peat bog smouldered, 
intense heat creeping ever deeper 
and spreading wider. 
 
Winter snow and the spring melt 
couldn’t deaden the bog fire. 
Rain and storms came and went. 
The bog fire outlasted 
the seasons and the years. 
 
There came a day one autumn 
when the air looked hazy, 
odour of charred wood on the wind 
that stung my eyes 
until they watered. 
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Cold Isn’t It 
 
The lamp emits a constant stream 
of light light light 
Each word breaks like an egg 
as it hits the wall, 
spilling its contents 
in an unbroken stain. 
 
Outside, the landscape lies buried, 
as if snowflakes were letters 
and every letter that ever was 
had fallen from the sky, 
sticking together on branches, 
on twigs, in drifts, on roofs, 
with a tenacity, 
as if they knew what they did 
and meant something by it. 
 
And what they mean must lie 
contained within the lumps 
and bumps that mark 
the presence of the thing itself. 
 
Bursting out of the sauna, 
slippery with sweat, 
I plunge my arms into the snow, 
scoop handfuls to rub 
over shoulders and chest. 
I don’t have a word for how this feels; 
cold isn’t it. 
 
Back in the hot room, 
when steam hits my skin, 
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it says sunburn. 
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The Winter Gardens In Summer 
 
Snow now is no more than a memory, 
like an image of perfection. 
A name is not enough to halt the seasons 
but the nights are almost as light as day 
and offer a refuge from our fears. 
An owl glides between the trees 
in silent search of dusk and prey. 
A hundred years of pain are on the palace walls 
but near the ornamental waters 
the statue of a nymph stands inviolate, 
surrounded by tall elms. 
The moon is nearly full, and faint 
among the shattered clouds. 
It’s June but the lovers are nowhere in sight. 
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Broken Villanelle 
 
Farewell, my one and only villanelle, 
your words mean more to me than I can say. 
Though our paths must part, yet I love you well. 
 
Your first draft lacked some facts I didn’t tell. 
Once you knew all you could go your own way. 
Farewell, my one and only villanelle; 
 
you understand the reasons that compel 
me now to stand and watch you drift away. 
Though our paths must part, yet I love you well. 
 
And since this final version’s where I spell 
out truths I used to shy from in dismay 
it means farewell, my only villanelle. 
 
I won’t moralise about the past or dwell 
on hopes and wishes or regrets this day, 
for our paths must part, though I love you well 
 
and trust that other readers’ breath will swell 
your words and let your lilting rhythms play. 
Farewell. 
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Courtly Love 
 
Like a shot, I’d accept that vassalage 
that in days gone by could firmly knit 
lover to mistress, perform sweet homage 
on bended knee. To please, I’d submit 
and be meek. No prob. I’d gladly do the chores, 
follow your orders to the letter and show 
the world – including me mates – that yours 
is the word I must obey; bestow 
it like a gift. I’d study ways of moving 
you to look with firm yet kindly aspect 
on the pain I’d suffer in my loving, 
and not give a toss about self-respect. 
 
We moderns think such bargains cannot be, 
but desire would make a willing slave of me. 
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Not Reading In My Garden 
 
The last drips of last night’s rain 
drop from the end of the drainpipe 
into the water butt. They’ve been doing 
this for hours. I know because I’ve watched. 
 
Ripples catch the light each time 
a new drip falls. The barrel is brimful 
and the concrete half-pipe that conducts 
the overflow sparkles where it meets 
the grass. The sun is gaining heat 
but in the shade the wet ground 
chills the air that moves across my skin. 
 
I laid my book on the garden table 
while I considered possible reasons 
for that continued dripping 
so long after the rain had stopped 
but I’ve decided to simply accept it 
and go back to my reading. 
 
The trunk of the silver birch is reflecting 
the sunlight, its leaves shine yellow-green. 
Is it the bark and leaves I’m seeing, 
or sunshine, or some third thing 
that has no name? 
 
We recently put grass seeds over a bare 
patch where we dug up a shrub. 
Many have sprouted, fine as fishing line. 
Some shoots are so delicate I only see them 
with my face close to the earth. 
Last night’s rain has done them good. 
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The smell of moist peat has merged 
with dung. Fecundity smells like this. 
 
Water is beautiful. Water in 
sunlight. The barrel below the eaves 
stands in the sun. I could give 
that new grass some more water, 
keep that nurturing dirt wet. 
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On A Country Road In Finland 
 
It was after turning at the Mihari junction 
and heading for the main road from Hämeenkyrö 
to Ylöjärvi that the most unlikely 
police car in southern Finland pulled us up. 
 
The beat-up Volvo I was driving 
had all its lights burning and doors shut, 
thanks to Jukka’s firm hand on the off-side rear. 
Still, we looked suspect, apparently. 
 
One officer approached my open window. 
His mate stood at a distance, arms akimbo. 
I had a driving licence and showed it; 
I knew the registration number and told it. 
 
He relaxed a bit and directed his torch over 
my shoulder. A bale of hay sat in the hollow 
where the back seat had once been, 
Jukka beside it on an upturned beer crate. 
 
Jukka didn’t make eye contact. Good 
body language. The beam flicked through 
the scented air. We waited in silence. ‘Okay,’ 
said the one with the light, ‘saat mennä.’ 
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Strange Food 
 
Twenty years I’ve watched the swans 
migrate in pairs each winter, 
consumed the primitive plants 
this land produces 
and its coloured fish 
without gaining weight, 
without losing appetite. 
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Having Nothing To Do With Figs 
 
When he wears his famous figgy coat 
he becomes a magician 
who sees what happens 
in places he’s left: 
 
the hand that plumps cushions 
on the sofa; innocent chairs 
moved into a new arrangement; 
curtains stirred by the breeze 
from a closing door. 
 
In his famous figgy coat, 
embroidered with bunny 
and tied round the middle, 
he’s the backwards boy. 
He can catch himself unawares 
from behind, can see himself 
as others see him. 
 
It makes him shriek and almost collapse 
with the hilarity of it all. 
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Falstaff’s Gut 
Banish plump Jack, and banish all the world. 
 
This man consumes the world, 
digests it and transforms it 
into flesh and blood and senses. 
He heaves his belly into position, 
braces his legs, locks his knees. 
This gut, trussed up in kersey 
and strong stitching, needs no simile 
to assert its undeniable existence. 
 
The dimpled, pock-marked skin’s 
the colour of cheddar, and clammy; 
drops of sweat trickle from folds in fat, 
darken clothing where the fit is tightest. 
 
A gut that sags earthwards, dragged 
down by its own weight, 
like clay that longs to return to its source. 
 
It’s like the globe 
suspended on strands of plasticine. 
It’s like the ocean 
scooped up into a rubber balloon. 
It’s like nothing you’ve ever seen. 
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Symphony 
 
And every time the musician 
struck C minor, that chord 
desperately tried to understand 
the meaning of the music 
made by all the other notes. 
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Notes 
 
Arrival In Finland, page 16: As a result of economic instability in the Grand 
Duchy of Finland caused by Russian troop movements during the Crimean 
War, the Czar granted Finland the right to produce its own currency in 1860. 
 
Talking To Edith Södergran, page 30: Words in italics are adapted from 
poems by Edith Södergran, translated by David McDuff. 
 
On A Country Road In Finland, page 70: ‘saat mennä’ is Finnish for ‘you can 
go’. 
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Chapter One 
 
Commentary on Without An Aim1 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
I am interested in how we perceive the world around us, in the relationship 
between that external world and our consciousness, and in how we might 
represent that perception and relationship in language. These concerns are 
present in my writing but perhaps not in an explicit or philosophical form. As 
Marjorie Perloff said of Roy Fisher, I am not a poet of ideas.2  And yet there 
is an evident interest in ideas of a philosophical nature in both my poetry and 
the subject of this doctoral project. The distinction that I want to make resides 
in the approach to the writing. Celia Hunt and Fiona Sampson describe what I 
have in mind: ‘having too many conscious intentions at the outset […] is 
likely to inhibit the spontaneous life of the text’.3 However, the authors also 
recognise that it is ‘unlikely that we can write creatively without having any 
intentions at all’ and that in the case of material that emerges spontaneously, 
‘intentions will emerge with it’ as the material is worked up (p. 51). I believe 
that this submerged intention can carry ideas which are the result of my 
reading of other poets and theorists and my speculations on those ideas, but 
without the conscious formulation that a writer of philosophy would bring to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In the commentary and critical section  that follow all quoted italics are in the original text unless otherwise stated. 
2 Marjorie Perloff, ‘Cutting-Edge Poetics: Roy Fisher’s ‘Language Book’’ in The Thing About Roy Fisher: Critical 
Studies ed. by John Kerrigan and Peter Robinson (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000), pp. 149-72 (p. 153). 
3 Celia Hunt and Fiona Sampson, Writing: Self and Reflexivity (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 51. 
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the text. This understanding of the writing process goes hand-in-hand with 
Hunt’s and Sampson’s comments on creativity: ‘the creative process cannot 
be forced to happen. The poem will not come into being through the use of 
reason and intention alone’ (p. 60). This describes my working method in 
producing the poems in this collection. I have not aimed to write poems that 
present ideas regarding perception and representation. I have tried to be 
receptive to the images my mind produces and to identify how the emerging 
text might reflect the interest I have in the issue of perception, representation 
and language. As a result of this working method these concerns form what I 
might call the environment of the poems. When my mind focuses on these 
issues it produces the image, or sense, of a gap between consciousness and 
external reality. I suspect that that sense is rather clichéd but I don’t let that in 
itself make me anxious because I do not write explicitly about any such 
notion of separateness. Instead I try to inhabit that space, and to create poems 
that inhabit that space, so they are not about the relationship between 
consciousness, experience and external reality; rather, they exist within that 
relationship, and by their existence they reflect something of how I feel that 
relationship to be. I could describe the terrain the poems inhabit as a kind of 
‘no-man’s-land’, though that is not an image I use in any of the poems. 
However, there are images suggesting the borders associated with the idea of 
no man´s land. ‘Liminal’ is a simple example of a poem that occupies a 
border of sorts as the narrator tries to find the point between floating and rest 
as the waves wash over him. This border-country idea applies not only to 
perceptions of physical elements in the real world but also to perceptions of 
time.  One of the effects this environment produces in the poems is a sense of 
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the relativity of experience; much can depend on which side of the border one 
is observing from. 
 There is a further sense in which I feel environment, in the sense of 
both landscape and cultural location, to be an important element in these 
poems. I was born and grew up in England. I lived in England for the first 
twenty-five years of my life. For the last twenty-seven years I have lived in 
Finland. These two rather different locations both inform my writing. A few 
of my poems mention Finland, or Finnish towns and regions, by name, but 
not many. More often the landscape of a poem is recognisably Finnish, at 
least to me. But England, too, and English landscapes form another important 
layer in my consciousness, one that is associated with memory and the past. I 
am usually conscious of which location is informing the landscape of each 
poem. In a few cases, ‘Out There’, for example, both landscapes appear. It is 
perhaps this sense in which my own life experiences are largely divided 
between these two geographical locations that reinforces my sense of borders 
and divisions. Furthermore, these geographical circumstances influence the 
poems that have been produced from the idea of them. 
I start from the belief that the notions existing in my consciousness, 
that are derived from the external world via my sense perceptions, are 
themselves representations. In the critical section of the dissertation that 
follows, I refer to Antony Easthope’s comment that ‘the real exists only at 
one with itself, outside representation’.4 Easthope refers here to the inevitable 
constructedness of representations of the real world in poetry.  He sees this as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Antony	  Easthope,	  ‘Donald Davie and the Failure of Englishness’ in Contemporary British Poetry: Essays in 
Theory and Criticism ed. by James Acheson and Romana Huk (New York: State University of New York Press, 
1996), pp. 17-33 (p. 22). 
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a problem. My approach is to recognise that the form that my knowledge of 
the real world takes is already a representation. I have access only to the 
images in my mind (representations); I do not have access directly to the 
things themselves. 
 
1.2 A closer look at imagination 
 
Imagination is an important concept in this understanding of the process of 
perception and representation. ‘Imagination’ is a word whose meaning has 
changed over time and it is appropriate that we briefly survey those uses of 
the word. Paul Dawson refers to the seventeenth-century understanding of the 
imagination as ‘the mental ability to reproduce images previously 
apprehended by the senses’.5 It also referred to the mind’s ability to produce 
images that were outside nature and reality; imagination could cause 
‘delusion by tricking the senses’ (Dawson, p. 23). Dawson points out that 
Thomas Hobbes explained such images as being composed of different 
elements from nature combined in an unnatural way. This view of the 
imagination represents it as a. reproductive; b. inferior to perception, since the 
remembered image is weaker than direct perception; and c. opposed to reason 
on account of its inclination to produces images that do not exist in reality. 
For this last reason, it was believed during the seventeenth century that the 
poetic use of imagination needed to be under the control of reason (pp. 23-
24). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Paul Dawson, Creative Writing and the New Humanities (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), p. 23. Future references to 
this volume are in parenthesis. 
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 Plato and Aristotle saw art as imitation of nature. In the Renaissance 
that view changed to the notion of creating a world in the mind (p.25). This 
was called invention rather than creation and it was distinct from imagination 
(p.26). When the term ‘creativity’ came to be used it was understood as ‘an 
internalization of divinity’ (p.26). The notion of creativity led to ‘speculations 
about original genius, as opposed to imitative talent’ (p.27): ‘Creative power 
was the capacity of a poet’s imagination to mimic the divine act of Creation 
[...] Hence, to be creative meant to be original’ (pp. 28-29). Thus imagination 
‘becomes liberated from its passive sensory function and is given a 
productive rather than merely reproductive function’ (p. 29). To the 
Romantics, this creative imagination ‘provided access to a higher truth’ (p. 
29). Samuel Taylor Coleridge developed this view of the imagination, not as 
a passive recipient of images of external objects, but as being active in the 
process of perception. Originality is the creation of something new as 
opposed to the scientific discovery of something which was always there (pp. 
30-32). 
Dawson thus identifies a development ‘from the faculty of 
imagination to that of creativity’ (p.22). However, he also points out that 
earlier senses of the word have survived into modern usage: ‘I must have 
imagined it’ can indicate that my senses were deceived; imagining can be 
misperceiving. Creativity, on the other hand, is not associated with the senses, 
sensory data or the possibility of the mind being tricked (p. 22). Furthermore, 
Romantic aspects of the concept have also survived, so that being imaginative 
can today signify something very close to Coleridge’s idea of possessing 
original creativity and thus being active in the process of perception. 
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Therefore the perceptions that we experience via our senses are mediated by 
imagination, and the term ‘imagination’ describes the examination of the 
contents of consciousness, those ‘images in my mind’ referred to above. This 
is one explanation of why we do not have direct access to the external world 
via our senses and also a way of understanding how our perceptions become 
representations of reality. Interpretation involves this process. Consciousness, 
as I use the word, refers to our knowledge of the representation of the external 
world that is the result of sense data and the workings of imagination. It 
follows from this that poetry is the representation of the contents of 
consciousness. Roy Fisher’s City is not a real city, it is ‘a city of the mind’.6  
The use of imagination is a feature which I comment on in my examination of 
the work of Elizabeth Bishop and Fisher in the critical part of this study. 
An example of how this idea of the space between consciousness and 
external objects can be dramatised appears in ‘Introit’ from Fisher’s A 
Furnace, in the passage where he portrays the narrator describing the 
different views to the left and right and the effects created by the differing 
angle of the light, but also represents the narrator as being active in the 
creation of that difference in perception: ‘and as if I was made | to be the 
knifeblade, the light-divider’7. At this point, the consciousness of the observer 
can itself be defined as the border between the two differing perceptions. This 
describes the phenomenon I have tried to explain in my definition of 
‘imagination’. It also describes part of the effect that I aim for in my own 
poetry. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Roy Fisher, Interviews Through Time and Selected Prose (Kentisbeare: Shearsman Books, 2000), p. 56. 
7 Roy Fisher, The Long and the Short of It (Tarset: Bloodaxe Books, 2005), pp. 51-54, (p. 51).
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Memory also relies on imagination to reconstruct the experience of 
past sense impressions. The first drafts of most of the poems in the collection 
that forms the creative part of this doctorate were written at a desk, without 
the objects represented in the poem before my eye. This means, naturally, that 
imagination plays a vital part in representation and I think of this 
phenomenon as being connected with the idea of the gap between 
consciousness and external reality. It may even be appropriate to say that 
imagination is what creates the gap. It divorces us from a direct relationship 
with the real world, but it gives us freedom to operate in a space that is 
effectively of, and for, our own making. Anne Stevenson alludes to this 
aspect of perception when she remarks about Elizabeth Bishop’s poem, 
‘Sandpiper’, that it ‘was doubtless begun after Bishop had observed an actual 
sandpiper running in and out of the surf’ but that the poem later moves ‘in a 
personal direction’ until, by the end, ‘the sandpiper is lost sight of’.8 So 
although the poem began, probably, with direct observation, it has developed 
via the imagination operating in that space between real world and 
consciousness. 
The evidence suggests that the same is true of Fisher’s ‘Introit’. He 
has given unusually precise information for the location and time of the 
poem: 12 November 1958 is the subtitle, the sun is ‘lifting towards low 
noon’, his bus is travelling to ‘the Fighting Cocks | by way of Ettingshall’. 
Yet Fisher did not write the words of the poem whilst sitting on a bus that 
day with the real objects under his direct observation. The Long and the Short 
of It gives the years of composition as 1984-85. Fisher is recalling a scene 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Anne Stevenson, Five Looks at Elizabeth Bishop (Tarset: Bloodaxe Books, 2006), p. 92-3. 
	   83 
from more than twenty-five years previously. The use and the power of the 
imagination, and its importance in trying to identify the nature of our 
perceptions is a lesson I have learned from these poets.  
Fisher states his view of this aspect of perception directly at the end 
of the prose section following ‘The Wind at Night’ from City:  
 
The light keeps on separating the world like a table knife: it sweeps 
across what I see and suggests what I do not. The imaginary comes to 
me with as much force as the real, the remembered with as much force 
as the immediate. 
    (Long and Short, p. 43) 
 
Here, in a nutshell, are three issues of major importance to my discussion of 
perception, experience and representation. The first, that ‘what I see’ can 
‘suggest[ ] what I do not’, describes the impact of imagination in a manner 
that I can fully endorse. It is an element in several of Bishop’s poems that I 
draw attention to in the critical part of this dissertation. It is a feature that I 
have adopted in my own writing: ‘Three Clementines’ is a good example. The 
environment of the poem is created by the details that the imagination focuses 
on in the process of writing. This involves choice; what is left out, and what is 
included, depends on the needs of the subject of the poem. ‘Three 
Clementines’ began by looking at three clementines on my dining table and 
noticing that the way I perceived their colour had been changed by the 
contrast between it and the colour of the table. This is the observation with 
which the poem opens and it is one which identifies the relativity of 
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perception. The colour of the clementines had not changed, only the way that 
I saw it. I then began to explore how my imagination responded to that 
observation, what thoughts were linked to it. In other words, what 
associations were suggested by the way I was experiencing these sense 
impressions. I was not concerned any longer with the clementines on the table 
but with the clementines in my mind and they led me first to the different 
lighting conditions that could change my experience of the colour and 
eventually to the point where I was doing some research into the production 
methods of commercial fruit farming. 
The other two premises: that the imaginary has the force of the real, 
and the remembered the force of the immediate, are more problematic. The 
problem, as I see it, is the according of equal status. Partly, the problematic 
issue comes down to definition: what exactly does Fisher mean by ‘with as 
much force’? His passage does not directly state that he, or the narrator of the 
passage, is not able to distinguish real events from imaginary ones, but on one 
reading, that is surely implied. If an imagined event truly had the force of a 
real one, then what element could there be that would enable the subject to 
make the distinction? And if such an element was present, if the subject could 
point to it and say: it is this which enables me to identify that the experience is 
imaginary, not real, then does not that also mean that the imagined 
experience did not have the force of the real, precisely on account of that 
distinguishing element? 
If, on the other hand, ‘with as much force’ means that the real and the 
imagined are not distinguishable, that raises issues of the status we accord to 
imagined experience. It is also related to the fact of our limited sensory 
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perceptions and thus introduces the risk of delusion; precisely the concern 
that was felt in the seventeenth century about the operation of imagination. 
Both Fisher and Bishop enter into this area of experience. It is an issue which 
I have confronted, too, but in a much more modest manner. 
In the critical part of this dissertation I refer to Donald Davie’s 
placing Fisher with Philip Larkin in a tradition defined by Thomas Hardy. 
Fisher has several very different antecedents, but amongst English writers, I 
would point to William Blake as representing a tradition that seems 
hospitable to Fisher, partly on account of his openness to the possibility of an 
element in human experience that cannot be described solely by appeal to 
sensory data; his ‘polytheism without gods’ (Fisher, 2005, p.43). Blake is 
also known for being hostile to working from nature.9 That is generally 
applied to his approach to painting, but the comment could refer to his 
poetry, too. Like Bishop and Fisher, he does not have the object in the real 
world before his physical eye when he represents it. 
The issue of indeterminacy is another which I feel to be important in 
my work and one by which I can identify the influence of the poets discussed 
in the critical section. By avoiding categorical assertions, indeterminacy 
allows the poet the freedom to operate in that space between consciousness 
and the external world. 
 The title of this dissertation, and of the poetry collection which forms 
its creative part, points to several elements that are raised in the critical part. 
Firstly, there is the issue of the directedness of perception: ‘without an aim’ 
draws attention to this by ironically suggesting the absence of such a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See Peter Ackroyd, Blake (London: Random House, Vintage edition, 1999), p.59. 
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direction. The strength and vitality of the relationship we have with objects in 
the external world determines the quality of directedness in our perception of 
those objects, as Elizabeth Bishop’s poem, ‘Crusoe in England’, 
demonstrates (see below p. 155). Crusoe’s knife meant much more to him 
when he was on the island: ‘it reeked of meaning’.10 It is my contention that 
that meaning is inseparable from the directedness of Crusoe’s perception of 
the object and that both vitalise the use of the name for the thing. In England, 
Crusoe remarks, ‘My eyes rest on it and pass on’; I could add, ‘without an 
aim’. 
 The pronunciation of those title words is virtually indistinguishable 
from the phrase, ‘without a name’. The role of language and naming in the 
construction of our understanding of the external world is another issue 
raised in the critical part of this dissertation. The title is itself an example of 
indeterminacy within language use similar to that which J. H. Prynne draws 
attention to when he gives the poem, ‘Die A Millionaire’, the subtitle, 
‘(pronounced “diamonds in the air”)’.11 Naming – language – is thus the 
vehicle by which we both understand and misunderstand the world. The point 
is made in another poem, ‘Cold Isn’t It’, that language mediates experience 
and that the external world contains elements for which we may not have a 
name. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Elizabeth Bishop, Complete Poems (London: Chatto & Windus, 1991), p. 166. 
11 J. H. Prynne, Poems (Tarset: Bloodaxe Books, 2005), p. 13. 
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1.3 The poems in Without An Aim 
 
In this section I will comment on some aspects of the form, style and themes 
of the poems in Without An Aim and refer to specific poems to illustrate the 
points I am making. 
 
1.3.1 Dramatic monologue 
 
I use dramatic monologue for several of the poems as this form is suited to 
revealing gaps, inconsistencies and indeterminacy in the narrator’s 
personality or attitude. As such, it is a form which is consistent with the 
notion of border-country that I referred to earlier. The opening poem, 
‘Lapidary’, illustrates the manner in which dramatic monologue can be 
employed to achieve these effects. The nature of the narrator’s activity is 
unclear; he does not reveal enough to indicate whether he is a police officer, 
private investigator or a stalker, yet the phrases he uses reflect on a possible 
identity - ‘curtains | mostly drawn’ - hints at voyeurism. The environment 
and oppressive atmosphere are also associated with the narrator since they 
are revealed in his words; the light that ‘dazzles others’ and the shade that is 
like stone both serve to conceal his actions and provide him with the 
possibility of evading observation. In the same way, the poem fails to reveal 
his motives or goals. This indeterminacy is underlined in the penultimate line 
where the conditional structure: ‘If I’d scratched my own motto | there it 
would read’ embodies both the narrator’s and the poem’s failure to 
communicate. 
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1.3.2 Relativity and misperception 
 
Our experience of the passage of time is also relative, dependent on such 
elements as context, attitude and knowledge, by which I mean an awareness 
of the significance of events. The multifarious nature of this experience is 
reflected in several poems. ‘Canoe Trip’ contrasts the experience of 
navigating a canoe through rapids with the growth of a sapling. While 
shooting the rapids, the narrator’s attention is focused on events that have a 
span of a second or two. During that brief moment these events fill the 
consciousness to the exclusion of every other item in the external world. As 
soon as they are over, they cease to exist. By contrast, the act of propping up 
a toppling pine sapling is visible two years later in the kink formed as the 
plant adjusts and readjusts to the angle at which it is growing. ‘Antiquities’ 
pursues the same theme of the relativity of time, and specifically how our 
perspective on time might be one-sided and misleading, while ‘Night And 
Day’ considers the border created by the existence of those two aspects of the 
diurnal cycle. 
The fact of relativity brings with it the possibility of misperception. 
This is an obvious element in experience and probably not of very great 
significance in itself, though the consequences may be. More interesting 
though, might be the fact of reassessment, of revising the sense or meaning of 
an experience in the light of later knowledge. In some sense, this is the human 
equivalent of the sapling changing the direction of its growth. A simple 
example appears in ‘At The Photograph Exhibition’ where the narrator thinks, 
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at first glance, that a photograph shows a close-up image of a piece of stone 
but then realises it is actually a long-shot of a cliff-face.  
The passage of time and the possibility of misperception and 
subsequent reappraisal is an issue that I wanted to explore in ‘How To Grow 
A Crystal’. The particles that will form the crystal are invisible to the naked 
eye. The sub-unit that they form is similarly imperceptible. The formation of 
the crystal in its early stages is the equivalent of a situation of which the 
narrator is unaware; it is ‘submersed in its environment’. When the process 
speeds up, the appearance of the crystal equates to the moment of insight 
when the true significance of a past event becomes apparent. The play on the 
words ‘solution’ and ‘fallout’ underline this aspect of the poem and draw 
attention to the fact that the new insight may have a radical impact on 
understanding. The final line hints that this process may be ‘hard’ and uses 
the play on the word ‘rock’. ‘Rock’ is slang for a diamond as well as having 
the literal sense of stone, and thus, firstly, allows the introduction of the word 
‘hard’ into the poem and secondly, introduces the theme of perception and 
external world conveyed in the image of stone, which I explain more fully 
below. 
The passage of time is an underlying theme in the collection, mainly 
at a personal level, on the time scale of an individual life. This is why I was 
keen to include poems that have childhood settings or associations. However, 
the larger operations of history and geological time also play a part. In 
‘Origins’ I wanted to combine those two temporal perspectives and also to 
introduce the role of language in how we experience our sense perceptions. 
The narrator’s earliest experience of a holiday has imbued the word itself 
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with the features of the place where he experienced it. Thus ‘waves rib the 
tidal sands | beneath Prague and Gstaad.’ 
 
1.3.3 The human and non-human worlds 
 
There is a potential danger that writing which focuses on the role of the 
individual consciousness in perception and representation of reality may 
come to seem self-regarding. The human subject may become too much the 
centre of attention. I reasoned that one way to avoid this was to ensure that 
the role of the external world as the source of the sensory data by which that 
world is represented in consciousness was emphasised in the poetry. One 
strategy that I employed to achieve this was to locate the human body in a 
physical environment that is acting on it, as in ‘Liminal’. In ‘The New 
Sisyphus’ this strategy takes the form of the physical world, in the shape of a 
pebble, itself the product of geological change, metaphorically becoming 
lodged in the body. That image is repeated in the next poem, ‘This Neck Of 
The Woods’, where the narrator describes ‘a tender spot’ on his jaw that is 
‘like a pebble’. The features of the wood are described in terms of the body: 
neck, thigh and gut, thus indicating the two-way nature of the relationship. 
Over several poems I aimed to build up this feeling of a continuity and 
interaction between the external world and consciousness via the body. For 
example, in the title poem, ‘Without An Aim’, the stream’s current is 
compared to ‘the flow of my own blood | through my own veins’. This theme 
is also important in the poem, ‘Falstaff´s Gut’, where the emphasis is on the 
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role of both the body’s physical equipment for perception and the imagination 
in creating the representation of reality in the consciousness. 
I will comment further on the relationship between the human and 
natural worlds later, but this is a good point to mention an image that runs 
through the whole collection and its function: stone, in some shape or other, 
appears in many of the poems. I use it partly as a linking device that enables 
dialogue between the poems. But more importantly, it is an image that 
represents, almost as an emblem or totem, the external, material world or, in 
the form of a kind of go-between, the relationship between the human subject 
and the world. Stone is ideally suited for that purpose because it is an image 
of the concrete, solid and heavy. I use it for various purposes in different 
poems, which I shall comment on specifically later. 
 
1.3.4 To leave, or to stay at home? 
 
The only historical event to play a part in the poems occurs in ‘Arrival In 
Finland’ where the economic consequences of troop movements during the 
Crimean War are seen to lead directly to the creation of Finland’s own 
currency. At the personal level, though, the link between childhood and adult 
experience is much more apparent. As in Muldoon’s collection, Why 
Brownlee Left, there are several poems set in childhood: ‘Departure’, 
‘Origins’ and ‘Boats’, for example. The first of the childhood poems, 
‘Departure’, introduces the theme of leaving home, travel, and a sense of 
homesickness and loss. The poem establishes a link between the broadening 
of knowledge about the world and travel, and therefore the need to leave 
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home.  Not leaving, being left behind ‘standing on the quay’, may possibly 
result in regret and a sensation of failure or missed opportunities, but 
departing can also lead to regret, loneliness and the loss of the warmth and 
security of home. The situation is ambiguous. The narrator is pulled in two 
contradictory directions and the poem inhabits the space between those 
conflicting impulses. In its own way, the poem explores a theme similar to 
Elizabeth Bishop’s ‘The Imaginary Iceberg’ (see p. 136 below) and to Paul 
Muldoon’s treatment of leaving home in Why Brownlee Left (see p. 211 and 
section 5.5 below). 
‘Origins’ extends the theme by, firstly, introducing a time perspective 
that encompasses prehistory in its references to Dorset’s Jurassic coast, 
thereby incorporating the idea that the urge to leave, to broaden experience 
and knowledge and discover a new place of belonging is linked to mankind’s 
evolutionary development. Secondly, the development of language is linked 
to the desire for experience, a different place in which to receive it, and a new 
language in which to express it. The desire to explore acquires this 
evolutionary aspect in the association of the goal of exploration, the distant 
headland, with a prehistoric beast, and the development of the language in 
which to express these experiences is also seen in this evolutionary context 
since the word ‘holiday’ has a Jurassic level. In its last line, ‘Origins’ hints at 
the contrary emotion of fear at being ‘carr[ied] too far out’. As with 
‘Departure’, the poem confronts the contradictory nature of the impulse to 
discover new locations but also to remain in the security of the known and 
familiar. The title, ‘Origins’ also introduces the notion of the place we start 
from, a location which is our natural home and which can confer authenticity. 
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‘Dedication’ combines some of the themes that I have mentioned so 
far. The protagonist’s relationship with the external world is portrayed in his 
search for the pebble. That search is linked to the sense of loss and the 
passage of time. This poem also highlights the themes of presence and 
absence, which, of course, are closely connected with the notion of loss. The 
fact that it is the pebble that is lost, and the sense in which stone represents 
the external, material world, suggests that the narrator´s relationship with the 
world of material objects is damaged or compromised in some way. By 
implication, the loss entails that location where the original home is and the 
possibility of an authentic relationship with the external world. 
 
1.3.5 Being at home in the world 
 
The notion of a past time, and a past existence, which was possibly ideal, or 
at least authentic, and which has been lost, leaving the protagonist with a 
diminished existence in the present, is a familiar theme from Why Brownlee 
Left. There is something of this quality in the protagonists in ‘Dedication’ and 
‘Without An Aim’. The atmosphere in the opening lines of the latter poem 
indicates that some kind of disaster has taken place, though there is no 
explanation as to what that might have been. The idea of this disaster is 
conveyed by the image of disruption in the natural environment: the sudden 
and unexplained diversion of the course of the stream. The result of this is to 
leave the narrator with no sense of direction or purpose. The key word, 
‘familiar’, appears in line 8, indicating that the conditions pertaining when the 
stream ran its former course represented the security and familiarity of home. 
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The title sounds like ‘without a name’, as if his actual identity has been 
undermined by this loss of his original home. It also hints at the role of 
language, naming, in the creation of identity and concepts of familiarity. 
By equating the state of the stream’s flow with the circulation of his 
own blood, the narrator of ‘Without An Aim’ establishes the relationship 
between himself and the natural environment. The same effect was used in 
‘Liminal’ where the crest of the incoming wave is described as a ‘pulse’ and 
the duration of its effect is measured against the narrator’s own heartbeat. The 
effect is achieved again at the end of ‘The New Sisyphus’, this time with the 
favoured image of stone in the form of a pebble. Having united the urban 
locations of work, town, shops, bus and train with the natural environment on 
a geological scale, the pebble, by being squeezed in the narrator’s hand, feels 
as if it has become part of his flesh. The image suggests the interdependence 
of the human and natural worlds, but with a disturbing element in that it is the 
result of bruising and an ache. The effect is more understated than the effect 
of Muldoon’s handling of this theme in ‘Whim’ and ‘The One Desire’ but it 
is comparable (see section 5.4 below). 
‘Comparative Studies’ pursues this comparison of human and natural 
worlds. The treatment is comic but there is a serious issue at the end of the 
poem: how do we understand our observations of the natural world? The 
notion of the researcher hoping to observe an animal ‘urging itself on’ is 
obviously an extreme and absurd example of humans imposing their own 
attitudes and preconceptions in inappropriate ways. This begs the question, 
though, of how far it is possible to be objective, if at all. Is it not inevitable 
that we must always see the world through human-coloured spectacles? The 
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final poem, ‘Symphony’, puts this issue in dramatic form in the image of the 
chord of C minor trying ‘to understand | the meaning of the music | made by 
all the other notes’. This is really to question the possibility of objectivity and 
this becomes a theme of the collection. 
The poems do not try to offer a solution to this dilemma, but several 
others explore the idea of trying to observe more clearly, or to adopt a 
radically altered mode of observation, a new point of view. ‘Out There’, for 
example, combines a naturalistic image of the narrator regarding a distant 
setting sun through a corridor of felled trees with the image of looking 
through the crack of a slightly opened door. The discrepancy between the 
actual size of the corridor between trees and the imagined crack in a doorway 
emphasises the changed mode of perception. There is a subtle allusion to 
Blake’s ‘doors of perception’ in the image. The poem indirectly asks what 
such a new perception might consist of. The word ‘ethereal’ hints at a 
mystical element which is underlined by the ‘silkweed seem[ing] more solid | 
than the shimmering quayside granite’. However, the poem and its narrator 
both know that this is due to the effect of the water, ‘the medium I see it 
through’. The narrator rejects the illusion and in the final line seems to desire 
direct contact with the external world –‘Give me stone’- but the poem does 
not comment further on that point. 
‘Sweeney’ takes the idea of seeing differently in a more literal sense 
in the character of the mythological Sweeney, whose point of view has been 
transformed into that of a bird and who sees the life and houses of the humans 
in a different light. He also sees the reality of the environment more 
accurately than the dwellers in the houses. This connects the idea of seeing 
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differently with the theme of leaving the safety and security of home behind. 
Sweeney has gained a new insight in some sense but he has had to leave his 
old way of life behind and this gives rise to a degree of uncertainty and 
trepidation: ‘I haven’t decided yet | what to do when winter arrives.’ 
The use of a mythological figure is a device that allows the 
exploration of more esoteric ideas that it might otherwise be difficult to 
handle. Another way of accomplishing this is used in ‘Talking To Edith 
Södergran’ where I have introduced an actual historical character. Södergran 
was a nature mystic and I introduce her point of view and her perception of 
the natural world in the form of words from translated versions of some of her 
poems. In the first stanza the narrator relates the sensation experienced when 
being in a high place that his own body is many times greater than it is in fact. 
He describes the sensation that he is able to step across a valley but he is 
unable to believe that such an experience can be anything other than an 
illusion which can be explained in terms of physical laws. His attitude is 
contrasted with Södergran’s certainty regarding a spiritual element in the 
relationship between consciousness and the external world. The narrator’s 
failure to be convinced by Södergran’s view of perception and experience is 
probably the clearest, most direct statement on this theme in the collection. 
However, the phrase, ‘as much as I can manage’, suggests that it could be a 
shortcoming in the narrator’s powers of perception that is the reason for his 
doubt and that Södergran’s view is valid. 
It is not only the issue of perception and experience of the external 
world that concerns me, but also how we represent those perceptions and 
experiences. This obviously raises the issue of language and the role it plays 
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in representation. I have already referred to this in passing in relation to 
‘Origins’, ‘Without An Aim’ and the ending of ‘Out There’ where the 
narrator rejects the ‘disembodied tone’ and wants a more direct contact with 
the objects in the external world. The narrator seems to be rejecting language 
at this point because it is divorced from objects. ‘Out There’ does not pursue 
that issue any further, but clearly, words can be used to place a specific 
interpretation on experience or situations. This is what happens in ‘Foreign 
Aid’ where the speaker is presenting the situation in language that carries an 
implicit attitude and judgement. The title itself crystalises the ambiguity 
created by language in this respect: does ‘foreign aid’ refer to the activities of 
the narrator’s military organisation, or the help which the local soldiers are 
providing? 
The role of language is the explicit subject of the poem, ‘Cold Isn’t 
It’, where words are portrayed as coming between the objects of the external 
world and consciousness in the way that snow covers the landscape, 
obscuring the actual features of the terrain. Those features are observable 
only in a changed form as ‘the lumps | and bumps that mark | the presence of 
the thing itself.’ Furthermore, the poem points out that there are experiences 
for which the words to represent them do not exist.  
In ‘On Doing Jig-Saw Puzzles’ I used the image of the puzzle to 
describe the way that we construct our own reality and that happens largely 
through language, of course. The jig-saw puzzle of the stone wall uses the 
image of stone to emphasise that this involves our perceptions of the external 
world and the fact that the narrator is constructing a wall, a kind of barrier, 
suggests that this prevents access to the thing itself. 
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The conflict between the urge to achieve objectivity and the subjective 
terms of perception leads inevitably to the role that imagination might play in 
trying to understand the world we inhabit. I have chosen to handle this theme 
without committing to a single point of view. Thus ‘Out There’ would appear 
to reject imagination as a useful route to knowledge but some other poems 
suggest that it might serve a beneficial purpose. In ‘Learning To Fly’ the 
virtual flight that the narrator imagines could be the beginning of a new way 
of understanding perception, though it results in failure on this occasion. The 
following poem is ‘Sweeney’, in which the protagonist has achieved a new 
point of view but under conditions that might cause the reader to be sceptical. 
The most successful case of exercising imagination occurs in ‘Having 
Nothing To Do With Figs’ where the protagonist acquires a degree of self-
knowledge via the imaginative ability to ‘see himself | as others see him’. It is 
the lack of this ability that leads the narrator of ‘Foreign Aid’ to produce his 
comment in the final line. 
The poem, ‘Falstaff´s Gut’, embodies one of the central concepts of 
the relationship between the external world and human perception of that 
world: that the physical structure of the body determines what the world is for 
us, that our concept of ourselves is determined by the place our body has 
within the external world, and that both of these are dependent on language if 
we are to be conscious of them. 
The themes that have developed in the course of writing these poems 
include: home and a place of belonging; the urge to leave home, to travel in 
search of a new place of belonging; the loss of security and sense of 
belonging; origins and authenticity; subjectivity and the role of imagination in 
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forming knowledge; the constructedness of knowledge and the role of 
language in producing it; the possibility, or otherwise, of objective 
knowledge; indeterminacy, ambiguity and misperception; the relationship 
between the human and natural worlds. These are all themes which will be 
seen to be of direct concern to the poets in the critical section of this 
dissertation. 
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Part Two: Critical Study 
 
Chapter Two 
 
Introduction 
 
2.1 The scope of this study  
 
This dissertation examines how language can be used to represent the 
experience of our perceptions of the real world. This is a double process, 
involving first identifying the perception and then expressing it in language. 
The attempt to represent our experiences involves poets in making decisions 
about how best to utilise language for this purpose and that in turn can lead 
poets to consider the conflicting demands of rhetoric and ideas of plain 
speaking in their attempts to represent the external world accurately in their 
writing. I use rhetoric here in its widest possible sense to refer to the manner 
and style of expression as opposed to its content. That rhetoric and plain 
sincerity might be understood to exist in a state of conflict derives, of course, 
from Plato who criticised the use the Sophists made of rhetoric to manipulate 
the opinions of their audience rather than to establish the truth.12 For the 
Sophists, Plato argued, persuasion was paramount, and they readily exploited 
any devices, figures, verbal ploys and linguistic flourishes that would enhance 
their persuasiveness.  This was in contradiction of the original function of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Robert Rowland Smith, On Modern Poetry: From Theory to Total Criticism (London: Continuum International 
Publishing, 2012), pp.69-70. Future references to this volume are in parenthesis. 
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rhetoric as a tool of philosophical debate designed to reveal truth. According 
to Plato, rhetoric had become debased. Today, as Robert Rowland Smith 
points out, ‘Rhetoric is understood primarily in the sense of political 
manipulation’, an understanding that carries a degree of disapprobation 
(Smith, p.70). Rhetoric, in its modern form of spin, suggests a willingness to 
dispense with the truth, at least in so far as the truth would work against 
acceptance of the politically favoured opinion. However, as Smith adds, the 
techniques used by rhetoricians come ‘from the same dressing-up box that 
poetry uses to adorn itself’, with the result that the use of literary devices in 
modern poetry is often ‘treated with suspicion’.13  At the same time, an 
equivocal attitude to the truth is a prevalent feature of the modern mindset. 
Smith comments that, ‘we believe everyone is entitled to their opinion, 
everything is relative, and that absolute truths do not exist’ (p. 70), opinions 
that Plato’s Sophists would have found quite congenial. 
 Yet many modern poets are committed to exploring methods of 
writing that ‘tell the truth about things’, as Randall Jarrell remarked of 
William Carlos Williams’s Paterson, and went on to ask, ‘how can we find a 
language so close to the world that the world can be represented and 
understood in it?’14 That expression, ‘find a language’, conveys the idea that 
the language the poet uses will not be such that is readily available and in 
common usage. The notion of needing to find the language implies that the 
form will be such that is unfamiliar to the reader. The demand that this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Smith, p. 69. Smith comments (p. xiii) that ‘modern’ poetry generally refers to post-1900, although that term does 
not then describe a homogeneous category. 
14 Randall Jarrell, ‘Paterson by William Carlos Williams’, in No Other Book: Selected Essays, ed. by Brad 
Leithauser (New York: Harper Collins Perennial edition, 2000), pp. 67-75, (p.68). 
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language is better suited to representing and understanding the world involves 
the writer in making decisions in which rhetorical devices may be felt to be at 
odds with plain sincerity. In addition, the writer must determine the nature of 
the world they represent. ‘I am trying to be truthful’, Carol Ann Duffy 
declares in ‘Valentine’.15 Smith comments that Duffy’s foregrounding of the 
need to be honest ‘could serve as a motto for identity moderne: the desire to 
convey subjective feeling in an intense fashion that nevertheless keeps poetic 
artifice on a tight leash in case it compromises the sincerity’ (xvi). 
 The references here to intense subjective feeling and the need to 
convey or express that feeling sincerely clearly suggests lyric poetry. M. H. 
Abrams comments that for the expressive lyric: 
 
The first test any poem must pass is no longer, ‘Is it true to nature?’ or 
‘Is it appropriate to the requirements either of the best judges or the 
generality of mankind?’ but a criterion looking in a different direction; 
namely ‘Is it sincere? Is it genuine?’16 
 
Abrams makes a very interesting distinction here between nature and 
authenticity, one which is not apparent in Randall Jarrell’s comment. One of 
the aspects I shall investigate is this separation of subjective experience and 
nature, or the external world. 
 Furthermore, these general concerns are widespread in modern poetry. 
For example, in a review of J. H. Prynne’s Poems, Michael Glover 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Quoted in Robert Rowland Smith, p. xvi. 
16 M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), pp.22-3. 
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commented that Prynne’s work ‘seems to strive after two things 
simultaneously: the need to define, and to pin down, the nature of the 
relationship between language and actuality and the need to let some thwarted 
inner sweetness flow’.17 Although the terms that Glover uses are slightly 
different they refer to the same division between subjective lyrical expression 
(‘inner sweetness’) and an authentic representation of the external world since 
defining the relationship between language and actuality necessarily implies 
the ability to produce a representation of that world and identify the degree of 
its authenticity. 
 My investigation will raise a series of issues: origins and authenticity; 
concerns with identity, home and a sense of belonging; the wanderer’s 
instinct to travel; choice, free will and predestination; nature and culture. The 
range of issues is so wide precisely because the implications of telling ‘the 
truth about things’ forces a consideration of what those ‘things’ mean to the 
observer. In this context, ‘things’ refers not just to inanimate objects but to all 
aspects of experience through sense perceptions, including our experience of 
other consciousnesses and behaviour. 
 These are issues that concern me both with and outside of my own 
writing. What do all those ‘things’ out there mean to me? A serious response 
to that question requires an objective stance toward subjectivity: a 
phenomenological attitude. I comment in more detail on this subject later in 
this introduction. Personally, I am somewhat sceptical as to how far that can 
be achieved, as my poem, ‘Symphony’, indicates, and as the findings of my 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Michael Glover in The Independent on Sunday, quoted in Anthony Mellors, Late Modernist Poetics from Pound to 
Prynne (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), p.120. 
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research suggest, but the attempt is endlessly fascinating and even failure can 
be rewarding. 
 
2.2 The cultural rules of representation 
 
An important aspect of this aim ‘to tell the truth about things’ concerns the 
representation in poems of objects that have an existence in the external 
world. However, in order to tell this truth it is necessary first to have 
knowledge of these objects. That in turn requires an understanding of the 
nature of our perceptions and the status of objects in the external world. It is 
this issue which I will begin to examine next. 
 In his essay, ‘Donald Davie and the Failure of Englishness’, Antony 
Easthope addresses the issue of how the real world might be represented in 
poetry. During the course of his argument he arrives at this point: ‘Because 
the real exists only at one with itself, outside representation, the real can only 
be represented precisely as representation, a human construction, and so not 
as itself’ (Easthope, p. 22). This would appear to be both self-evident and 
conclusive. A poem, in this respect, resembles a painting of a pipe, on which 
René Magritte inscribed, ‘This is not a pipe’. Similarly, if the word ‘iceberg’ 
appears in a poem then, as Elizabeth Bishop’s title indicates, it must be ‘An 
Imaginary Iceberg’. 
 This fact is described by Easthope as ‘a problem’ (p. 22). The reason 
it appears as a problem is that other distinctions are made in poetry regarding 
the manner in which objects that have an existence in the external world are 
treated by poets. Just before making the point quoted above, Easthope had 
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been examining the implications of Pound’s comment, which Easthope 
summarises in his own words, that when a natural object acts as a symbol, 
‘the symbolic meaning should not replace a literal sense of the object as it is 
presented in the everyday world’ (p. 21). As Easthope realises, this suggests 
that both symbolic representations and representations which constitute ‘a 
literal sense of the object as it is presented in the everyday world’ are 
possible. The ‘problem’, I understand, is just what the latter might consist of, 
given the condition already agreed, that ‘the real can only be represented […] 
as […] a human construction, and so not as itself’. There would seem to be a 
contradiction. However, to illustrate the validity of Pound’s distinction, 
Easthope had referred to Charles Tomlinson’s poem, ‘Hawks’, which ‘keeps 
moving between an assertion of the difference between hawk and human, on 
the one hand, and “what we share with them” on the other’ (p. 21). He 
compares Tomlinson’s poem favourably with ‘the sentimental banalities of 
Ted Hughes’s hawk poems’. 
 It is the symbolic value of Hughes’s hawk that Easthope takes issue 
with, but even so, in order for Easthope’s argument to have a sound basis 
there must be some identifiable sense in which Tomlinson’s treatment of the 
hawk is closer to the ‘literal sense of the object as it is presented in the 
everyday world’, rather than being just another ‘human construction’. Of 
course, it is quite reasonable to suggest that some representations are better 
than others but this does beg the question of how the judgement is made; on 
what it is based. Forming and defending judgements of quality in writing that 
represents objects from the everyday world may mean focusing on the skill 
exhibited in the use of language. Such a defence though, if it rested entirely 
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on language, is all about human construction. If, however, the defence is 
based on a claim that one description is closer to the reality of the object in 
the external world, as Easthope’s defence of Tomlinson seems to be, then we 
need to know on what authority that judgement can be based. 
 Easthope does offer a solution, which is for the poet to produce an 
‘effect of the real’. He goes on to explain a ‘strategy’ for achieving this: 
 
A main strategy here … is to sustain a set of subjective meanings that 
are obviously derived from an objective setting alongside but askew 
from a rendering of the objective setting itself, so that the effect of the 
real comes to be represented in the gap between them, as it were. 
                                                 (p. 22) 
 
As I understand this, the ‘set of subjective meanings’ conforms to the 
condition earlier identified that all representation is a human construction, but 
that the ‘rendering of the objective setting itself’, by being ‘askew’, achieves 
a quality that is somehow different to the ‘subjective meanings’. This, 
Easthope claims, creates the gap where the ‘effect of the real’ resides. The 
greatest problem is how the objective setting can be anything other than 
another subjective representation; and that being so, how it can harbour 
something more real, even as an effect. 
 It is revealing that directly after observing that ‘the real can only be 
represented precisely as representation’, Easthope goes on to ask: ‘How then 
can an effect of the real be given?’ The impulse to produce this effect appears 
to be the immediate response to the conditions of representation, indeed, a 
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resistance to those conditions. Easthope does not refer to Roland Barthes at 
this point but it is worth considering Barthes’s comments in his essay, ‘The 
Reality Effect’, since his and Easthope’s phrases are so similar. Barthes 
begins by identifying what he calls ‘insignificant notation’ which ‘is related 
to description’.18  He finds an origin for the practice of descriptive writing in 
rhetoric. Early in antiquity the epideictic genre was ‘a ceremonial discourse 
intended to excite admiration’ (Barthes, p. 143). In the second century A.D. 
‘there was a craze for ecphrasis, the detachable set piece … whose object was 
to describe places, times, people, or works of art’ (p. 143). At this time there 
was no demand for description to be realistic. As Barthes puts it, ‘plausibility 
is not referential here but openly discursive: it is the generic rules of discourse 
which lay down the law’ (p. 144). Such description served an aesthetic 
function that has continued into modern literature. Barthes takes the example 
from Gustave Flaubert’s Madame Bovary of the description of Rouen and 
comments that, although the modern age demands verisimilitude, the figures 
of rhetoric persist. Barthes concludes that the description is ‘justified … by 
the laws of literature: its “meaning” exists, it depends on conformity not to 
the model but to the cultural rules of representation’ (p. 145). 
 However, Barthes points out that modern description ‘is thoroughly 
mixed up with “realistic” imperatives, as if the referent’s exactitude, superior 
or indifferent to any other function, governed and alone justified its 
description’ (p. 145). Barthes traces the process of development to the point 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Roland Barthes, ’The Reality Effect’ in The Rustle of Language, trans. by Richard Howard (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1989), pp. 141- 148 (p. 143). 
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where ‘declaratively renouncing the constraints of the rhetorical code, realism 
must seek a new reason to describe’ (p. 146). He then goes on to observe that:  
 
The irreducible residues of functional analysis have this in common: 
they denote what is called “concrete reality” (insignificant gestures, 
transitory attitudes, insignificant objects, redundant words). The pure 
and simple “representation” of the “real”, the naked relation of “what 
is” (or has been) thus appears as a resistance to meaning. 
       (p. 146) 
        
Barthes thus draws attention to a division between the ‘real’ and ‘meaning’. 
Meaning is constructed by humans; the ‘real’ is out there, and according to 
modern realism, it is ‘self-sufficient’ and ‘strong enough to belie any notion 
of “function”’ (p. 147). Similarly, verisimilitude, which to the ancients was 
distinct from the ‘real’, a matter of public opinion and not an ‘absolute’, takes 
on the nature of the ‘real’ (p. 147).  As Barthes puts it, ‘a new verisimilitude 
is born, which is precisely realism (by which we mean any discourse which 
accepts “speech-acts” justified by their referent alone)’ (p. 147). Barthes 
names this the ‘referential illusion’ (p. 148). 
I would suggest that Barthes’s concerns here are rather different from 
those of Easthope, despite the similarity in wording, which might explain why 
Easthope makes no reference to Barthes. However, I will refer to the issue of 
the conflict between the ‘real’ and ‘meaning’ that Barthes raises when I 
investigate the divide between the empirical realist approach of the 
	   109 
Movement poets and the alternative, so-called ‘counter-culture’19 poets later 
in this section and in the following section. We will also see that Barthes’s 
observations are important in relation to the issue of scientific knowledge and 
the limitations of scientific objectivity that will arise when I consider 
phenomenological aspects of the reality question (see section 2.4). In section 
2.5 I consider these elements in relation to ecocritical theory. 
Easthope offers a few examples to illustrate his ‘effect of the real’ in 
operation. In addition to Tomlinson’s and Hughes’s poems about hawks, he 
refers to Wallace Stevens’s ‘The Snow Man ‘ and ‘Montana Pastoral’ by J. V. 
Cunningham. In the space of one page, the word ‘sentimental’ appears twice 
and ‘unsentimentality’ once. All four poems are judged according to the 
degree to which they exhibit this quality. Easthope’s point is that ‘the 
sentimental cast of mind […] seeks to co-opt object to subjectivity’ 
(Easthope, p. 22). By contrast, Cunningham’s unsentimental approach 
presents ‘an objective landscape’ of summer, grasses, dryness and wheat but 
‘find[s] in this pastoral arcadia anything but happiness’ (p. 22). This could be 
taken two ways but presumably Easthope’s intention is not simply to debunk 
the pathetic fallacy here so reading his comment to mean that the wheat is not 
happy would probably be to mistake his meaning.  More likely he is saying 
that the human subject has not experienced happiness through its exposure to 
this natural environment. There may be any number of reasons to account for 
this but it is difficult to see why any of them should elicit our admiration 
particularly, or to see why it should be ‘sentimental’ for a human being to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Davie’s term. See Donald Davie, Thomas Hardy and British Poetry (1972), reprinted in With the Grain: Essays on 
Thomas Hardy and Modern British Poetry, ed. by Clive Wilmer (Manchester: Carcanet, 1998), pp. 21-170 (p. 142). 
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experience pleasurable sensations on a summer day without rain, surrounded 
by grasses and wheat. 
Easthope’s argument seems to become contradictory when, having 
congratulated Cunningham on not finding happiness in arcadia, he comments 
on his ‘finding instead a subjective possibility expressed in images of winter’ 
(22). I understand this to be an example of what Easthope means when he 
speaks of subjective meanings being askew from the objective setting: there is 
this kind of discrepancy. However, both the ‘images of winter’ and those 
images that constitute a representation of summer are human constructs. If 
combining the images of summer, wheat and grasses with happiness amounts 
to co-opting object to subjectivity, then surely combining images of winter 
(‘blizzards’ and ‘this huddled chill’) with the opposite of happiness amounts 
to the same.  It is no defence, I think, to point to the ‘objective landscape’ 
since it is no more ‘objective’ than the blizzard and the chill. Easthope’s 
argument seems to rest on the unstated assumption that the summer landscape 
is more genuinely present in the poem than the blizzard and the chill. 
 What interests me far more than the applicability of the strategy, 
though, is the position that Easthope feels compelled to adopt, of finding a 
strategy at all, of feeling a need to defend the validity of an approach to 
writing poetry grounded in its being closer to the literal sense of the object. I 
feel that this issue of the representation of things in poetry is crucial to the 
idea of sincerity and truth. It is therefore with a curiosity about this 
relationship between the objects of the external world and the representation 
of that world in poetry, via the perceptions and consciousness of the poet, that 
I have approached the poets in this study. I have asked myself the question: 
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How do these poets go about finding their own solution to the dilemma that 
Easthope identifies in this passage of his essay? 
 
Furthermore, the point that Easthope raises here and the nature of his solution 
to the ‘problem’ is part of a larger discussion within British poetry. That 
discussion is deeply bound up with perceptions of reality and what is 
involved in producing representations of objects from the real world. 
Easthope goes on to comment on the poetry of the Movement and refers to 
the writings of Donald Davie and Robert Conquest in terms that reveal the 
nature of the division between the two opposing views. In order to get a clear 
picture of what is involved in this division it will be helpful next to refer to 
Davie’s comments on the work of Roy Fisher and the terms in which he 
formulates his judgements. 
 In his 1972 study, Thomas Hardy and British Poetry, Donald Davie 
argues a case for placing Roy Fisher, along with Philip Larkin and others, in 
an essentialist English tradition that was dominated by the figure of Thomas 
Hardy. Although Davie acknowledges that Fisher ‘writes in free verse and 
open forms’ he claims that the affinities with Larkin and Hardy are more 
significant. His argument is based on the writers’ exposure to shared ‘social 
and political circumstances’ rather than on a direct influence derived from 
reading the work of the earlier author.20 During the course of his examination 
of Fisher’s work Davie quotes the prose section of ‘Lullaby and Exhortation 
for the Unwilling Hero’ from City and comments: ‘This is description at its 
most impressive … One responds to it in the first place as one responds to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Davie, p. 142. 
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Larkin’s ‘Whitsun Weddings’: this is how it is!’ (p.146). Davie’s response to 
this passage in Fisher’s work is revealing of the grounds on which he makes 
his larger claims for an English poetic tradition headed by Thomas Hardy. It 
is based on a belief in the empirical, realist approach to writing poetry 
whereby the poem’s success is judged by its truth to life and its, the poem’s, 
ability to represent that reality. This would seem to be a perfect example of 
Barthes’s ‘referential illusion’; his account of the ‘simple “representation” of 
the “real”, the naked relation of “what is” (or has been)’ is precisely the 
element that Davie is appealing to in his phrase: ‘this is how it is!’ In the 
terms that Abrams uses above, Davie is answering the question: ‘Is it true to 
nature?’ in the affirmative, rather than the question: ‘Is it sincere?’ 
The terms in which I describe the basis of Davie’s judgement of 
quality here are strikingly similar to the terms which Easthope had under 
consideration in his comments on the literal sense of objects. However, 
Easthope objects to the empirical nature of the approach employed by Davie 
and other of the Movement poets. In his essay on Davie, Easthope quotes 
Robert Conquest’s introduction to his New Lines anthology, where Conquest 
writes that the poetry of the Movement ‘is empirical in its attitude to all that 
comes. This reverence for the real person or event is, indeed, a part of the 
general intellectual ambience’.21 Easthope comments: ‘As Conquest makes 
clear, at issue is not just an empirical reliance upon facts but an empirical 
notion that the real exists unproblematically “out there”’ (p. 28). Without in 
any way implying that the two positions, or the styles of poetry they endorse, 
are similar, the terms in which these arguments are presented both seem to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Quoted by Easthope in Contemporary British Poetry, p. 28. 
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make a similar claim for their own approach. Conquest’s ‘reverence for the 
real person or event’ could be understood as something very similar to 
Easthope’s ‘symbolic meaning should not replace a literal sense of the object 
as it is presented in the everyday world’. Or again, Davie’s ‘this is how it is!’ 
could be taken to coincide with Easthope’s ‘effect of the real’. 
It thus becomes clear that the ultimate goal of both sides is the same: 
they both aim to achieve a form of representation in writing that will 
reproduce the experience of the real more exactly than rival methods. The 
different courses they take, the differences in the style of writing they 
produce, derive from philosophical differences about the nature of our 
perceptions and their relation to the external world. As can be seen, this is a 
restatement of my principle question. 
 One indication of the differences that are at issue here is suggested by 
Easthope’s introduction of the word ‘unproblematically’ into his comment. 
The Movement’s poetics appeal to a commonsense understanding of the real. 
For example, and of great significance, the fact that the recognition of success 
in the representation of reality is presented by Davie as an instinctive 
reaction. The exclamation, ‘this is how it is!’ is self-evident and brooks no 
contradiction, Davie implies. He certainly does not justify it beyond making 
an appeal to the feelings of anyone who knows the cities of the North and 
Midlands. Easthope identifies this same attitude in Conquest and refutes it as 
a species of jingoism: 
 
Conquest not merely advocates Englishness, he enacts its main 
procedures in his advocacy. To defend English national culture, he 
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appeals to individuals who simply experience Englishness as a direct 
access to the real, and this is the method of empiricism.22 
 
By contrast, Easthope’s ‘strategy’ for achieving ‘an effect of the real’ raises 
concerns, as I have indicated above, that might be termed ‘problematic’. 
 
2.3 The mainstream and counter-culture 
 
So despite certain similarities in the goals described by Easthope on the one 
hand, and by Davie, Conquest and the Movement on the other, two distinct 
schools of thought are in question here. They correspond to a division in 
British poetry that widened after the heyday of the Movement and was at its 
most marked in the 1970s. Davie himself refers to this division as ‘literary 
culture and counter-culture’ or ‘an establishment and anti-establishment’ and 
states that readers and critics feel persuaded to take sides.23 Several of the 
poets belonging to the ‘counter-culture’ faction were published in an 
anthology, A Various Art, in 1987. In the introduction to that anthology one 
of the editors, Andrew Crozier, described the kind of poetry sanctioned under 
the ‘redefinition of taste in the 1950s’: 
 
It was not to be ambitious, or to seek to articulate ambition through 
the complex deployment of its technical means: imagery was either 
suspect or merely clinched an argument; the verse line should not, by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Easthope, p. 31. 
23 Davie, p. 142. 
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the pressure of its energy or shape might exert on syntax (sic), 
intervene in meaning; language was always to be grounded in the 
presence of a legitimating voice.24 
 
 Reacting against this formula, the poets in the anthology looked 
outside England, and particularly to America and ‘the tradition … of Pound 
and Williams’ (Crozier, p. 12). It was from the American poets writing in this 
tradition that the counter-culture British poets found examples that constituted 
an alternative way to represent the world and experiences that were relevant 
to them. This is directly relevant to my concerns in this study because those 
American poets were themselves asking the same question, as Randall 
Jarrell’s comment on Paterson, quoted earlier, illustrates. Specifically, this 
involved exposure to the open form promoted by Charles Olson. These 
techniques were sufficiently different to the British mainstream to earn them 
the labels ‘alternative’ and ‘experimental’.25 
 Davie also refers to criticism of mainstream British poetics when he 
refers to the allegations circulating in the 1960s ‘that writing like Larkin’s 
was damagingly insular and provincial’ and considers the possibility, which 
significantly he rejects, of using American models. The ‘medicine 
prescribed’, as Davie terms it, was to read ‘foreign poets in translation and 
[…] some Americans’ (Davie, p.77). But, Davie goes on to argue, this 
medicine failed ‘to cure the disease’, and the reason for this was that ‘the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Andrew Crozier, ‘Introduction’ in A Various Art, ed. by Andrew Crozier  and Tim Longville (London: Paladin 
Books, 1990), p. 12. I have followed the wording in the Paladin edition. I believe the unclear phrase should read: 
‘the verse line should not, by the pressure its energy or shape might exert on syntax, intervene in meaning’. 
25  Marjorie Perloff, p.151. 
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distinctive quality and the distinctive task of poetry in Britain were defined, 
and are still to be defined, by the fact that Britain as a whole is the most 
industrialised landscape in the world’.26 Davie is drawing attention here to the 
alignment of the British counter-culture poets with the American alternative 
model, and, more importantly for my thesis, he stresses the importance of the 
link between poetic production and the physical environment in which it is 
produced. Davie’s final comment states that poetry is the result of perception 
of an external environment and that poetry’s ‘quality’ and ‘task’ are 
determined by the poet’s perception of that environment. This is Davie’s 
version of ‘telling the truth about things’. 
Neither the establishment poets nor the counter-culture poets formed a 
homogeneous group with an agreed and fixed programme. Individual writers 
had their own approaches and there could be some inconsistency in their 
methods. For example, Edward Larrissy points out that ‘[Veronica] Forrest-
Thomson’s theories are more radical than her poems’ and goes on to find in 
those poems ‘the kind of easy naturalization that is expressly denigrated in 
her critical theories.’27 However, we do have a situation where the two sides 
were both attempting to find a way of writing that best satisfied their desire to 
achieve either an ‘effect of the real’ or the response ‘this is how it is’ and that 
this led to two divergent practices with two essentially divergent ontologies. 
One of the main differences in those ontologies involved the issue of 
representing objects from the real world. The orthodox establishment view 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Davie, p.77. 
27 Edward Larrissy, ‘Poets of A Various Art: J. H. Prynne, Veronica Forrest-Thomson, Andrew Crozier’, in 
Contemporary British Poetry:	  Essays in Theory and Criticism, ed. by James Acheson and Romana Huk (New York: 
State University of New York, 1996), pp. 63-79, (p. 71). 
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was empirical and sought to reproduce the perceived reality (‘this is how it 
is!’). The counter-culture emphasised the constructedness of perception but 
wanted to render the experience of that perception as truly as possible. This 
involved those poets in a struggle to identify the true nature of perception and 
find a way to convey that in language. In both cases there is an identifiable 
urge towards a writing that is closer to actual experience. This process 
sometimes brings these poets very close to speculation about the nature of the 
reality they are perceiving. Perhaps that is quite natural. It is in no way 
surprising that their interest should have been awoken. One might even say 
that it is inevitable that when examining the nature of one’s perceptions the 
qualities of the things perceived also come into the equation. Thus we find J. 
H. Prynne making the statement: ‘The first essential is to take knowledge | 
back to the springs.’28 As Larrissy comments, this is partly ‘about capturing 
the process of the formation of knowledge in the individual mind’ (Larrissy, 
p. 66). There is also a sense of achieving authenticity here, though. Larrissy 
recognises this and goes on to compare Prynne’s lines with Martin 
Heidegger’s comments from Being and Time: 
 
For the latter [Prynne], Heidegger’s insistence both on the importance 
of language, and on the time-bound character of interpretation, seems 
more apt, especially because he is nonetheless wedded to a return to 
“those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of 
determining the nature of Being.” Heidegger also espouses the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 J. H. Prynne, Poems (Tarset: Bloodaxe Books, 2005), p. 13. 
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critique and “destruction” of inauthentic language.   
                       (p. 66) 
 
The issue of authenticity, grounded on origin, is one which will recur during 
the course of this investigation. 
The perceptions and understanding that are involved here can still be 
constructed. One construction may coincide more closely with perceived 
reality (in other words, tell the truth about things more effectively), but 
Larrissy also identifies ‘a certain doubleness in Prynne’ of which this 
‘seeking origins’ is an example (p. 66). Furthermore, there are occasions 
when this ‘doubleness’ takes on a contradictory quality. Larrissy refers to the 
‘chains of imagery that might begin to assert themselves with an air of 
inscrutable self-evidence’ and that patterning of this nature can ‘exhibit that 
doubtful drift toward coherent views’, concluding that ‘the desire for the 
transcendent persists in a world that cannot believe in it’ (pp. 67-8). Larrissy 
goes on to enlarge on the paradox: 
 
in the process we lose our appreciation of the actual and the 
momentary. Nor can we really get back to an innocent origin. Yet, 
paradoxically, it seems that we need the idea that we can do so in 
order to go forward in our track through the world.  
      (p. 69) 
 
It is, indeed, a paradox, and a fascinating one. It impinges directly on 
my main question which I can now modify: How do my chosen poets go 
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about finding their own solution to the dilemma of representing the external 
world with Easthope’s ‘effect of the real’ when all representation is a human 
construction, and do their strategies involve anything similar to the Prynne-
paradox, as identified by Larrissy? 
 
2.4 The relevance of phenomenology to this study 
 
In addition to literary critical analysis and my experiences as a practising 
poet, I also refer at some points to phenomenology as a way of investigating a 
poet’s point of view or creative process. A useful definition of 
phenomenology is provided by Robert C. Solomon: 
 
The object of phenomenological description was to get to the essences 
or ideas (eidos) that presented themselves to experience, to go beyond 
the various ‘facts’ of experience and the relativity of theories and 
practices to those features of experience which are ‘absolutely given 
in immediate intuition’. As opposed to [René] Descartes and 
[Immanuel] Kant […] [Edmund] Husserl’s phenomenology is an 
appeal not to deduction or dialect but directly to ‘evidence’, not the 
evidence of the senses but of the consciousness as such, ‘apodeictic’ 
evidence that can be directly intuited, with a specially trained method 
of philosophical investigation.29 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Robert C. Solomon, Continental Philosophy Since 1750: The Rise and Fall of the Self (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), p. 131. Soloman is referring to Edmund Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations but does not supply a page 
reference for the quotes used here. 
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Clearly, the concerns of phenomenology are directly relevant to the area that I 
am investigating. 
In its early development under Husserl phenomenological theory 
asserts a manifold of appearances in the object which allows the observer to 
intuit an identity. Both of these aspects, manifold of appearances and identity, 
are separate. Thus the essence of the object is not accessible to physical 
observation; empirical investigation will not reveal it, imagination and 
intuiting must play a role. A distrust of physical senses can thus be deduced in 
this theory. Robert Sokolwski refers to phenomenology’s ‘struggle against 
psychologism’ in the ‘activity of achieving meaning, truth and logical 
reasoning’: ‘Meaning and truth also have their empirical dimensions, but they 
are more than just empirical things. To treat them as simply psychological is 
to leave out something important.’30 These aspects of phenomenological 
theory will be seen to play a part in my investigation of the poets under 
consideration. 
 Later philosophers, for example, Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, deny this separation of appearances and essence.31 
The philosophers, in fact, are in dispute about similar elements in experience 
and perception as the poets. Husserl maintained that objects and 
consciousness of them were separate and that it was possible to ‘bracket’ the 
world and its objects in order to examine the activity of the ego or 
consciousness (Sokolowski, pp. 59-60). Heidegger rejects this bracketing and 
‘reinterprets the phenomenon as “the showing-itself-in-itself” without 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 115. 
31 See Solomon pp. 174, 176. 
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implying any distinction between phenomenon and thing in itself’ (Solomon, 
p.157). Solomon continues: 
 
For Heidegger it is Being itself rather than the existence of beings that 
is in question, and our understanding of Being is not derivative of our 
knowledge of particular beings […] Heidegger makes it clear that it 
cannot be an ego that constitutes the world. (p. 157) 
 
Heidegger emphasises that Being does not consist in the traits or qualities an 
object bears, nor in the information that the senses receive about an object: 
 
a thing never reaches that position [of the greatest possible proximity 
to us] as long as we assign as its thingly feature what is perceived by 
the senses. […] The thing itself must be allowed to remain in its self-
containment.32 
 
 An important element in the phenomenological attitude is the 
distinction between a thing and its appearance. Sokolowksi comments that 
without the phenomenological attitude we ‘will be likely either to posit 
appearances as barriers between us and things, or to make things into mere 
ideas’ (Sokolwski, p. 51). This leads to phenomenology’s critique of the 
scientific approach: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. by Albert Hofstadter (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), p. 
26. 
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So long as a science is merely objective, it is lost in positivity. We 
have truth about things but we have no truth about our possession of 
these things. We forget ourselves and lose ourselves even as we are 
fascinated by the things we know. The scientific truths are left floating 
and unpossessed. They seem to be nobody’s truth.     (p. 52) 
 
Merleau-Ponty also addresses this issue of the limitations of scientific 
objectivity. He emphasises that scientific knowledge is important but goes on 
to ask 
 
whether science does, or ever could, present us with a picture of the 
world which is complete, self-sufficient and somehow closed in upon 
itself, such that there could no longer be any meaningful questions 
outside this picture.33 
 
 What is important in these general definitions is the notion of a way of 
observing that achieves a fuller and more accurate knowledge of the real 
world than the everyday ‘natural attitude’. This coincides with the aims, and 
claims, that we found amongst the poets and critics of the post-50s era and the 
poetry wars. The terminology used to describe the phenomenological stance 
is perhaps more suggestive of the counter-culture poets from that period. 
These issues also constitute an important aspect of the work of the poets that I 
will examine in detail in this study. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The World of Perception (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), p. 34. 
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2.5 The relevance of ecocriticism to this study 
 
The terms in which Jarrell defines Williams’s project in Paterson bring two 
elements into a kind of confrontation: ‘truth’ and ‘things’, which are later 
expressed as ‘language’ and ‘the world’. These two pairs are really different 
terms for the same concepts: truth is expressed through language; the world is 
composed of the things it contains. Furthermore, these terms are, in fact, a 
way of expressing the well-known dichotomy between culture and nature, 
between the human and non-human and, as such, they relate to Barthes’s 
distinction, mentioned earlier (2.2), between ‘meaning’ (human) and ‘the 
real’ (non-human). Consequently, my investigations have constantly led me 
into issues that are also the focus of ecocriticism since ecocriticism examines 
the relationship between the human and non-human. Ecocriticism is deeply 
concerned with the impact that our industrial and post-industrial society has 
had, and is continuing to have, on the environment. There is a history of such 
concern which goes back a good deal further than the beginnings of 
ecocriticism. The Romantics saw a conflict between society and nature and 
sought various routes by which to return to a natural state and a natural way 
of life. In some forms those routes relied on imagination to create an ‘interior 
state of nature’.34 Even the ancient Greeks had their Golden Age. Nature in 
these contexts carries the association of origins, authenticity and a genuine, 
unspoiled state of existence. Bate comments:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Jonathan Bate, The Song of the Earth (London: Picador, 2000), p.41. 
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The myth of the natural life which exposes the ills of our own 
condition is as old as Eden and Arcadia […] All human communities 
have myths of origin, stories which serve both to invent a past which 
is necessary to make sense of the present and to establish a narrative 
of humankind’s uniqueness and apartness from the rest of nature. 
      (Bate, p.26) 
 
These myths, then, are ways of understanding the relationship between the 
human and the non-human. They are, in fact, earlier ways of ‘telling the truth 
about things’. In the course of my examination of the poets in this study, I 
find that the same concerns that Bate describes as being traditionally involved 
in myths of origin appear again. Ecocritical thinking highlights these 
connections between earlier and modern ways of understanding these issues, 
as well as revealing the inevitable differences. Ecocriticism, however, is not a 
single concept with a unified theoretical base. There are different types of 
ecocriticism and there are ecocritics with differing views, focuses and 
approaches. Scott Slovic comments: ‘There is no single, dominant world-
view guiding ecocritical practice’, and a little later: ‘ecocriticism has no 
central, dominant doctrine or theoretical apparatus’.35 
 One of the issues that ecocriticism raises and which I feel to be 
important in relation to my study concerns independence and inter-
dependence with regard to elements in the external world. Some ecocritics 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Scott Slovic, ‘Ecocriticism: Containing Multitudes, Practsing Doctrine’, in The Green Studies Reader: From 
Romanticism to Ecocriticism, ed. by Laurence Coupe (Abingdon: Routledge, 2000), pp. 160-162 (pp. 160, 161). 
	   125 
emphasise the Otherness of the natural world, its non-human quality. They 
use this concept as a way of countering the view that ‘because mountains and 
waters are human at the point of delivery, they exist only as signified within 
human culture’.36 This then becomes a ground for demanding that the human 
world and the activities it engages in should show respect for the Other. 
Coupe continues: ‘As Bill McKibben puts it in his lament over the 
subordination of the non-human world by the human: “Nature’s independence 
is its meaning; without it there is nothing but us”’.37 But this approach can 
encourage a dualism that other ecocritics believe can be self-defeating; if the 
human and non-human worlds appear to be divorced in this way, it can offer a 
justification to some minds for the commercial exploitation of the 
environment. 
 The counter-argument, then, is to insist on the inter-dependence of the 
human and non-human and effectively to deny the division into separate 
categories. Gary Snyder, who ‘seeks to refute the nature–culture split’ is a 
good example (Coupe, p.121). However, such an emphasis on one-ness is 
open to the accusation of Romantic delusion and transcendentalism. A further 
example of inter-dependence is proposed by Donna Haraway; when she 
writes that ‘one pole of a dualism cannot exist without the other’,38 she is 
making an ‘attempt to subvert the categories of culture and nature’ (Coupe, p. 
121). 
 Timothy Morton offers a third view on this issue. Morton argues that 
the idea of ‘Nature’ obscures our understanding of the environment: ‘Putting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Laurence Coupe, ‘General Introduction’ in The Green Studies Reader, pp. 1-8 (p.2). 
37 Coupe, p. 2. Coupe cites Bill Kibben, The End of Nature (Harmondsworth: Penguin), 1990, p. 54. 
38 Donna Haraway, ‘The Dualism of Primatology’ in The Green Studies Reader, pp. 144-47 (p. 145). 
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something called Nature on a pedestal and admiring it from afar does for the 
environment what patriarchy does for the figure of the woman’.39  His 
approach leads Morton to question writing about nature and also criticism of 
that writing. He comments: ‘I consider the literary criticism of environmental 
literature itself to be an example of environmental art’ (p. 3). Morton sees 
ecocriticism as influenced, and indeed, tied, by misconceptions of ‘nature’, 
which he terms, ‘the ideological baggage it is lumbered with’ (p. 5) and 
consequently aims to ‘challenge the assumptions that ground ecocriticism’ 
(p.9). 
Morton draws attention to the contradictory elements in the notion of 
the term: ‘Nature, a transcendental term in a material mask’ (p. 14). Nature, 
he comments, is the blanket term for all the items that can be subsumed under 
it, but, ‘Nature wavers in between the divine and the material […] nature 
hovers over things like a ghost’ (p.14). Morton points out that this 
ambivalence in the quality of nature allows it to appear as ‘something that 
exists in between polarized terms such as God and matter, this and that, 
subject and object’ (p.15). He goes on to relate this to art, and specifically to 
‘nature writing’ which has consistently promoted this misleading use of the 
term through its attempts to create the illusion of the presence of a natural 
environment in writing: 
 
Art gives what is nonconceptual an illusive appearance of form. This 
is the aim of environmental literature: to encapsulate a utopian image 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Timothy Morton, Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, paperback edition, 2009), p. 5. 
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of nature which does not really exist – we have destroyed it. 
      (p. 24) 
 
Morton relates this aspect of aesthetics to distance, and thus to concepts of 
space and dimension: 
 
Dimension, like the aesthetic itself, sits somewhere between an 
objective notion (in mathematics, for instance) and a subjective 
experience. Many of the writers this study encounters treat the 
aesthetic and nature as if they comprised a single, unified dimension. 
But […] a dimension is something we are in – or not – and this 
assumes a dichotomy between inside and outside, the very thing that 
has yet to be established.     (p. 25) 
  
This is an interesting comment from my point of view because it relates to my 
notion, mentioned above in section 1.1, of the gap between objects in the 
external world and the images I receive in my consciousness through sensory 
perception. Morton’s analysis indicates that further thought is needed on how 
far my conceptualisation is valid. 
Morton pursues his argument to the point of concluding that ‘Nature 
writing partly militates against ecology rather than for it. By setting up nature 
as an object “over there” – a pristine wilderness beyond all trace of human 
contact – it re-establishes the very separation it seeks to abolish’ (p. 125). 
Morton therefore suggests that ‘one of the targets of genuine critique would 
be the very (eco)critical languages – the constant elegy for a lost unalienated 
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state, the resort to the aesthetic dimension’ (p. 23). It is my contention that the 
poets in this study share the same concern: they critique the notion of that 
‘lost unalienated state’, the origin and home that could underwrite 
authenticity. 
 I have also referred in several places to Jonathan Bate, a thinker 
whose approach to ecocritical ideas is quite different to Morton’s. Bate is 
more concerned with how art, and especially poetry, functions; he asks what 
poetry is for. Bate states his purpose clearly quite early on in The Song of the 
Earth when he writes: 
 
I want to consider the possibility that other works of art, mostly 
poems, may create for the mind the same kind of re-creational space 
that a park creates for the body […] to see what happens when we 
regard poems as imaginary parks in which we may breathe an air that 
is not toxic and accommodate ourselves to a mode of dwelling that is 
not alienated.     (Bate, p.64) 
 
The role of imagination and creativity is acknowledged here, especially in the 
use of the hyphen in ‘re-creational’. There is a potential lack of clarity in this 
construction, though, since the prefix ‘re’ suggests the creation again of 
something that already has, or has had, an existence. I am not entirely clear 
whether Bate means to imply this or not. He does write about the ‘myth of the 
lost idyll’ in which ‘there is no restless division between internal and external 
worlds’ (p. 74), and then goes on to consider whether poetry can construct 
this original state: ‘Ecopoetics asks in what respects a poem may be a making 
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(Greek poiesis) of the dwelling-place’ (p.75), though this dwelling-place may 
exist only in consciousness. Near the end of his book, Bate comments that 
 
works of art can themselves be imaginary states of nature, imaginary 
ideal ecosystems, and by reading them, by inhabiting them, we can 
start to imagine what it might be like to live differently upon the earth.
      (pp. 250-51) 
 
The tenor of this element in Bate’s argument indicates a division between the 
human world and consciousness, on one hand, and the natural world on the 
other. Bate makes it quite clear that he accepts that representations of ways of 
being in nature are precisely that: representations (p. 20). His interest is in 
‘the way in which an imaginative entry into […] fictive worlds’ may 
encourage ‘an attunement to both words and the world’ and the 
acknowledgement that ‘we do not live apart from the world’ (p.23). The 
reader might well wonder whether Bate is offering a form of escapism here 
but there is a pragmatic side to Bate’s position: ‘it is we who have the power 
to determine whether the earth will sing or be silent’, which Bate offers in the 
form of a question, but which connotes responsibility for the environment (p. 
282). Bate hopes that poetry will influence human behavior. But there is also 
a sense that poetry will be the imaginary resting place for what mankind has 
destroyed. 
 A final point that I want to make with regard to this topic concerns the 
expression ‘nature writing’. This term is often used in relation to texts that are 
approached from an ecocritical perspective. I understand it to be the 
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equivalent of pastoral, but my concern is not with niceties of definition. 
Rather, I want to state that I do not think of my own writing as ‘nature 
writing’ in the sense of pastoral. Words that refer to various items that may be 
found in the natural world occur in my poems; my interest is in the 
relationship between my perceiving consciousness and the external world and 
how that might lead to the production of poetry. The field of interest overlaps 
with the concerns of ecocritics but I feel that the distinction that I seek to 
make here is important. 
 
2.6 The poets in this study 
 
The poets that I have selected for my study are Elizabeth Bishop, Roy Fisher 
and Paul Muldoon. In the case of the first two, I examine poems from across 
their whole oeuvre. In the case of Muldoon, I restrict my examination to one 
collection, Why Brownlee Left. This is partly because Muldoon’s work is 
already so extensive and varied as to be unmanageable for my purposes, and 
because Why Brownlee Left exhibits the characteristics I am looking for. I 
selected Roy Fisher partly because he is famous for his representations of the 
city and he is claimed by both the establishment and counter-culture sides as 
representing their own values,40 which makes him an especially interesting 
and relevant case. Elizabeth Bishop has a reputation as a highly accomplished 
observer and describer of the objects in the external world and this makes her 
poetry ideal for my analysis. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 See below, pp. 162-163. 
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Furthermore, although these poets produce very different kinds of 
poetry that sometimes reveal sharp contrasts, there are some elements which 
they have in common and which offer the prospect of interesting and 
enlightening comparison. Elizabeth Bishop travelled widely as a young 
woman, after an unsettled childhood that involved not only moving home but 
living in different families. As an adult she spent extensive periods in Europe 
and Florida before settling in Brazil for fifteen years. The subject of travel 
and foreign locations appears frequently in her poems and the continuing 
presence of early experiences is a theme in both her poems and short stories. 
Roy Fisher, by contrast had never spent a night out of England until he was 
fifty years old and set The Ship’s Orchestra on a ship precisely because he 
had never been on one.41 Muldoon’s collection shares with Bishop’s work an 
interest in origins and authenticity, and like her, he examines the difference 
between travelling or staying at home. In addition to these three, I will refer 
to the work of J. H. Prynne because it provides a useful means, by way of 
comparison, of linking my comments on the other three poets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See Roy Fisher, Interviews Through Time, p. 56. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Elizabeth Bishop 
 
In this chapter I want to consider Elizabeth Bishop’s representation of the 
external world in her poetry, and the relationship between that external world 
and the observing consciousness. Bishop’s poetry is often characterised as 
being precise and truthful, of consisting of accurate and detailed observation 
of the physical world.42 Anne Stevenson refers to an occasion when Bishop 
expressed her belief that the contents of a poem under discussion were 
‘literally true’. Stevenson goes on to comment that for Bishop ‘poems can and 
should tell the truth’ and that first and foremost this required the ability and 
inclination to observe accurately (Stevenson, p.16). This raises the issue of 
representation and the real world outlined in my introduction. Is the ‘literal 
truth’ that Bishop was in search of the truth about the thing itself, or the truth 
about the impression it made on her consciousness? 
 I will argue in this chapter that Elizabeth Bishop’s early work is more 
concerned with the relationship between mind and the external world; that 
this gives rise to poems that employ surrealism and metaphysical conceits and 
that the function of the objects that appear in these poems is to concretise the 
ideas produced by her examination of that relationship. I shall identify a 
middle stage where she focuses on and examines the contents of 
consciousness in a process that suggests the phenomenological reduction and 
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masterly’. Randall Jarrell (2000), p. 276. 
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I shall go on to argue that her later work exhibits a concentration on the 
external world that removes the self from the picture in a Heideggerian focus 
on Being. Furthermore, I shall argue that the phenomenological stance that 
Bishop adopts is linked to a way of understanding perception and reality that 
has both Romantic and existential elements. 
 Several of Bishop’s early poems that concern the relationship between 
the external world and the imagination also show art being generated out of 
the contemplation of that relationship. This gives rise to an interest in the act 
of creation itself, as it happens in the process of writing the poem. Two early 
poems that illustrate the process I have in mind are ‘The Map’ and ‘The 
Imaginary Iceberg’. 
 The opening line of ‘The Imaginary Iceberg’ introduces two objects, 
the iceberg and the ship, and places them in a kind of opposition.43 One is 
preferred over the other; the necessity of choosing between them is implied. 
The notion that ‘we’– the pronoun assumes the reader shares the poet’s 
judgement – will prefer the iceberg over the ship, prompts the reader to 
wonder what these two objects might represent beyond themselves. That they 
do represent something seems to be the inevitable conclusion from this 
opening, there being no necessity to choose between them in the ordinary 
course of events. And in the extraordinary course, where the necessity of 
choosing really was forced on us, it is difficult to believe that the outcome 
would be so much a foregone conclusion. The title, of course, has already 
alerted us to the fact that the iceberg under consideration is imaginary, whilst 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Elizabeth Bishop, Complete Poems (London: Chatto & Windus, 1991) p. 4. All future references are to this 
volume. 
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the language of the poem is rooted in the physical world of things: sails, 
snow, water, sailors, as well as the ship and iceberg. Thus we begin to 
perceive that this poem is concerned with the relationship between these two 
fields: the mind’s function of imagination and the external world. 
 As an image, or symbol even, an iceberg suggests the magnificence, 
beauty and power of nature, also nature’s alienness to humanity. Its existence 
in locations that are among the most hostile to mankind, and its well-known 
threat to shipping, underline the potential danger in the concept of iceberg. A 
ship, on the other hand, is a human construction and provides safety to its 
occupants in otherwise inhospitable locations on the oceans. In addition to the 
division between mind and external world, the poem thus sets up a further 
division between nature and humanity. The two pairs are linked, of course: 
humans possess minds (and build ships), nature and the external world are in 
one sense synonymous (and contain icebergs). Thus we see that although the 
language of the poem is rooted in concrete objects it uses those objects as 
emblems, an approach on the part of the poet that removes the poem, and the 
reader’s experience of it, one step further from the real world. When, as 
reader, I notice that the poet is drawing my attention to the artifice of her 
poem, I begin to alter my way of reading it. The imaginariness of the iceberg 
is emphasised. Furthermore, being imaginary, the iceberg is the product of 
human minds: the poet’s as she wrote and all the readers’ as they read. It is 
also part of another product of the human mind: the poem itself. It has no 
existence outside of that verbal construct. So rather than being emblematic of 
the external world of nature, the iceberg now appears to be emblematic of the 
imaginative functioning of the human mind. Now the choice between the ship 
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and the iceberg assumes a new character. Anne Stevenson calls it a choice 
between imagination and life: ‘This iceberg, the coldest possible embodiment 
of the imagination, is preferred to the ship of comfortable, messy life’ 
(Stevenson, p. 44). 
 As I read further in the poem, I sometimes try to see the iceberg as an 
image of nature, but also as an emblem of an austere imagination, an artist’s 
imagination, perhaps, committed to sacrifice in the name of art in preference 
to the hum-drum, everyday existence on the ship. As an image, the iceberg 
has a dual character, an example of what Stevenson refers to as the ‘variety of 
interpretations’ and ‘indeterminacy’ of the poem (p. 43). However, I cannot 
retain both readings in my mind simultaneously. If I understand the iceberg as 
a natural phenomenon, I am not thinking of imagination. If I understand the 
iceberg as an emblem of the imagination, I am not focusing on it as a 
phenomenon in nature. The case is similar to the well-known drawing from 
Gestalt psychology that can be seen as a duck or a rabbit, but never as both at 
the same time. The same is true of the iceberg. 
 This dual quality in a single object, and the perception of each quality 
being dependent on how the observer looks, coincides with the way that 
phenomenologists understand the nature of perception: the observer is active 
in the creation of meaning, has a choice in what they perceive. Philip Mairet 
puts it like this: 
 
Perception depends upon this pre-existent element of choice, which 
determines the form in which we perceive not only all the varieties of 
geometrical figures but every phenomenon of which we become 
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aware. What is perceived is not the reflection of something objective 
which the mind duplicates within itself; it is the result of that 
something and of the mind’s percipient activity44 
 
Perception, then, is inescapably subjective. We need now to examine how far 
this theory is applicable to Bishop’s poetry. 
 When I read the first two lines of ‘The Imaginary Iceberg’ in the light 
of the elements I have noticed so far, I find they suggest a range of 
possibilities to me. Choosing the iceberg before the ship, ‘although it meant 
the end of travel’ can refer, at the literal level, to the iceberg sinking the ship. 
It can also suggest, again in a quite literal sense, that the imagination can 
replace the need to travel physically: faraway places can be visited in the 
imagination. Or I might understand it to express a preference for nature (the 
iceberg) over technology, commerce, tourism (the ship); what might today be 
called a green or ecocritical reading. Or I can interpret ‘travel’ in the way 
Stevenson does ‘ship’ as referring to everyday life. The lines can then 
indicate that the life of the mind and imagination requires a renunciation of 
the more ordinary blessings of a simple life represented by the familiar image 
of life as a journey: finding a partner, establishing a home, starting a family 
and so on. 
 Interpretations multiply; indeterminacy is intensified. In the second 
stanza there is a transformation in the diction, effected by the sliding of the 
word ‘boards’ (Bishop, p. 4, line 16) out of its nautical application and into a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Philip Mairet, ‘Introduction’ in Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, trans. by Philip Mairet (London: 
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theatrical sense, which triggers a series of associated images involving the 
curtain rising, wits sparring and the iceberg itself on ‘a shifting stage’ (p. 4, 
line 22). This is preceded by the apparent contradiction of the sailor who is so 
keen to see the scene that he would ‘give his eyes for’ it (p. 4, line 12). The 
contradiction is removed, however, if the scene is understood to exist solely 
in the mind, physical eyes being then unnecessary. This thought, I believe, 
occurs to readers even though they recognise the idiomatic sense of ‘give his 
eyes for’. The poem enables the reader to perceive these variant readings in a 
similar fashion as the Gestalt drawing can be variously perceived. 
 The reader never was in any doubt that the poem did not originate in 
the careful and accurate scrutiny of an iceberg in the ocean; we always knew 
it was imaginary from the title. But from the treatment of the poetic material, 
as here described, we understand that the poem is concerned more with the 
actions of the mind as it adapts the objects it has selected for its own purposes 
of reflecting on art, creativity, perception and imagination than with a true 
depiction of external objects. 
 ‘The Map’ starts on a more concrete level.45 Anne Stevenson 
mentions that the poem was written about a real map that Bishop once owned 
(Stevenson, p. 44). The poem opens by describing the land and sea areas and 
the colouring of the map. We can imagine that the poet had the object before 
her as she wrote. The context and the style would seem to be quite different to 
that of ‘The Imaginary Iceberg’ but in fact the map performs a similar 
function in its poem as the word ‘imaginary’ in the title of that poem because 
it allows Bishop to employ the vocabulary of geography and landscape in a 	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context where it is obviously not what she is describing. The land, sea, ‘long 
sea-weeded ledges | where weeds hang’, the ‘sandy shelf’ and ‘lovely bays’: 
none of these elements of the landscape are there, either before the poet as she 
writes, or in the setting of the poem (Bishop, p.3, lines 3-11)). The map acts 
as a prompt to allow her imagination to speculate, often whimsically – ‘Or 
does the land lean down to lift the sea from under, | drawing it unperturbed 
around itself?’ (lines 5-6) - on those features that are represented on the map. 
So although the diction is loaded with geographical terms, they are as far 
removed from their referents in the external world as was the nautical 
terminology of ‘The Imaginary Iceberg’. 
 There is a sense, I feel, in which the map stands between the poet-
observer and the reader, on the one hand, and the landscape of the external 
world on the other and thus serves as an image for the way appearances are 
sometimes felt to get between the observing consciousness and the thing itself 
in the external world of objects. It is this confusion between appearances and 
thing that the phenomenological reduction seeks to avoid and which Bishop 
seeks to utilise here as a poetic device. In another sense, the map could 
suggest the mediation of experience by language. The map represents an 
attempt to bridge the gap between the observing consciousness and the 
objects it surveys and emphasises the role of consciousness and mind in the 
act of perception and the creation of human representations of that external 
world: art, language, poems, maps. There is an image in the second stanza of 
the poem which duplicates this sense of removed consciousness: ‘We can 
stroke these lovely bays, | under a glass as if they were expected to blossom, | 
or as if to provide a clean cage for invisible fish’ (p. 3, lines 11-13). Here the 
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glass performs the same function with regard to the map as the map performs 
with regard to the landscape in the external world: it comes between, acting 
as a barrier but allowing perception via its own medium. The ‘invisible fish’ 
are unseen, but in our imagination we have faith that they exist below the 
surface of the actual bay. The effect echoes the sailor who ‘gave his eyes’ to 
see the scene. In this state of removed consciousness, the mind speculates and 
reflects on its own functions, inventing conceits – perhaps the glass allows the 
bays ‘to blossom’ like a greenhouse, or is a tank intended to contain ‘invisible 
fish’ - and creating art in the process. 
 These two early poems show Elizabeth Bishop writing poems that 
focus on the activities of her own imagination; the objects of the external 
world provide the stimulation that sets her mind and imagination working. 
There seems to be a clear privileging of the mind over the world of objects. 
‘Over 2,000 Illustrations and a Complete Concordance’ extends this theme.46 
The poem reveals how the reality of foreign travel failed to live up to the 
imaginary travels inspired by looking at the illustrations. As such, it repeats 
the idea of travels in the imagination being preferable to travels in fact that 
we found in ‘The Imaginary Iceberg’. It can also be read as regret for the loss 
of religious faith. The final, vibrant image of the Nativity scene: 
 
- the dark ajar, the rocks breaking with light, 
an undisturbed, unbreathing flame, 
colorless, sparkless, freely fed on straw, (p. 58-9) 
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contrasts with the sordid and decaying ‘holy grave’ they actually saw: 
 
 An open, gritty, marble trough, carved solid 
 with exhortation, yellowed 
 as scattered cattle-teeth; 
 half-filled with dust.    (p. 58) 
 
The eyes that see ‘the rocks breaking with light’ are those of the child 
Elizabeth, as the childish designation of ‘a family with pets’ and the reference 
to ‘infant’ indicate. The final line concludes: ‘- and looked and looked our 
infant sight away.’ This is a rather ambiguous line. Anne Stevenson lists 
several possible readings. After mentioning that the passage as a whole, while 
voicing a regret for the loss of simple faith, resolves that issue ‘by escaping 
into art’, Stevenson finds in the final line a ‘Wordsworthian sense’ of the 
value of ‘infant sight’ but wonders why the poet wants to look it away 
(Stevenson, p. 40). One explanation, she suggests, could be that it is 
necessary to rid ourselves of childish beliefs; another that since ‘infant sight’ 
will disappear inevitably it is better to use it all up by looking while we have 
it. This latter seems a little contrived to me. 
 Stevenson then goes on to speculate that the ‘truth’ revealed to ‘infant 
sight’ might be accessible to the adult observer, if only they could look in the 
right way: 
 
Suppose she were to look and look, harder and harder, at ‘God’s 
spreading fingerprint’ in the book of life? Suppose she let her eyes 
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drop ‘weighted’ through those ‘ripples above the sand’ and through 
the storms of her own dreamy imagination until it freed her into an 
intimation of knowledge?     (p. 41) 
 
The terminology here suggests the possibility of access to a transcendental 
reality beyond that available to everyday vision. Stevenson is suggesting that 
Bishop might believe the ‘infant sight’ was more authentic, that the reality it 
perceived contained a greater truth than the contents of an adult 
consciousness can claim. Such a reading raises the issue of the authority 
which might be able to underwrite the notions of more authentic and greater 
truth. It is possible that Bishop might refer here to something equivalent to 
the phenomenological reduction; that the ‘infant sight’ is an image for the 
neutralisation of the intentionality of perception. It is based on physical 
observation but everything rests, I understand, on the role and function of the 
imagination in this process and the sources which imagination is tapping. It is 
a bold speculation, and one that will need further evidence before much can 
be made of it, but it is intriguing. 
 A final comment on this point: it is a common usage to add the word 
‘away’ immediately after a verb to express the idea of the action being 
performed without obstruction or restriction. Someone wishes to ask me some 
questions: ‘Fire away,’ I reply, to indicate that he is free to ask whatever he 
wishes. It is true that this is not exactly the construction that Bishop uses, but 
Stevenson comments that ‘Bishop herself probably could not have explained 
what she meant by “look and look our infant sight away”’ (p. 41). I would 
suggest that this common usage might be buried in her phrase and if so, it 
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would be in harmony with Stevenson’s notion of accessing the ‘truth’ of 
‘infant sight’, though I do not suggest that it is anything like proof. 
 The distinction that we have observed between looking outward to the 
external world or inward to the consciousness corresponds to the division 
David Kalstone identifies in Bishop’s work between observation and 
interiorisation.47 He goes on to mention her admiration of Gerard Manley 
Hopkins and refers to her notebook writings where, Kalstone comments, 
‘what engages her attention is the mysterious relation between the observed 
and what it “spiritually” signifies’ (p. 15). Kalstone is referring specifically to 
Bishop’s early work here and comments on the frequency of dream-like states 
of semi-consciousness which allow her protagonists to escape ‘into a prized 
state of withdrawal’ (Kalstone, p. 16). Comments such as these indicate a 
conflict between outward observation and the contents of imagination which 
is dramatised in the poem, ‘Squatter’s Children’, where the children, and even 
their house, are described as ‘specklike’ because of the distance between 
them and the observer, yet later a detail is added which it would clearly have 
been impossible to see: ‘one of their father’s tools, | a mattock with a broken 
haft’ (Bishop, p. 95). So Bishop’s imagination is supplying the truth that her 
consciousness wants to find in the scene but which is not accessible to 
physical vision. Something similar occurs in ‘The Fish’ where the intense 
observation and description of the fish includes ‘the course white flesh | 
packed like feathers’, ‘the little bones’, the ‘shiny entrails’ and ‘the pink 
swim-bladder’, none of which would have been available to eyesight (Bishop, 
1991, p. 42). The description could be read as dramatising the notion of going 	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  David Kalstone, Becoming a Poet (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2001), p.12. 
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beyond the mere surface of things, and although in ‘The Fish’ these details 
are prefaced with ‘I thought of’, in ‘Squatter’s Children’ the details are 
presented as if actually observed. It is, of course, perfectly possible to direct 
attention towards objects that are not present, what are called ‘empty 
intentions’ in phenomenology,48 but we also need to know what significance 
Bishop accords them. 
 I would suggest that there is an element of contradiction in these 
poems. Bishop is concerned with observing objects in the real world yet is 
conscious of the inevitable separation of her sense impressions from the 
things themselves and consequently seems to be distrustful of the evidence of 
her senses. She relies on the functioning of her imagination to arrive at an 
understanding of her relationship with the external universe but is committed 
to grounding that imaginative activity in physical reality, yet she goes beyond 
what can be physically seen in her attempt to achieve a complete knowledge 
of the object. This may constitute something more than the phenomenological 
notion of choice or directedness. There is thus a struggle to reconcile what is, 
ultimately, irreconcilable that gives her early work, as well as some later 
poems, their distinctive quality. 
 ‘A Miracle for Breakfast’ takes the idea of moving beyond physical 
vision a step further. The important point is not whether something that can 
be termed a ‘miracle’ has taken place; the point is the way of looking and the 
attitude, what Kalstone describes as belonging ‘to a speaker impatient for 
revelation. Craving signs of it everywhere’ (Kalstone, p. 50). I think that 
Kalstone’s word ‘revelation’ is most telling here in describing the element in 	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the poem we are concerned with. And as with the mattock in ‘Squatter’s 
Children’ and the bones in ‘The Fish’, imagination is required to bring about 
the conviction of its existence. 
 ‘At the Fishhouses’ is a poem that shows Bishop focusing more on the 
world of external objects and less on the functioning of mind and 
imagination, at least for most of its length.49 The reader can almost follow her 
eye moving around the scene she is observing: the old man netting, the 
structure of the fishhouses, the prevalence of the silver fish scales, the capstan 
behind the fishhouses and then back to the old man. After some lines, the 
poet-observer’s attention moves to the water’s edge, the ramp descending into 
the water, the water itself: ‘Cold dark deep and absolutely clear’ (Bishop, p. 
65). 
 Suddenly she breaks off, apparently distracted by the memory of a 
seal that she has seen several times which leads into an amusing anecdote of 
how she sang to him and he would regard her quizzically. Then the image of 
the water returns, beginning with exactly the same words: ‘Cold dark deep 
and absolutely clear | the clear grey icy water …’. Again she breaks off, this 
time to make a rather trivial and clichéd comment that ‘a million Christmas 
trees stand | waiting for Christmas’ (p. 65). It is as if her consciousness is not 
able, or ready, to take in and understand what the water means to her. In these 
breaks in the flow the reader senses Bishop’s subconscious processing of the 
data that nature is supplying. Gradually she allows her mind to imagine what 
it is. Visual description – ‘The water seems suspended | above the rounded 
gray and blue-gray stones’ - is interspersed with the products of speculative 	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imagination, although without the whimsicality of the speculations we noted 
in ‘The Map’ – ‘If you should dip your hand in, | your wrist would ache 
immediately’ (p. 65). The contradiction that the water being so cold would 
make your hand burn ‘as if the water were a transmutation of fire’ (p. 66) is 
both mysterious and an accurate account of the physical sensation. Finally, 
she  arrives at the point that she has been trying to reach: ‘It is like what we 
imagine knowledge to be’ (p. 66). 
 The reader feels this to be a moment of insight. Knowledge has been 
gained about the world, through observation and imagination combined. But 
intriguingly, Bishop makes a distinction between ‘our knowledge’ and ‘what 
we imagine knowledge to be’ (my italics) as if there were two types of 
knowledge. The knowledge which is not ours, which we only imagine, is 
emphatically rooted in the real world: ‘drawn from the cold hard mouth | of 
the world, derived from the rocky breasts | forever’ (p. 66) but it would seem, 
from the grammar of the lines, to be a form that we cannot know, only 
imagine. The role of imagination in the generation of knowledge is fully 
acknowledged here. The final line, however, suggests an overlap between 
these two forms of knowledge because, ‘since | our knowledge is historical’, 
the imagined knowledge is both ‘flowing, and flown’ (p. 66). The line 
appears to say that the form of the imagined knowledge is such as to be 
accessible to human perception, but it is gone as soon as it is received. The 
implication is that this knowledge which is not ours, is not historical, but 
timeless and unchanging. These are qualities which are alien to human 
perception. We may intuit this knowledge through imagination, but at the 
moment of intuition our human perceptions transform that knowledge into 
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historical terms and it is ‘flown’. This would offer some kind of explanation 
for the contradiction in the poem’s terminology. 
 George Szirtes notes the paradox of the image of the sea and the 
notion of flowing: ‘Rivers flow, the sea has tides. There are currents of 
course, but seas don’t flow.’50 I would argue, however, that this simply 
underlines my point that there are two types of knowledge at issue here: ‘our’ 
knowledge, which is historical, and the knowledge derived from this moment 
of insight, symbolized by the sea, which, as Szirtes goes on to remark and 
which I agree with, is ‘out of time, out of the river’ (p. 17). That knowledge 
which the sea symbolises is out of time; but the historical nature of ‘our’ 
knowledge demands that our perception of it is ‘flowing, and flown’. In other 
words, our perception is in time though the sea-knowledge itself is out of 
time. 
 There is, admittedly, some ambiguity in these lines from ‘At the 
Fishhouses’ and my reading requires a degree of interpretation but there is a 
sense here of intense observation leading to a momentary perception that is 
more than an awareness of physical objects. This knowledge is firmly rooted 
in those physical objects but it is also connected with the imagination, yet it is 
real. Terminology is difficult in this area of thought; words like mystical, 
spiritual, transcendental and metaphysical suggest themselves, and they are 
problematic. 
 Bishop repeatedly presents perception in subjective terms. ‘The 
Imaginary Iceberg’, ‘Arrival at Santos’, ‘Questions of Travel’ and ‘Quai 
d’Orleans’, of which Kalstone remarks that ‘we see nothing that is not already 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 George Szirtes, Fortinbras at the Fishhouses (Tarset: Bloodaxe Books, 2010), p. 16. 
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coloured by consciousness at the very moment of seeing’ (Kalstone, p. 67) 
are good examples. However, she frequently seems to ask whether the ‘pre-
existent element of choice’ (Mairet, p. 13) denies authenticity to human 
perceptions, and asks, moreover, whether it might be possible to circumvent 
that condition and arrive at a more authentic view of the external world. This 
is why it is so important to register that the sea-knowledge in ‘At the 
Fishhouses’ is not historical: choosing is a temporal activity; removing the 
temporal element restores the authenticity. This urge is Romantic and her 
questions remain unresolved, but the urge is present and it is interesting to see 
where it will finally lead her. 
 Several poems in the Brazil section of Questions of Travel continue 
the exploration of the relationship between the observing consciousness and 
the external world. The first three stanzas of ‘Arrival at Santos’51 focus on the 
scene as the poet-observer’s ship arrives in harbour. The poem opens with the 
plainest of plain-spoken language: ‘Here is a coast; here is a harbor’ (p. 89). 
The sentence structure and rhythm are reminiscent of children’s elementary 
readers. It is as if Bishop wants to emphasise the simplicity and 
unaffectedness of her observation - a disavowal of rhetoric, in fact. There will 
be no dressing up of the external world or attributing subjective emotions to 
objects. In the description that follows we are presented with several details: 
mountains, greenery, church and warehouses, but the tenor of the poem is 
quite removed from the extended, detailed description of ‘At the Fishhouses’. 
Bishop applies some surprising adjectives to the objects in the scene. The 
mountains are ‘self-pitying’ and ‘sad’, the greenery ‘frivolous’, the palm trees 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Bishop (1991), pp. 89-90. 
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‘uncertain’ and the colour of the warehouses is ‘feeble’. These adjectives, all 
of which describe human emotions and attitudes, clearly derive from the 
observing consciousness. Indeed, they largely correspond to the sensations 
the traveller experiences on arriving in a new and unknown country, as she 
reveals in the slightly self-mocking question that she puts to herself as a 
response to her observation of the scene: 
 
 is this how this country is going to answer you 
 
 and your immodest demands for a different world, 
 and a better life, and complete comprehension 
 of both at last [?]    (Bishop, p. 89) 
 
 There is uncertainty in the tone, possibly some sadness that shades 
into self-pity, though it could be read as tongue-in-cheek, and a degree of 
frivolity in the ‘immodest demands’. Bishop is clearly indicating here that her 
reception of the external world is dependent on her own state of mind as she 
observes. The natural world is looking back with the same characteristics 
with which Bishop regards it; the individual’s emotional state is very much in 
the forefront of this perception. Indeed, the poem reveals the directed nature 
of observation, making an attempt to examine how the poet-observer has 
directed her attention towards objects in the external world. Nerys Williams 
describes the process that I perceive here when she remarks of John 
Ashbery’s ‘Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror’ that ‘the poem performs 
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phenomenologically, it grants us the perception of perception’.52 Williams’s 
comment that Ashbery’s poem ‘points to the self-reflexive intricacies of self-
portraiture’ and that ‘the verisimilitude that we see in Parmigianino’s portrait 
results from “his reflection, of which the portrait | Is the reflection once 
removed”’ (p. 41) applies also to Bishop’s poem where the scene acts as a 
mirror, reflecting the observer’s characteristics which the poet reproduces in 
the vocabulary of her description. In other poems Bishop seeks to remove her 
self as much as possible from the contemplation; here, however, she does not. 
Instead, in a way that is comparable to the hesitations and breaks her 
consciousness made in the face of the cold, dark knowledge in ‘At the 
Fishhouses’, she interrupts her observation and focuses on breakfast and the 
practicalities of getting off ship and ashore. By the end of the poem, the 
impression the location has created is one of impermanence: the wasting 
away of soap, the slippage of postage stamps with defective glue, the 
departure of the tourists for a new location. The impressions supplied by the 
surroundings reflect the poet’s own state of mind. She too is transient, passing 
through. 
 Travel is a theme that recurs in several poems and it is often seen as 
posing a moral question. We have already noted the uncertainty over whether 
it might not be better to travel in the imagination only, as suggested in ‘The 
Imaginary Iceberg’ and ‘Over 2,000 Illustrations and a Complete 
Concordance’. ‘Brazil, January 1, 1502’ introduces a new dimension to that 
concern: the relationship between the traveller and the country, people and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Nerys Williams, Contemporary Poetry (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), p. 41.  
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culture that they come in contact with.53 The Christian Portuguese colonists 
provide an example of an attitude that respects neither the environment nor 
the local inhabitants. Jonathan Bate points out that Bishop’s stance here is 
ecopoetic: 
 
Bishop’s imagery always respects nature as it is and for itself, while at 
the same time recognizing that we can only understand nature by way 
of those distinctively human categories, history (the cannonball) and 
language (the shape of the letter ‘S’).54 
 
Bishop’s concern with how to observe the external world and 
understand the relationship between it and the observing consciousness 
expands in the course of this poem to take on this quite specific moral 
dimension. Questions of Travel asks these questions in their most explicit 
form: ‘Should we have stayed at home and thought of here? […] Is it right to 
be watching strangers in a play | in this strangest of theatres?’ (Bishop, p. 92). 
The image of the theatre here accords with the traveller’s sense of guilt at 
exploiting the foreign location and inhabitants for her own entertainment. In 
that respect, it amounts to a form of self-criticism. But there is the further 
sense in which it expresses the notion of artificiality. If everything is an act, 
then it is not genuine and real. However, the artificiality can only pertain to 
the observer’s perceptions. The place and people are genuine to themselves, 
but the directedness of the observer’s perceptions, if the phenomenological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Bishop (1991), pp. 91-92. 
54 Jonathan Bate, p. 65. 
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reduction fails or is impossible, prevents genuine knowledge of the objects in 
that world. Bishop here reveals the fear that she is not seeing the real world 
that is before her but what her imagination produces from it, that she imposes 
her imaginative perceptions on reality as she imposed the imaginary detail of 
the mattock’s broken haft in ‘Squatter’s Children’. So the role of the 
imagination, which in ‘At the Fishhouses’ resulted in acquisition of 
knowledge beyond sense perception, is here seen as containing the risk of 
artificiality, a kind of deception, or self-deception. It is this distrust of the 
process of observation that David Kalstone refers to when he writes: 
‘Physical vision seems tied to separateness and loss, and somehow to guilt’ 
(Kalstone, p. 17). 
 There is, then, a clear concern with philosophical and moral issues in 
Bishop’s work. Anne Stevenson refers to ‘the line of ontological-cum-
epistemological questioning’ and identifies this concern in ‘In the Waiting 
Room’, ‘Questions of Travel’, ‘Arrival at Santos’ and ‘At the Fishhouses’, 
amongst others. Stevenson points out that 
 
It is, of course, one thing to ask ‘big’ questions in plain language, 
another to answer them […] Nor do her poems, as a rule, provide 
more than signposts pointing to temporary resting places […] They go 
on so long, pointing and looking so intently that, by the end, some 
more abstract impression has to be felt. Only rarely, however, is this 
abstract idea identified, and even then it is often formulated as a 
question or a set of questions.  (Stevenson, p. 110-11) 
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Certainly, I am not looking for answers to these questions in the poetry. I am 
more interested in what they show about Bishop’s way of looking and how 
we might categorise that way of looking now, in the light of the processes we 
have observed at work. It is my view that the combination of intense 
observation and philosophical and imaginative speculation produce what 
might be termed a Romantic tone. 
 Isaiah Berlin points out that according to Romantic and existentialist 
theory, ‘the greatest virtue – the greatest of all – is what existentialists call 
authenticity, and what the romantics called sincerity.’55 As we have seen, 
Bishop is concerned about the authenticity of her actions and perceptions in 
the opening poems of the Brazil section of Questions of Travel. She is also 
concerned about the possibility of free will, another major tenet of the 
Romantics and existentialists, as Berlin goes on to explain. The title poem 
explores the issue of travelling or staying at home and finds benefits on both 
sides, ending by reiterating the question but then introducing a note of 
scepticism as to the possibility of free choice: ‘the choice is never wide and 
never free’ (Bishop, p. 94). The final line and a half extend the doubt even to 
the notion of home: ‘Should we have stayed at home, | wherever that may 
be?’ So on the one hand, Bishop is seeking authenticity in her freely-willed 
dealings with the world, but on the other hand she is uncertain that either the 
freedom or the authenticity is possible. In other words, her Romantic or 
existentialist instincts are undermined by her own awareness of the terms of 
perception. Again, we find the struggle to reconcile the irreconcilable. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Isaiah Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism (London: Pimlico, 2000), p. 139. 
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 The moral turn that Bishop’s deliberations on her perceptions, and 
importantly, on her actions, take in the Brazil poems raises issues that reflect 
Sartre’s existentialist concerns. Two central tenets in that philosophy are 
freedom of choice and individual responsibility: ‘the action presupposes that 
there is a plurality of possibilities, and in choosing one of these, they realise 
that it has value only because it is chosen’ (Sartre, p. 32). Similarly, the pre-
existent element of choice that phenomenology identifies in perception can be 
described as the attributing of ‘value’ to the preferred form of the perception. 
But whereas earlier phenomenologists sought to circumvent that subjectivity 
by the phenomenological reduction, Sartre relies on the project of value to 
confer meaning. These seem to be the ideas that Bishop is concerned with in 
those poems where she examines the role of consciousness in the nature of 
perception and whether the recognition of that role constitutes real knowledge 
or is an instance of inauthenticity. Choosing the quality of a perceived object 
– is the drawing of a rabbit or a duck? – fails to achieve full knowledge of the 
object. Bishop seems to be asking whether the same is true of the value 
ascribed to a given action. This is not a simple issue to resolve, but the notion 
of choice in perception involving ‘value’ seems a helpful alternative to terms 
like transcendental, spiritual and mystical that troubled us earlier. 
 This dilemma reflects on Bishop’s sense of her self and identity, 
which seems to be as divided as her perception of the outside world. A sense 
of a stable identity, of a place called home, where one belongs in a world 
where we understand our perceptions is placed in conflict with fractured 
impressions that leave the observer uncertain and doubtful and without a 
sense of belonging. This world of fractured impressions appears in the early 
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poem, ‘The Weed’, where each drop of water contains an ‘illuminated scene 
[…] (As if a river should carry all | the scenes that it had once reflected)’ 
(Bishop, p. 21), an image that serves also to represent memory. 
 But perhaps the clearest expression of this sense of fragmentation is 
the poem ‘Sandpiper’56. Stevenson remarks of this poem that it ‘was 
doubtless begun after Bishop had observed an actual sandpiper’ but that it 
very soon moves ‘in a personal direction’: ‘Everything the sandpiper sees or 
does reminds us of the poet’ (Stevenson, pp. 92-3). The terms in which 
Bishop describes the bird - ‘preoccupied’, ‘obsessed’, ‘looking for something, 
something, something’ - could serve as a summarised description of her 
writing. The world in this poem, as opposed to the figure of the bird, is 
presented in terms that emphasise its ambiguity, inconsistency and 
variableness: 
 
 […] a sheet 
 of interrupting water comes and goes 
 and gazes over his dark and brittle feet 
 […] 
 The world is a mist. And then the world is 
 minute and vast and clear.   (p. 131) 
 
By the end the bird has disappeared and we are left with the ‘millions of 
grains’ and each contains a world. There is a feeling of desperation and of 
wondering how to make sense of all this. 	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 The problem of how to feel at home in the world, and how to make a 
home for oneself, is a major concern of ‘Crusoe in England’57. Bishop’s poem 
imagines Crusoe’s life and sentiments in the period after the events related in 
Defoe’s novel. Back in England, Crusoe is, in a sense, back home, but he 
feels ‘bored’ (p. 166). His memories of life on the island are hardly easy, but 
they are certainly more active and dynamic. His comment, ‘Home-made, 
home-made! But aren’t we all?’ (p. 164), suggests that ‘we’, in other words, 
our self and identity, are the product of our own actions and our interaction 
with the environment we inhabit. This could suggest a degree of existential 
free will and self-determination, but Bishop is careful not to take a single and 
decided position on the question. Everything rests on the extent of the outside 
influences and whether they amount to predestination. Earlier, Crusoe had 
remarked: 
 
 “Do I deserve this? I suppose I must. 
 I wouldn’t be here otherwise. Was there 
 a moment when I actually chose this? 
 I don’t remember, but there could have been.”  (p. 163) 
 
The first two lines quoted suggest the possibility of predestination; the second 
two, the possibility of free choice; but neither is certain. What is certain is the 
transformation that the change in Crusoe’s circumstances has had on his 
perceptions. The knife that meant so much to him on the island no longer has 
any meaning: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Bishop (1991), pp.162-166. 
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 it reeked of meaning, like a crucifix. 
 It lived. How many years did I 
 beg it, implore it, not to break? 
 […] 
 Now it won’t look at me at all. 
 The living soul has dribbled away.    (p. 166) 
 
This really goes beyond looking, or sense perception; it is more like a 
relationship. The meaning or value that an object holds depends on the 
relationship that the individual has with it. The idea of the object that is 
derived from this relationship might be termed knowledge of the thing. 
 Throughout her work Bishop is concerned with how to establish that 
relationship with the objects in the external world. In the early poems we 
looked at her focus was more inward, on the role of her consciousness; in 
some of her later poems, and most notably, I think, ‘The Moose’, she aims to 
remove her self from the process of observation as far as possible. Anne 
Stevenson refers to an essay Bishop wrote on the topic of Marianne Moore’s 
animal poems in which she praised 
 
Moore’s ability ‘to give herself up entirely to the object under 
contemplation, to feel in all sincerity how it is to be it.’ Being ‘it’ for 
Bishop meant knowing instinctively how not to confuse ‘it’ with 
herself.    (Stevenson, p. 76) 
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Putting aside Bishop’s phrase, ‘to be it’, her point about ‘not confusing “it” 
with herself’ is surely apposite in the case of her own poem, ‘The Moose’.58 It 
describes, I would propose, something akin to Heidegger’s notion of Being 
(see section 2.4 above). 
 The moose, the animal, actually plays a small part in the poem in 
terms of number of lines: only six of the twenty-eight stanzas feature the 
animal, and two of those focus more on the passengers’ reactions. The 
description of the moose relies heavily on cliché and hyperbole. It ‘looms 
[…] Towering […] high as a church | homely as a house | (or, safe as houses). 
| […] otherwordly’ (Bishop, p. 172-3). And yet the moose dominates the 
poem. Partly, that is achieved by having so much scene-setting description 
while the reader, having registered the title, is waiting for the moose to 
appear. But it is also a canny admission on the part of the poet that we do not 
have the words to express the presence of the animal. Cliché and hyperbole 
are probably the best we have. ‘Loom’ is the best word for the standing of a 
moose, even though it is also the least original. Being ‘otherworldly’, the 
moose is best left outside our world. Attention is focused instead on the effect 
the animal’s appearance has on the passengers and on trying to evoke that in 
the reader. This is a further reason for the long build-up: it helps to place the 
reader imaginatively in the scene. ‘Why, why do we feel | (we all feel) this 
sweet | sensation of joy?’ the poet asks (p. 173). It is because we have been 
taken outside ourselves, had a glimpse, literally, into another world. Here 
again, Bishop’s view is amenable to ecocriticism; Jonathan Bate comments: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Bishop (1991), pp. 169 – 173.
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Bishop knows that we can only know nature by way of culture […] 
The moose is encountered on the road, a road being a piece of land 
that has been transformed by the demands of culture, a route from city 
to city. The moose comes to the bus, rather than vice versa. This is a 
poem not about getting back to nature, but about how nature comes 
back to us.     (Bate, p. 202) 
 
 What Bishop achieves in ‘The Moose’ is something very similar to 
what Heidegger describes when he writes: ‘ only one element is needful: to 
keep at a distance all the preconceptions and assaults of the above modes of 
thought, to leave the thing to rest in its own self, for instance, in its thing-
being.’ (Heidegger, pp. 30-31). The ‘above modes of thought’ to which 
Heidegger refers are those which attempt to define the thing as its traits, its 
manifold of appearances, and as formed matter. These concepts only give us 
factual, scientific information which we already possess; they do not give 
knowledge about the ‘thingly character of the thing’. Heidegger goes on: ‘The 
earth appears openly as itself only when it is perceived and preserved as that 
which is by nature undisclosable’ (p. 46). The work of art can achieve this: 
‘In the work of art the truth of an entity has set itself to work. […] Some 
particular entity, a pair of peasant shoes, comes in the work to stand in the 
light of its being’ (p. 35), as the moose stands, as a presence, in its poem. 
 David Kalstone, referring to the early poems and stories, comments on 
Bishop’s ‘sense of absence or half-presence in the world’ and remarks on the 
changed attitude in her later work: ‘Her commitment to the illusion of 
physical presence – her hallmark – was hard won’ (Kalstone, p. 22). Illusion 
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it may be, but the reader is not able to judge Bishop’s mental state as she 
wrote, only the tone of the poem. What is certain is that Bishop preserves the 
space between the observer and the outside world that we had noticed in the 
earlier poems. There is no sense of merging, no sense of transcending 
physical boundaries, and no sense of appropriating what is alien or other. 
Kalstone comments on Bishop’s reservations regarding Lowell’s use of 
experience and the external: 
 
Bishop simply felt not only that the outside world was often being 
absorbed and distorted by Lowell’s autobiographies […] but that he 
was “mythologizing” his life in a dangerous way, that the present was 
cripplingly shadowed by the burden of the past.     (p. 213) 
 
It is precisely this danger that Bishop avoids in ‘The Moose’. 
 Inevitably, the bus passengers’ reception of the sight they have seen, 
and the reader’s reception of the poem, are coloured by the human 
consciousness; describing the moose as ‘safe as houses’ is an example of that. 
But in the act of absorbed concentration we might forget ourselves for a 
moment. We can do the same when we read attentively, so that, although the 
real objects are not, cannot be, present in the poem, the quality of absorbed 
contemplation is the same in concentrated observation of the real world or 
concentrated reading of the text. So the moose becomes ‘The Moose’, an 
object in the real world that we experience intensely and recognise its value. 
 The issues raised throughout this chapter have relevance to ecocritical 
approaches to writing. ‘The Moose’ specifically can be read as representing 
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the ideas Timothy Morton proposes under his term ‘dark ecology’: ‘Rather 
than seeking some false oneness, acknowledging the gap is a paradoxical way 
of having greater fidelity to things’ (Morton, p. 142). This describes the 
position that Bishop adopts in her poem. Morton argues that ‘openness to 
nonidentity […] is still a kind of subjectivity’ (p. 182) and that ‘dark ecology 
dances with the subject-object duality […] to love the thingness’ (p. 185), 
with the goal ‘that the narrator or protagonist is radically involved with his or 
her world, and thus responsible for it’ (p. 187). Bishop treats the moose in 
nature in a similarly objective style. Her treatment of the poem’s subject also 
reminds us of Charles Olson’s requirements for ‘projective verse’: ‘the 
getting rid of the lyrical interference of the individual as ego’.59 In the next 
chapter I shall examine Olson’s comments more closely and in relation to my 
next poet, Roy Fisher. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Acquiring secrets objects share: an examination of Roy Fisher’s poetry 
in the light of Charles Olson’s ‘objectism’ 
 
At the start of the second section of his essay, ‘Projective Verse’, Charles 
Olson defines the core issue as being ‘the degree to which the projective 
involves a stance toward reality outside the poem as well as a stance towards 
the reality of the poem itself’.60 This, writes Olson, is ‘a matter of content’ 
and he goes on to coin the term, ‘objectism’, which he distinguishes from 
‘objectivism’,61 in his formulation of what this means: 
 
Objectism is the getting rid of the lyrical interference of the individual 
as ego, of the ‘subject’ and his soul, that peculiar presumption by 
which western man has interposed himself between what he is as a 
creature of nature […] and those other creatures of nature which we 
may, with no derogation, call objects.   (pp. 47-8) 
 
Such a description suggests the opposite of that aspect of Romantic verse that 
emphasises the individual imagination:  
 
 […] the mind of man becomes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 A Charles Olson Reader, p. 47. 
61 Donald Davie (With The Grain p. 275) quotes George Oppen on the definition of ‘objectivism’ . The word refers 
not to an ‘objective attitude to reality’ but to the ‘objectification of the poem’. Davie gives the citation: Serge 
Faucherau, ‘Three Oppen Letters with a note’, Ironwood 5, Tucson, Arizona (1975), pp. 78-85. 
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 A thousand times more beautiful than the earth 
 On which he dwells […] 
 […] as it is itself 
 Of substance and of fabric more divine.62 
 
Olson’s approach is grounded in material reality and is closer to Morton than 
to William Wordsworth. Olson then claims that through the pursuit of 
‘objectism’ the writer ‘will be able to listen, and his hearing through himself 
will give him secrets objects share’ (Olson, p. 48). The reference to ‘objects’ 
here accords with the notion of material reality, but the sense of the word 
‘secrets’ must imply that whatever this knowledge is, it is not ordinarily 
perceived; it has the quality of being hidden from view. This in turn must lead 
us to speculate as to why this knowledge should be ordinarily unperceived, 
how perception might be achieved, and what the nature of knowledge which 
is available to objects might be. The notion of hidden and secret knowledge 
which is lodged in the world of objects has a Romantic ring, which might 
seem surprising, and even contradictory, beside the more materialist terms 
that Olson uses. 
 However, it might be that what Olson is really getting at here is the 
quality of perception. One way to understand what that could mean is through 
the theory of Victor Shklovsy who emphasised that ‘as perception becomes 
habitual, it becomes automatic’.63 The function of art is to ‘recover the 
sensation of life […] to impart the sensation of things as they are perceived 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 William Wordsworth, The Prelude (1805), XIII. 446-52. 
63 Victor Shklovsky, ‘Art as Technique’ in Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays, trans. and ed. by Lee T. 
Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), pp. 3-24, (p. 11). 
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and not as they are known’ (Shklovsky, pp. 11-12). The knowledge that 
Olson speaks of then becomes simply that derived from perception which is 
not clouded by habit; it is only secret insofar as automatic perception misses 
the nature of the thing observed. This explanation chimes with the general 
sense and tone of Olson’s essay but in the examination that follows I intend to 
keep in mind the Romantic tendency that Olson’s terminology suggests. 
 Roy Fisher’s name has frequently been linked to Olson’s, and others 
of the Black Mountain poets. Similar to Olson’s concerns in his essay, 
Fisher’s work is, in Sean O’Brien’s words, concerned with ‘the processes of 
perception, representation and interpretation’.64 It is the purpose of this 
chapter to examine whether Olson’s definition of projective verse might be 
useful in helping to identify the quality of Fisher’s approach to these issues of 
‘perception, representation and interpretation’. 
 In his introduction to The Thing About Roy Fisher, Peter Robinson 
draws attention to the conflicting views of Fisher’s work.65 For example, 
despite acknowledging Fisher’s position outside the mainstream of English 
poetry, Donald Davie places Fisher in a social democratic tradition dominated 
by Thomas Hardy. Eric Mottram, on the other hand, ‘presented Fisher as the 
English exponent of an international modernism’ and as an experimentalist. 
Robinson then goes on to list critics who have variously described Fisher as a 
modernist, a non-modernist and a postmodernist, and points out that Fisher 
has described himself as a Romantic. Andrew Crozier has used the terms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Sean O’Brien, The Deregulated Muse (Newcastle upon Tyne: Bloodaxe Books, 1998), p. 121. 
65 Peter Robinson, ‘Introduction’, in The Thing About Roy Fisher: Critical Studies, ed. by John Kerrigan and Peter 
Robinson (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000), pp. 1-15 (pp. 9-10). 
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‘mysticism’ and ‘transcendence’ in describing Fisher’s work,66 yet Fisher has 
also been described as writing a poetry of things in the tradition of William 
Carlos Williams. 
 Partly, this wide range of critical assessments is evidence of the fact 
that Fisher’s work does not fit into any of the customary categories. He ‘does 
not occupy a position in contemporary poetry’, as Robinson puts it (p.10). It 
is also evidence of a pluralistic quality in his work. However, it might seem to 
be somewhat surprising that this pluralism should give rise to such 
contradictory assessments and it is worth examining what there is in the 
writing that accounts for this and identifying whether that explanation can be 
linked to Fisher’s methods of representing the objects of perception and the 
terms Olson uses in defining projective verse. 
 The issue of representation is raised in an essay by Michael O’Neill in 
which he refers to a resistance to ‘symbols’ and goes on to quote Eric 
Mottram, ‘that nothing can really stand for another thing’,67 a comment which 
might have its origin in a suspicion of rhetorical devices, particularly 
metaphor. O’Neill proceeds further to observe that writers who hold this 
belief produce work which is ‘inductive and empiricist’.68 This suggests 
writing which is grounded in sense experience and which infers general truths 
from the observation of particular instances. Such an account of the writing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Quoted by Ralph Pite in ‘”Coming into their Own”: Roy Fisher and John Cowper Powys’ in The Thing About Roy 
Fisher, pp.231-56 (p.242). 
67 Michael O’Neill, ‘”Exhibiting Unpreparedness”: Self, World and Poetry’ in The Thing About Roy Fisher, pp. 209-
30 (p. 209). 
68 O’Neill is quoting Peter Barry when he uses these terms. 
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process might lead the reader to expect poems which focus exclusively on 
concrete objects in the real world. 
 Mottram was one of the leaders of the radical group that challenged 
the poetry establishment in the 70s. His sentiments were echoed by another 
radical poet, Andrew Crozier, of whom Edward Larrissy comments that ‘he 
finds contemporary British poetry vitiated by an alliance of the “lyric self” 
with an intrusively “figurative” technique’.69 Ironically, all language consists 
of one thing standing for another; that is why the real cannot be represented, 
except as representation. But there is also clearly a choice of attitude available 
to the writer as to the degree to which, as Davie puts it, ‘words symbolize 
anything beyond themselves’ or ‘stubbornly point to that which they name, 
and to nothing else, to nothing “beneath” or “above” or “beyond”’.70 
 Larrissy’s comments on Crozier echo Olson’s on objectism in that 
both refer disparagingly to the ‘lyric self’. Olson sees this self ‘interposed’ 
between man’s being and the natural world of things; Crozier sees it 
operating ‘intrusively’. In order to perceive accurately the observer needs to 
escape from his or her personal identity, to be more alive to the thing itself, 
without interference. The use of overly figurative language is reckoned to 
constitute a form of such interference. It will be useful to bear this attitude in 
mind, and to place beside it the function of association between objects that 
allows poets to explore internal states and emotions in terms of images drawn 
from the natural world. This is a function that we found to be of great 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Edward Larrissy, ‘Poets of A Various Art’ in Contemporary British Poetry, p. 75. 
70 Donald Davie, ‘One Way to Misread Briggflats’, reprinted in With the Grain, p.289. 
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importance in the work of Elizabeth Bishop. It is now time to examine 
Fisher’s work in the light of these considerations. 
 
Issues of observation and of how to represent the sense perceptions that the 
observing consciousness receives are the focus of Fisher’s poem, ‘The 
Memorial Fountain’,71 where he writes: 
 
 As for the fountain: 
   nothing in the describing 
 beyond what shows 
   for anyone […] 
 no ‘atmosphere’ […] 
 I don’t exaggerate.   (Fisher, p. 167) 
 
This amounts to a declaration of plain-spokenness. Later he states that he is 
‘working | to distinguish an event | from an opinion’ (p. 167). In other words, 
Fisher wants his description to show us the thing itself, not to tell us his 
opinion about it. However, this approach is problematic. Language is not so 
innocent. When Fisher uses the word ‘gaunt’ for the shadows and ‘garish’ for 
the twilight he is selecting words that carry a tone, create an atmosphere. He 
even brings this atmosphere into the poem explicitly in the phrase ‘sombre 
mood’. So there seems to be a contradiction in the poem, and Fisher is aware 
of it. After declaring his intention to avoid exaggeration he returns to his 
description with the phrase, ‘And the scene?’ This is followed by: ‘a thirty-	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   167 
five-year-old man, | poet, | by temper, realist’, which would fit Fisher himself 
as the observer. The observing consciousness is inseparable from its 
observations. So the poem is not just about a fountain; it is about the poet 
watching the fountain. The ‘sombre mood’ is the mood of the poet, ‘in the 
presence of things’ certainly, but the mood is subjective, it is not part of the 
external world he is observing. In fact, he draws attention to this by adding, 
‘no matter what things’, thereby indicating that his mood would be as it is 
whatever he looked at, and it is his mood that causes him to select ‘gaunt’ and 
‘garish’. It seems that Fisher’s intention is not to achieve a pure, objective 
description of the thing itself, but to describe the event of observing. That 
would necessarily include the observing consciousness, too. But Fisher has 
written, ‘nothing in the describing | beyond what shows | for anyone’; ‘what 
shows | for anyone’ cannot be individual and subjective. And more than 
mood, the poet has a ‘temper’, which is realist and this leads him to debate 
the virtues of pure description. Debate like this does not really fall within the 
terms of ‘working to distinguish an event from an opinion’. Fisher is aware of 
all this but clearly the subject interests him enough to include the 
contradictions in the poem. Hence his final, ironic comment that the goal he 
has been debating for his writing is a ‘romantic notion’. 
 Michael O’Neill points out that 
 
‘The Memorial Fountain’ suggests the difficulty of escaping the ‘self’ 
[…] Fisher’s poem is a beautifully controlled illustration of the 
impossibility of distinguishing ‘event’ from ‘opinion’ […] The semi-
humorous phrase, ‘by temper, realist’, implies that ‘realism’ involves 
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subjective preference, but it does not free one from the dilemma that 
poetic knowledge will negotiate between ‘event’ and ‘opinion’.  
(O’Neill, p. 217) 
 
In ‘Projective Verse’, Olson seems to suggest that he believes the removal of 
the ‘self’ to be a possibility, whereas here O’Neill is emphasising the 
difficulty, or rather, Fisher’s perception of the difficulty, of achieving that. 
Earlier in the same essay, O’Neill states the case in somewhat stronger terms: 
‘At the heart of his [Fisher’s] work is the unignorable fact of his own 
subjectivity’ (p. 210). 
 The term ‘realism’ may be understood as something different to 
having faith in our ability to have direct knowledge of the external world and 
to represent that knowledge through language. Given the belief that ‘self’ can 
never be removed from our understanding of the impressions we receive 
through our senses, ‘realism’ might be understood to be an accurate portrayal 
of the operations of sense impressions on the observing consciousness. That 
would mean observing and describing as precisely as possible but including 
the operation of consciousness as a necessary element in that process. 
  ‘The Memorial Fountain’ does exactly this. ‘The Sidings at Drebkau’ 
offers a more extreme example of the same process.72 It begins with realist 
description of the railway line and freight trains. The language here mimics 
its subject: lines 3-7 move with a heavy, slow, clunking rhythm, like shunting 
trains, which is achieved by the use of hard consonants. After line 7 the 
rhythm speeds up, like the trains gathering speed as the scene moves out into 	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open country. As the poem progresses we become more aware of the poet-
observer and his judgements, at first implicit in the choice of words like 
‘hacked’, ‘flayed’ and ‘deaden’, but becoming more explicit in verse 4. Fisher 
is examining his own response to the scene, the contents of his consciousness, 
as much as he is examining the content of the scene itself. His approach is 
similar to Bishop’s in ‘Arrival at Santos’ and ‘Brazil, January 1, 1502’. In the 
last verse the poet’s consciousness becomes explicitly the location for the 
event of the poem as he assimilates the scene he has been observing and 
records the impressions the scene has made on his consciousness, the 
historical awareness it elicits, ending finally at ‘home’ (Fisher, p. 172). 
 Does this go against Olson’s prescription for the removal of the self in 
‘objectism’? Not necessarily, if we understand Olson’s objection to ‘the 
lyrical interference of the individual ego’ to refer to a habit of seeing external 
reality only through the needs of the subject. If Olson’s objection is to poetry 
that manipulates the natural world, viewing objects in the natural world 
purely as vehicles by which to express human emotions, rather than as objects 
in their own right, then Fisher’s approach of examining his response in the 
face of an accurate recording of the impressions objects make on his 
consciousness accords with Olson’s recommendation. The poet’s 
consciousness is responding to the external stimuli, not recognising a pre-
existing emotion and then imposing it on the external scene. Fisher is here 
adopting an ecocritical approach as described by Laurence Coupe: 
 
any literature which addresses the natural environment, should 
acknowledge its ‘dual accountability’ – that is, to both outer and inner 
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landscapes. Thus, nature is best represented, not through a flat 
‘naturalism’ but rather through a creative play of language which 
alerts the reader to the delicate poise between the non-human world 
and the human mind.73 
 
 Coupe’s comment places emphasis on the role of the observing 
consciousness in representations of external reality and on the possibility of 
language establishing the relationship between them, which I feel to be 
applicable to Fisher. Marjorie Perloff, though, expresses some doubts about 
both sides of this model with respect to Fisher. 
 Perloff is sceptical of the view that Roy Fisher is an empiricist poet 
and the popular linking of Fisher with William Carlos Williams, Charles 
Olson and members of the Black Mountain group. In Perloff’s view the 
connection is tenuous and is at least partly attributable to critics being ‘misled 
[…] by Fisher’s stated predilection for a poetry of “things”’.74 She develops 
her argument to demonstrate that Fisher is not as realist and ‘thingy’ as many 
critics suggest. Indeed, she identifies a refusal ‘to let the images do the work’ 
and a distrust of perceptual sensations, which somewhat contradicts both the 
popular view of Fisher and his own statements in interview (p.153). 
Furthermore, she maintains that ‘“ideas” […] are definitely not congenial to 
Fisher’ and she goes on to refer to his dislike of a ‘poetry of moral or political 
statement’ (pp.153-4). I can agree that moral and political statement, at least 
of a didactic nature, is alien to Fisher, though a moral and political stance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Laurence Coupe, ‘Introduction to Part Four’ in The Green Studies Reader, pp. 157-9 (p.158). 
74 Marjorie Perloff, p.151. 
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may be found in his work. For example, his comment when discussing The 
Ship’s Orchestra that he was ‘not interested in making … a thing which has 
got an authoritarian centre’, I take to indicate a political stance (Fisher, 2000, 
p.58). However, that Fisher is not interested in ideas seems quite wrong to 
me. In an earlier interview he even cites Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus-
Logico-Philosophicus (1921) as ‘a very splendid sort of stylistic influence for 
one to adopt’ (p.43). It is true that Fisher refers here to Wittgenstein’s style, 
rather than content, but the reference is suggestive, particularly since the 
Tractatus is concerned with the nature of reality, the status of things and the 
role of language in mediating experience. 
 I would suggest that there is both a reliance on perceptual experience 
and a distrust of perceptual sensations in Fisher’s work and the existence of 
these opposing elements leads him to explore the nature and validity of his 
perceptions. This constitutes an interest in ideas. According to objectivism,75 
the poem is an independent object in the real world that readers can 
experience as they experience other objects. And like other objects, the poem 
can be associated in the readers’ minds with other elements they have come in 
contact with. Furthermore, the poem is a language construction and it is in the 
nature of language to form its own connections and associations, 
independently of the speakers and writers. Denise Riley refers to this aspect 
of language: 
 
All language in use […] both is and isn’t under the control of its 
speakers and writers […] If there is ‘an unconscious’ which is in part 	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language, but if language itself can also be argued to have an 
unconscious of its own and to possess a remainder, to be at the mercy 
of the invasive determinations of sound associations, of the wild and 
fruitful propagations of metaphor, and so on – then the speaker and 
writer become even less the masters of their utterance.76 
 
Through the connections and associations produced by both the mind and 
language the poem can become connected to events or issues beyond the 
referents of its own vocabulary in the external world. Fisher takes advantage 
of this to do some thinking about ideas in the process of producing his poems. 
It may be this very aspect of the creative process that Perloff is responding to 
when she refers to Fisher ‘refusing to let the images do the work’. The ‘work’ 
is seeking for something beyond the image, contrary to imagist theory and the 
approach preferred by Mottram, Crozier and Davie. In Coupe’s terms, 
Fisher’s text acknowledges its ‘dual accountability’. 
 Fisher himself says that he has no training in abstract thought and is 
suspicious of it (Fisher, 2000, p. 57). Fisher likes ideas, but he handles them 
like a poet, not a philosopher, as in ‘The Memorial Fountain’. This means that 
the reader may not find a consistent and logical working out of a 
philosophical position in Fisher’s poetry. Rather Fisher allows the associative 
qualities of language to explore the possibilities of various lines of inquiry 
and speculation. The result is indeterminate.77 If Perloff means that, then I can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Denise Riley, The Words of Selves: Identification, Solidarity, Irony (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 
pp.12-13. 
77 Ian Gregson makes exactly this point when he refers to ‘Fisher’s central concerns with the complexities of 
perception and the problematic nature of representation […] Fisher’s poems are consequently indeterminate in their 
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agree with her. What the reader can find is a philosophical curiosity and an 
exploration of ideas related to external reality and perception. In ‘An 80th 
Birthday Card for Roy Fisher’ Fleur Adcock writes, ‘your poems are not 
songs; they are to think with’ and I feel she is absolutely correct.78 
Importantly, ‘they are to think with’, apart from being a witty glance at the 
opening line of ‘Texts for a Film’, indicates that the ideas in Fisher’s poems 
are not definitive. Rather, they are in a raw form, for the reader to go to work 
on. 
 The ideas that Fisher explores in his work have to do with these issues 
of sense perceptions, the external world, and the relation between the two. As 
a result of these interests, Fisher’s writing contains a lot of ‘things’. Perloff 
refers to John Kerrigan’s comment on the ‘state of empirical overload’ and 
the ‘exhausted encounter with the real’ (Perloff, p. 152) in Fisher’s early 
poems, but goes on to observe herself that Fisher is ‘a poet drawn to the 
“perceptual field” of sensations, who doesn’t in fact quite trust those 
sensations either’ (Perloff, p. 153). This places Fisher in the same 
philosophical camp as the phenomenologists who maintain that empirical 
facts cannot give complete knowledge of an object and potentially in 
agreement with Heidegger that Being cannot be reduced to the data of 
sensory perception. It is also a crucial point to remember when reading his 
work because it takes us a good way towards understanding the impulses and 
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Ian Gregson, Contemporary Poetry and Postmodernism: Dialogue and Estrangement (Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Press, 1996), p. 172. 
78 Fleur Adcock in An Unofficial Roy Fisher, ed. by Peter Robinson (Exeter: Shearsman Books, 2010), p.38. 
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motivation that give rise to Fisher’s style of writing. He not only records the 
impressions that he receives of the external world through his senses, but at 
the same time he questions the content of those impressions, exploring their 
unreliability and inconsistency. Ian Gregson identifies this tendency as a 
particularly British response to postmodernism: 
 
So where the work of thorough postmodernists is about the relentless 
deconstruction of the “real”, there is in the work of even the most 
postmodern of British poets a tendency to accord the real a residual 
respect and allow it a residual place.   (Gregson, p. 5) 
 
Gregson identifies in Fisher ‘a stubbornly pre-postmodernist resistance to 
pure fictiveness’ and ‘a modernist anxiety over the boundaries of knowledge’ 
combined with ‘explorations of the fragmentariness of being’ (p. 5). 
 The notion of distrust of sense impressions is identifiable in several 
early poems but it also leads to the idea that there might be a way of 
perceiving which avoids the usual faults and inaccuracies. There is an 
attempt, or speculation about the possibility of attempting, to shrug off 
whatever is false in the poet-observer’s reception of those sense impressions 
by constantly questioning the validity of the impressions the observer is 
conscious of. The residual place allowed to the real is located in the 
possibility that identifying and removing those false impressions brings the 
observer into closer contact with external reality. I will give this practice the 
term, ‘perceptual-realism’. I want to use the term ‘perceptual-realism’ to 
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distinguish it from the nineteenth-century form of realism with its faith in the 
ability of language to describe the external world transparently. 
 In ‘Linear’79 and ‘Kingsbury Mill’80, this perceptual-realism is 
presented as an openness to the flux and plurality of life as opposed to hiding 
from it in routine and repetition. This perceptual-realist temper means always 
seeing things in Shklovskian style as if for the first time and in a different 
light: recognising is not perceptual-realism, but escapism.81 In both poems, 
travelling is used as an image for the possibility of that sense of fresh and 
changing experience. In ‘Linear’, Fisher describes travelling as: 
 
 a long line without anything 
 you could call repetition 
 
 always through eroded 
 country   (Fisher, 2005, p. 163) 
 
In ‘Kingsbury Mill’, Fisher is even more explicit about this desire to shrug off 
old habits of perception: 
 
 If only, when I travelled, 
 I could always really move – 
 not take the apparatus, 	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81 Fisher uses the phrase ‘escapist realism’ to refer explicitly to this attitude in ‘Day In, Day Out’, Fisher (2005), 
p.175. 
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 teeth and straps, 
 the whole thought-mangle. 
 
The sight of Kingsbury Mill itself is followed by 
 
 Feeling the load of what’s behind 
 like steel bars caving in a lorry-cab 
 racketing onwards through the pause. (p. 162) 
 
The impact of the steel bars is an image of the weight of the cultural baggage 
the sight of the mill, and the naming of it, sets in motion. In ‘Kingsbury Mill’, 
that weight of preconception overrides any possibility of new perception. The 
poem begins, ‘If only […]’, implying that the desired condition did not 
transpire, and no preconception-free idea of the mill is offered. On the 
contrary, the poem questions whether it is even possible to escape such 
cultural programming and the predetermined effects of language use. There is 
a similar questioning of the ideal of genuine perception in ‘Linear’, where the 
‘long line without […] repetition’ ends as ‘crazily long and determined’. In its 
sense of ‘not giving up’, ‘determined’ is a concept full of will and energy; but 
it also means ‘predestined’, which actually contradicts the first sense. What 
use is will and energy if everything is already decided? As in ‘Memorial 
Fountain’, Fisher is speculating about ideas that remain beyond his reach but 
which attract him with the possibility of shrugging off false perceptions and 
acquiring some new knowledge of objects in the external world. 
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 Such an ideal might be described as an aim towards greater realism, 
but the term ‘realism’ is problematic because of its reference to an earlier way 
of approaching the objects of the external world, as mentioned above: an 
incarnation of the ‘thought-mangle’, in fact. Fisher does not always make the 
sense in which he is using the word clear. This may well be an intentional use 
of ambiguity and designed to draw the reader into the process of investigating 
the terms of perception and representation, just as I am doing now. It might 
also be called an effect of writing as a poet rather than a philosopher. In ‘Day 
In, Day Out’,82 for example, Fisher writes: 
 
 Escapist realism, 
 flight for a day 
 on a determinist train […] 
 
 Likelihood 
 of a certain emotion at the flight’s extremity 
 great unlikelihood of its failure 
 to be conjurable[.]    
 
This suggests that realism is a screen for escapism into a predetermined and 
acted social identity and that the mood or emotion is preconceived;83 a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Fisher (2005), p. 175. 
83 Denise Riley describes this process: ‘As I project myself as being a such-and-such, I tacitly envisage myself 
participating in the wider social scene through some new identity category as I step, gingerly or proudly, across its 
threshold. Any act of identification is systematically askew, since I’m envisaging what I presume that I’m supposed, 
in the eyes of others, to really be’ (Riley, The Words of Selves, p.13). The narrator in Fisher’s poem is projecting 
such an identity and the poem is the vehicle that communicates it to ‘the wider social scene’. 
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manufactured emotion that the poem’s speaker believes he wants to have, or 
believes others will expect him to exhibit. This is the effect of the word 
‘certain’ before ‘emotion’, and also of the ‘unlikelihood of its failure | to be 
conjurable’. This is the thought-mangle again. The question of whether the 
reader understands this to apply to a nineteenth-century style of realism, or 
whether it applies equally to the poet-observer’s failed attempts to evade 
repetition in his perceptions, the perceptual-realism I have described remains 
an open one. 
 Another early poem, ‘Toyland’, also suggests the possibility of seeing 
beyond superficial appearances to some deeper reality, described by the 
phrase, ‘the secret laugh of the world’84. Interestingly, Fisher uses a word 
here, ‘secret’, from Olson’s description of the qualities derived by the poet 
from the application of objectism. In its beginning, ‘Toyland’ could be read 
as objectism in practice. The poem records the observations of the narrator 
with an attention to detail that serves to erase his presence from the scene 
while focusing on objects and surroundings. Such a self-effacing attitude 
chimes with Olson’s prescription for removing the ‘individual as ego’. Ian 
Sansom describes this aspect of the poem as ‘withdrawal up and away from 
the people’ and ‘drawing apart from the crowds’.85 Fisher’s attitude to the 
notion and to the ‘secret’ seems to be ambivalent, however. In the first place, 
the poem’s speaker is unable to get at the secret: ‘I don’t know what the joke 
is’ (Fisher, p. 181). In this respect, ‘Toyland’ shares the uncertainty of the 
other poems on this theme. Furthermore, the treatment of the external 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Fisher (2005), p. 180-181, (p. 181). 
85 Ian Sansom, ‘”The Secret Laugh of the World”’ in The Thing about Roy Fisher, ed. by Kerrigan and Robinson, 
pp.193-208 (p.203). 
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elements in the poem, the people particularly, is problematic. Far from 
observing Olson’s exhortation of ‘getting rid […] of the individual ego’, the 
narrator of ‘Toyland’ is very much present and in judgemental mood. The 
self-effacing quality mentioned above applies only to the first half of the 
poem. Composed of twelve couplets, the pronoun ‘I’ first appears in the 
seventh couplet. Between that point and the end it is used nine times. Ian 
Sansom goes on to observe that the narrator’s ‘drawing apart clearly assumes 
a standing above […] implies a God-like omnipresence’ (Sansom, p. 204). 
There is a patronising, supercilious, even arrogant, tone in some of the terms 
Fisher chooses to apply to the characters: ‘they spread formality’, ‘staunch 
smilers’, ‘nubile young lily-ladies’, ‘their calm hands’, ‘we know what they 
will do’. It is worth asking who ‘we’ refers to in the last of those phrases. 
Does Fisher include the reader in this power to know the secret doings of 
others? The reference to ‘making water’ is presumably intended to place the 
characters in some way but its effect is more that of sneering. The title of the 
poem compounds the problem. ‘Toyland’ suggests triviality and the poem 
seems to imply that that characteristic adheres to its inhabitants. It is also 
worth considering whether we read ‘Toyland’ as spoken in Fisher’s personal 
voice, or as a dramatic monologue, though there is no clear indication as to 
the identity of the persona. 
 ‘Linear’, ‘Kingsbury Mill’, ‘The Memorial Fountain’, ‘Day In, Day 
Out’ and ‘Toyland’ all share this concern with perception and the 
interpretation of sense data. They all seek to arrive at, or speculate about, a 
level of perception that might be termed as ‘secret knowledge’. In this they 
might seem to conform to Olson’s ideal of objectism. Where they depart from 
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that ideal is in their recognition of the failure of the project and their 
questioning of the terms in which it is phrased. 
 Light and the effects that it can create are recurring elements in 
Fisher’s poetry and they are frequently associated with appearances changing 
and misperception, but there are also cases when this experience is associated 
with the notion of acquiring a true vision of the external world. In the prose 
section following ‘The Sun Hacks’ from City,86 there is a series of misleading 
appearances: a drunken engine-driver leaning against a pile of baskets, 
clutching a parcel, looks at first like an embracing couple. The section goes 
on to draw a contrast between a view of the city and its inhabitants which 
recognises individuality and variety and the ‘unformed stirrings and shovings 
spilling across the streets’ (Fisher, pp. 37-8). The implication is that the 
various ways of seeing the figures and objects that are described here all have 
their own validity. However, this perhaps overly-rational conclusion is 
complicated by Fisher’s comment on his vision of the engine-driver: ‘I could 
not banish the thought that what I had first seen was in fact his own 
androgynous fantasy, the self-sufficient core of his stupor’ (p. 37). It is 
interesting that he describes this ‘core’ as ‘self-sufficient’, which suggests 
that the vision is not dependent on the imagination of the observer, but is 
something independent emanating from the figure observed and that he has 
therefore gained access to another individual’s fantasy. This would seem to 
suggest that the vision of the engine-driver as an embracing couple was not 
entirely a case of misperception. If the sight of the couple embracing was the 
engine-driver’s own fantasy, then the observer-narrator has seen something 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Fisher (2005), pp. 27-44. 
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which is ordinarily unperceived; something that might be described as 
‘secret’. This train of logic could lead us to the suspicion that such ‘secret 
knowledge’ might be obtained by apparently misperceiving concrete objects, 
the so-called misperception having a validity of its own. This speculation 
borders on the mystical. It is also important to notice that Fisher never says 
that any of these things are so. The first step in the train of reasoning is not a 
fact but ‘the thought’ that the observer-narrator ‘could not banish’. There is 
nothing in the poem that endorses this thought. The passage remains 
indeterminate; the reader is drawn in once again to wonder how far to go 
along the path of speculation. 
 ‘The Square House: April’ offers a more explicit example of what 
might be an instance of insight.87 The poem opens with simple and direct 
description: 
 
 Dawn birds at noon 
 on a still pale grey 
 April day with a tractor 
 behind the wood and aeroplane sounds 
 hidden in the sky[.]  
 
 The style and tone is plain-spoken; the timbre of the line ‘April day with a 
tractor’ is suggestive of William Carlos Williams’s red wheelbarrow.88 But 
there is another element in the poem which is only identified as ‘something’: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Fisher (2005), p. 186. 
88 William Carlos Williams, Spring and All (New York: New Directions Books, Paperback Original edition, 2011), 
p. 74. 
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‘There’s something in the fluid air’. It may be this ‘something’ that gives rise 
to the disorienting experience of all of the several species of birds that are 
mentioned possessing characteristics different to how they are named. The 
magpie is ‘like a parrot’, the ringdoves rise on ‘phoenix wings’, finches jump 
‘like lice’, the blackbird is ‘a luminous emblem’, and all together these are 
‘dawn birds’ seen ‘at noon’. The poem’s narrator says that the birds ‘sense’ 
this ‘something’, and finally: ‘They are in it. I | witness it. It is in | me.’ The 
poem seems to record a moment of insight, comparable to Bishop’s in ‘At the 
Fishhouses’, when the poet-observer achieves something similar to Olson’s 
notion of ‘secrets objects share’, although what that secret might be is not 
revealed. In one sense, Fisher has replaced uncertainty with vagueness, but 
there does seem to be a clear statement here of belief in this secret something. 
The final three lines of the poem encapsulate one of the central issues of the 
relationship between the observing consciousness and the external world. 
After the witnessing of the scene and description of its elements, during 
which the observer-narrator has apparently remained quite detached from the 
scene, he concludes: ‘It is in | me’. This could be read in an impressionist 
sense as the effect that the natural world has produced in his consciousness: a 
transfer from outer to inner. Or it could be read in an expressionist sense as 
the transfer from his inner state onto the external environment: the 
‘something’ that he has witnessed deriving from his own consciousness. Or 
the poem might be read as questioning its own strategy of applying 
contradictory similes and metaphors and searching for ‘something’ in nature. 
The poem, characteristically, gives the reader no indication as to which 
reading to choose. 
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At this stage in our examination it is worth clarifying one of the elements that 
has arisen, namely that a poet who is often so firmly grounded in the material 
world can at other times appear to be attracted by concepts that seem to move 
beyond the purely material. The issue comes down to whether Fisher is 
seeking knowledge that might be termed metaphysical, or whether he is 
merely sceptical of the power of human senses to perceive all that there is in 
the natural world, and of human understanding to interpret correctly the 
perceptions that we do receive. If the latter, then his concern with perception 
may not be something so mystical, but rather a simple case of trying to see 
more clearly. This brings us back to Perloff’s observation about Fisher’s 
distrust of sense perceptions. It is interesting, though, to consider how far, and 
in which direction, these speculations can take him. The issue is further 
complicated by the role imagination plays in the experiences that Fisher is 
describing. As he comments in the prose section following ‘The Wind at 
Night’: ‘The imaginary comes to me with as much force as the real, the 
remembered with as much force as the immediate’ (Fisher, p. 43). The 
‘something’ that the narrator of ‘The Square House: April’ witnessed may 
have occurred in his imagination, but that may not make it any less ‘real’. 
This notion is reinforced by the possibility we discovered in the prose section 
following ‘The Sun Hacks’ that the narrator perceived something that was not 
a concrete object in the real world but which nevertheless had an existence 
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independent of the observer’s consciousness. The operation of imagination 
might be a suitable explanation for this phenomenon.89 
 Ralph Pite raises a related issue when he refers to Fisher’s dedication 
of A Furnace to John Cowper Powys. Pite quotes Fisher’s ‘Preface’ where he 
expresses his debt to Powys ‘for such understanding as I have of the idea that 
the making of all kinds of identities is a primary impulse which the cosmos 
itself has’.90 Pite goes on to observe that Powys believed that ‘animals and 
plants, even stones and minerals, are not only alive, but each kind of living 
thing possesses its own quality of consciousness and seeks to become as 
completely itself as possible’.91 Such a belief, which Fisher seems to suggest 
he shares, gives the notion of materialism a different sense to the one we are 
used to. Rather than suggesting a commonsense empirical attitude, materials 
have been invested with mystical properties. These are the terms used by 
Andrew Crozier in describing A Furnace: 
 
What is imagined – the timeless identities entering nature – might yet 
give even well-disposed readers pause. And I think we should at least 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 William Carlos Williams’s Spring and All is relevant here. Williams is often cited as an influence on Fisher and 
Fisher refers to Williams quite frequently when speaking of his own reading. In Spring and All Williams emphasises 
that the imagination and the real world are not separate entities: ‘To refine, to clarify, to intensify that eternal 
moment in which we alone live there is but a single force – the imagination.’ 
William Carlos Williams, Spring and All (New York: New Directions Books, Paperback Original edition, 2011), p.3. 
90 Roy Fisher, A Furnace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p.vii. 
 There is also a possible agreement with Heidegger’s description of the opposition between the self-
disclosing world and the self-secluding earth by which entities achieve their identity. See Heidegger, Poetry, 
Language, Thought, pp.47-48. 
91 Ralph Pite, p.231. 
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pause to ask if A Furnace does not arrive, finally, at a heterodox 
mysticism. Is its aim […] to offer a prospect of transcendence? 
  (Ralph Pite, quoting Andrew Crozier, p. 242) 
 
Crozier’s conclusion is that this is not the case, but Pite comments that 
Crozier underestimates the ‘heterodox mysticism’. ‘It’s as if Crozier cannot 
believe that Fisher would do such a thing’, Pite concludes (p. 242). 
 Ian F. A. Bell and Meriel Lland propose a reading of Fisher’s work 
that might provide a way to understand the apparent transcendentalism and 
mysticism and the idea of an element of consciousness in nature and 
inanimate objects. They identify a preoccupation with ‘blending and 
bleeding’, with ‘transitional manoeuvrings which mix and mingle’, a 
‘crossing of borders and boundaries of all kinds’.92 The processes by which 
the products of nature are constantly forming, absorbing and evacuating 
material, decaying and appearing in other forms, can be explained in purely 
physical terms. Ecocritical understanding of the interdependence of natural 
systems is in harmony with such processes. Bell and Lland draw a 
comparison with William James’s preference for ‘the relational character of 
subjectivity’, for the ‘transitive’ over the ‘substantive’ (p. 109) of which 
‘flow, seepage, and permeability’ might be an expression. However, this 
materialist interpretation does not necessarily preclude a reading which looks 
beyond material considerations and finds in the notion of the ‘transitive’ the 
possibility of processes by which objects might acquire consciousness, at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Ian F. A. Bell and Meriel Lland, ‘ Osmotic Investigations and Mutant Poems: An Americanist Poetic’, in The 
Thing about Roy Fisher, ed. by Kerrigan and Robinson, pp. 106-27 (p.106). 
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least in theory. I will comment more on Bell’s and Lland’s ideas when I come 
to look at The Ship’s Orchestra, but first I would like to examine A Furnace, 
where we can find another form of border crossing which bears witness to 
Fisher’s willingness to speculate beyond the material. 
 Passing from life into death might be described as crossing a border 
and considerations of the two states, and the relations and commerce between 
them, is a major theme of A Furnace. The poem is much concerned with 
whatever the dead might be said to leave behind: a remaining presence in the 
world. Although this does include the lives and deaths of human figures, Clair 
Wills points out that individuals do not occupy the centre of the poem: ‘the 
concern of the poem is with temporal relations – the overlapping and 
occlusion – of landscapes, cities and cultures, rather than with anything in the 
domain of personal experience’.93 To a large extent, this is true. There is a 
modernist impersonality to many sections of the poem, although there are 
also passages which draw on the narrator’s personal experience, recounting 
childhood episodes in section III, ‘Authorities’, such as: ‘Don’t | ask your 
little friend | what his father does […]’ and ‘Neighbour-fear | for the children 
[…]’ (Fisher, 1986, pp. 21 and 25). There is also the vividly described 
personal experience of the opening of ‘Introit’. In fact, there is a noticeable 
contrast in style between these personal and impersonal passages. The 
recording of direct sense impressions here: 
 
 old industrial road, 
 buildings to my left along the flat 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Clair Wills, ‘A Furnace and the Life of the Dead’, in The Thing about Roy Fisher, pp. 257-74 (p.259). 
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 wastes between townships 
 wrapped in the luminous 
 haze underneath the sun       (p. 1-2) 
 
contrasts strikingly with the abstract tone of: 
 
 Whatever breaks 
 from stasis, radiance or dark 
 impending, and slides 
 directly and fast on its way, twisting 
 aspect in the torsions of the flow 
 this way and that[.]    (p. 11) 
 
 It is possible to find a model for this aspect of Fisher’s approach in A 
Furnace in the work of T. S. Eliot. A. David Moody draws attention to Eliot’s 
employment of a transition between the impersonal, abstract thought of ‘Time 
present and time past | Are both perhaps present in time future’ and the 
personal experience of ‘Round the corner. Through the first gate, | Into our 
first world’ in the opening of Burnt Norton.94 95 This modulation between two 
voices is a defining aspect of the style of Four Quartets. Fisher also alternates 
between two such voices in much the same way in A Furnace in order to give 
expression to the contrasting elements of experience of the material world and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 A. David Moody, ‘Four Quartets: music, word, meaning and value’ in The Cambridge Companion to T. S. Eliot, 
ed. by A. David Moody (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 142-57 (p.144). 
95 T. S. Eliot, Burnt Norton in The Complete Poems and Plays of T. S. Eliot (London: Faber and Faber, 1969), pp. 
171-176, (p. 171). 
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the attempt to interpret sense impressions through mental analysis. The two 
voices are, in fact, the result of two different ways of approaching sense 
experiences of the external world. 
 Interestingly, there are further points of comparison between Eliot’s 
Four Quartets and Fisher’s A Furnace. Thematically, the two poems deal 
with the same issues: life and death, time, experience of the real world and 
the urge to discover a ‘meaning’ behind outward appearances. For Eliot, that 
leads to a reliance on the spiritual and divine. Fisher’s treatment of the theme 
leads him at one point to consider the border between life and death in terms 
that coincide with Bell’s and Lland’s description of liminality and border 
crossing when he refers to Edgar Allan Poe’s tale of M. Valdemar.96 This 
passage occurs towards the end of a section which critiques the establishment 
of a binary concept of reality that is based on language and education: 
 
 wherein the brain 
 submits to be 
 cloven up, 
 sideways and down 
 in all of its pathways 
 
 where to convert 
 one term to its antithesis 
 requires that there be devised 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Poe’s tale ‘The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar’ (1845) describes the result of an experiment in which M. 
Valdemar is put into a hypnotic trance moments before he dies. The narrator experiment preserves the subject in a 
state of suspended life-death for seven months. 
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 an agent with authority – [.]      (Fisher, 1986, p. 16) 
 
Fisher sees this binary, oppositional world view as one of the power 
structures of authority; a means of validating the privileged side of the 
dichotomy. It is significant, though, and an aspect of the major theme of A 
Furnace, that one of the dichotomies he critiques is life-death. A Furnace 
repeatedly suggests that this is a false distinction, that the dead are present in 
various ways and that the denial of this is part of authority’s commercial and 
management structure. M. Valdemar’s experiment is in ‘the province of the 
agent, | between antithesis and thesis’, the result of the exploitation of which 
is: ‘And as if it were a military installation | specialize and classify and hide | 
the life of the dead’ (p. 17). 
 The aim of this activity is to ‘hide the life of the dead’, in other words, 
to erase the signs by which the past may be known, as in the urban renewal 
schemes described in City and others of Fisher’s poems. Ironically, the 
exhortation to ‘make it new’ or to see things always as if for the first time 
might be understood to work towards the same final result: a loss of the past. 
I do not say that is Pound’s or Shklovsky’s intention, nor even that it is a 
necessary outcome of pursuing their theories and methods. The point is more 
about language. The terms in which these differing theories are couched 
contain a verbal contrariness to the meaning of the phrase in Fisher’s poem. I 
think that Fisher is exploiting that here. At the same time, in the British way 
mentioned by Gregson (see above, p. 173), he allows that space for a 
traditional, empirical conservative approach to the world that a sense of 
history promotes. 
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 Furthermore, Fisher also exploits the ambiguity of his own phrase, 
‘the life of the dead’, treating those words not just as expressing the idea that 
past generations leave their marks on the environment, but also literally, to 
mean that the dead experience a kind of existence that can be called life. I 
would suggest that he does this for a number of reasons. Firstly, because the 
words are already on the page with one meaning so why not explore their 
other meanings, too? Secondly, because mystical speculation like this 
undercuts the traditional empirical conservatism mentioned above. Thirdly, 
because the combination of the first two reasons creates the kind of 
indeterminacy that Fisher so often aims at. This could also be an example of 
Denise Riley’s contention that language has its own ‘unconscious’ and to 
some extent ‘isn’t under the control of its speakers and writers’ (See above 
pp. 170-1). 
 The presence of the dead may be inscribed in a quite materialist, 
commonsense way in the street plan of cities that have passed through several 
stages in their development, each supposedly new plan super-imposed over an 
earlier one and deeply influenced by its form. But A Furnace also includes 
references to the dead visiting the real world. Section 1, ‘Calling’, opens with 
an allusion to Odysseus in the underworld attracting the dead by filling a pit 
with blood (Fisher, 1986, p. 5). An important element in this allusion is the 
fact that by giving blood to the dead Odysseus also restores memory to them, 
and recognition. Memory and a sense of the past are vital elements in our 
understanding of the external world and our own identities. That allusion is 
picked up again later in the section by the repetition of the phrase, ‘Waiting in 
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blood’ (p.9). The lines that follow this repetition seem to enact the crossing of 
the boundary between life and death and then to retrace that progress: 
 
 […] The straight way forward 
 checks, turns back 
 and sees it has passed through, 
 some distance back and without knowing it[.] (p. 9) 
 
This notion of the dead crossing and re-crossing the border between life and 
death recurs, again with an allusion to Odysseus, near the end of section II: 
 
 They come anyway 
 to the trench, 
 the dead in their surprise, 
 taking whatever form they can 
 to push across[.]     (p. 18) 
 
One way to read these passages is to regard the references to the return of the 
dead to the living world as a metaphor for the persistence of genetic material 
and characteristics in later generations. There is an explicit reference to genes 
in the lines immediately preceding the dead coming to the trench and it is 
couched in terms that recall the back-and-forth motion across a border of the 
earlier account of the life-death dichotomy: 
 
 […] Genetic behaviour, 
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 scrabbling, feeling back across the spade cut 
 for something; the back-flow of the genes’ 
 forward compulsion[.]   (p. 18) 
 
Furthermore, the term ‘double spiral’, which Fisher uses in his preface and 
which occurs as an image throughout the poem and features on the cover, is a 
term that also describes DNA. 
 There is, then, an account of these passages that is grounded in 
physical materiality. Fisher, on this reading, would not seem to be proposing 
that something of our personal identity survives death. However, there are 
other passages where this materialism seems to be called into question. It is 
my proposal that these passages represent Fisher’s response to the sense of 
mystery in life. Such a sense of mystery is present in the opening section of 
‘The Return’. Here Fisher writes of ‘the timeless flux | that cannot help but 
practice | materialization’ and describes ice crystals ‘falling from where they 
were not’ (p. 11). There is a scientific explanation for the formation of ice 
crystals; however, science is not invoked here: as an image it suggests 
creation of concrete substance out of thin air. More significantly, the passage 
goes on to refer to ‘timeless identities […] with no | determined form’. An 
identity with no form, no physical incorporation, and also timeless seems to 
defy materialism in no uncertain terms. Given this apparent questioning of the 
validity of a materialist view of reality and the concern with the life of the 
dead, the quotation from John Cowper Powys a little later must lead the 
reader to speculate whether Fisher is envisioning a form of transcendence 
here: ‘they have life in them that can be revived’ (p. 12). 
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 Fisher refers explicitly to a sense of the unexplainable in life in the 
final section of the poem: 
 
 […] There have always been 
 saucers put out for us 
by the gods. We’re called 
for what we carry.    (p. 46) 
 
The word ‘called’ here echoes the title of section I, ‘Calling’, which in turn 
recalls the allusion to Odysseus. The ‘saucers put out for us’ resemble the 
blood he put out for the dead. The title, ‘Calling’, might be understood in 
various ways. A calling can be a vocation, such as a poet has, or a priest; it 
might refer to calling in the sense of trying to communicate with someone, 
and in the context of the poem, that suggests contact with the dead. The 
phrase, ‘what we carry’, suggests both memory (especially in connection with 
Odysseus) and carrying cultural baggage, by which not only the nature of the 
calling is culturally relative, but also attitudes to issues of calling are regarded 
as relative to the cultural standpoint from which the calling in question is 
being examined. The present of the poem is described as ‘barbarous’, and 
makes of callings ‘rank parodies’ (p. 46). In this cultural environment, ‘for 
what we carry’, suggests material possessions, or trade and commerce, 
‘cargo-cult’, as Fisher calls it; such is the nature of this debased ‘calling’. The 
terminology implies criticism of these contemporary manifestations of 
callings, thereby suggesting that other, earlier examples were more authentic 
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and valid. However, Fisher’s approach may be ironic, itself a ‘rank parody’ of 
genuine callings. 
 In fact he suggests this in a passage from section 3, ‘Authorities’, 
which refers to being ‘grotesquely called’ and 
 
 […] compelled 
 by parody to insist 
 that what image the unnatural 
 law had been stamping 
 was moving into Nature[.]   (p. 23-4) 
 
However, the state of being ‘compelled | by parody to insist’ that an unnatural 
image ‘was moving into Nature’ is attributed to ‘fools’ (p. 23) who are 
specified as ‘priests’ sons’ and ‘teachers’. These teachers have ‘a little 
Homer, | a little Wordsworth, two or three generations | of Symbolist poets’. 
The combination of influences might describe Fisher himself. Similarly, the 
complaint about the activity of these ‘fools’ – insisting on the unnatural 
image being able to move into Nature – ironically amounts to a parody of 
section 2 of Fisher’s poem (see above, p. 192). The notions of barbarity and 
parody serve to muddy and question these concepts further. They are, as 
Fisher puts it, ‘refracted by whatever murk | hangs in the air’ (Fisher, 1986, p. 
46), but in the final section the appearance of apparently supernatural beings 
enacts this transition from the idea of being outside the natural to having an 
existence in the natural world: 
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 […] Self-generated 
 and living perfect to themselves 
 in some other dimension, they have it 
 laid on them to materialize in the cold 
 upper air of the planet[.]   (p. 46) 
 
Furthermore, the terms in which their appearance is described extends the 
idea of materialisation noted in the reference to ice crystals ‘falling from 
where they were not’. There are elements in A Furnace that clearly defy the 
laws of physics as we understand them. At another level, Fisher is simply 
playing the familiar game of viewing clouds as the objects their shapes 
suggest and his comment that ‘There’s a choice of how to see it’ implies that 
perception is purely subjective. 
 There is a characteristic vagueness, once again, in Fisher’s use of 
these terms and what the reader might understand by them. In addition to that 
sense of indeterminacy, we need to take account of the fact that the title of the 
prefatory section of A Furnace is ‘Introit’. As a psalm or chant preliminary to 
Holy Communion, ‘Introit’ is a title that is clearly relevant to the themes of 
life, death and transcendence. Its connection with the celebration of Holy 
Communion casts a specifically religious light on the issue of objects and 
materials changing form, suggesting transubstantiation represented in the 
wine and the wafer. And finally, it leads the reader again to speculate on the 
significance of the return of the dead in those passages where they are 
represented as having an existence after death. It is true that the portrayal of 
the dead in the poem is more suggestive of zombies than anything that might 
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be likened to Christian concepts of life after death and I am not suggesting 
that Fisher’s poem promotes a Christian view of the world. Indeed, at this 
point the treatment is more suggestive of the parodying of religious callings 
that is a feature of modern barbarism. However, his treatment of the themes I 
have been discussing is intriguing. He seems to slip back and forth across the 
boundary of belief in a metaphysical element in life, rather in the same way as 
he represents individuals crossing and re-crossing the border between life and 
death. This contributes further to that sense of vagueness and uncertainty that 
we have identified, and creating that sense is very probably a part of Fisher’s 
intention. 
 Clair Wills comments on the indeterminacy of A Furnace in 
connection with this notion of transcendence: 
 
He preserves an indeterminacy, a suspension between a robust 
naturalism and what he calls ‘the other dream or intention: of 
encoding / something perennial’ (F, p. 12 [Wills’s abbreviation for A 
Furnace, p. 12]) which is reminiscent of gothic ambivalence towards 
supernatural forces. A Furnace is marked by the impossibility of 
telling signs from coincidences, portents from accidents; it achieves 
an unlikely marriage of secular doubt and a sense of trans-human 
powers[.]97 
 
This seems to me to be an excellent summary of this aspect of the poem, and 
of elements in Fisher’s work in general, and one which I fully endorse. Fisher 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Clair Wills, ‘Life of the Dead’, p.260. 
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himself makes an explicit statement about his position regarding what Wills 
calls ‘robust naturalism’ when he writes, ‘I want to believe I live in a single 
world’ (Fisher, 2005, p. 43). It is the idea of wanting to believe that is so 
telling. It suggests that monist materialism cannot satisfy his curiosity, much 
as he wishes it would. In the same paragraph, the lines ‘The imaginary comes 
to me with as much force as the real, the remembered with as much force as 
the immediate’, could be read as a comment on indeterminacy, an inability to 
distinguish between experiences designated ‘real’ and those designated 
‘imaginary’. More importantly though, Fisher here accepts both ways of 
perceiving: the habituated form of perception which remembers and 
recognises objects and their associations, and the Shklovskian form of seeing 
as if for the first time. Furthermore, these lines amount to a statement on the 
role of imagination in constituting reality that strongly echoes William Carlos 
Williams’s thoughts on the subject as expressed in Spring and All. Williams’s 
argument in that book is that art which attempts to reproduce nature is a form 
of plagiarism and is lifeless. Instead, ‘works of art […] must be real, not 
“realism” but reality itself’ (Williams, p. 45). There is a danger that this might 
be misunderstood to suggest an attempt at the impossible: a contradiction of 
the premise accepted at the start of my introduction that ‘the real can only be 
represented precisely as representation’. That would be to mistake Williams’s 
point, though, which is that the work of art, when it is released from the 
artist’s hands, becomes a part of the external world of things and its audience 
experiences it as an element of that reality. This is a theory which has 
ecocritical implications. As Jonathan Bate explains it, although a work of art 
is ‘a representation of the state of nature’ that ‘does not make it unreal’. Art, 
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particularly poetry, ‘may create for the mind the same kind of recreational 
space that a park creates for the body’ (Bate, pp. 63-4). The poem becomes a 
space in the external world which other minds can inhabit and which they can 
experience as they experience other objects in the natural world. Williams 
and Bate thus provide a theoretical basis for Fisher’s comments on the 
imaginary, the remembered and the real. The last paragraph of ‘The Wind at 
Night’ is speculative and philosophical in tone; to discover how it would feel 
if the imaginary were portrayed as experience with the force of reality, we 
should look at The Ship’s Orchestra.98 
 The Ship’s Orchestra presents the imaginary and the real having equal 
force. The ship in the poem is sometimes presented in traditional realist 
terms, as in the opening section describing the Ivory Corner and the corridor 
and washroom. It is also described in terms that reveal it as an image of the 
body. If life is a journey, then the body is the vessel in which we make that 
journey. The ship is also an image of the mother’s body. The long paragraph 
that begins: ‘Reasons. The ship is a unity’ continues by describing its ‘skin of 
white paint’ (my italics) and goes on, ‘some would think of it as having the 
shape of cleavage’, which suggests the mother’s breasts (Fisher, 2005, p. 
112). This metaphor is a continuation from the previous paragraph which had 
suggested an equivalence between the ship and breast-feeding: ‘I am about to 
be fed with cosy food […] It is the sort of time when something very large 
and wide and silvery, like the capsized hull of a vast ship, can begin slowly to 
rise above the horizon’ (p. 112). Simultaneously with the experiences 
described in the above quotation, the narrator is hearing Amy play her 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Fisher (2005), pp. 105-128. 
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trombone and the whole paragraph moves seamlessly between simple, 
realistic statement (‘Soon there will be a meal’), infantile expression (‘my 
being a great big boy criminal’), the scene on the ship, the infant’s feeding 
time, and the image of the mother’s breast as the dominant reality in the 
infant’s world. This metaphor of ship for mother’s body, combined with the 
infant’s point of view, is repeated a few pages further on: 
 
The ship has come close, drawn itself up my body and stretches far 
away from me above and below and on all sides. And all the 
compartments of which it is made are full of milky sounds ready to 
knock against the bulkheads and echo all through the vessel. 
       (p. 117) 
 
 The text does not distinguish between what is ‘real’ in the sense that it 
is a representation of an object existing in the external world and what is 
‘imagined’ or memory and has its existence in the narrator’s mind. As such it 
presents the scene on the ship where events are represented as taking place, 
and the events that take place simultaneously in the narrator’s mind. The link 
between these two areas of experience could include the fact of the 
approaching mealtime and the effect of hearing Amy play her trombone. The 
quality of the sound produced by the instrument, the shape and action of 
playing the instrument itself may have awakened the associations in the 
narrator’s mind. In this passage, Fisher is creating a fuller representation of 
experience than we generally meet with. He aims to ‘tell the truth about 
things’ in the sense of rendering the feel of experience into language. He is 
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unveiling the nature of our experience of the external world as we move 
through a scene and interact with its objects and other people.  
Fisher’s method here is illustrative of the whole poem which 
constantly mutates from one form to another at the levels of realist 
description, metaphor and image, and language. The nonsense language of the 
anonymous lovers: ‘Throbber, she said, you’re my throbber. And you’re my 
gummy, was the reply. My gummy; my guggy gummy. Now you’re my 
thrubber, she said’, is followed by the matter-of-fact style of: ‘I have known 
this all along’ (p. 110). The great discrepancy in the register of the two styles 
is in keeping with the tendency of the poem to constantly shift perspective. 
The nonsense word, ‘gummy’, is also constantly trying to transform itself in 
the reader’s mind into ‘mummy’, which both enacts the mutating process of 
the text in the reader’s mind, and the narrator’s subconscious desire to regain 
the infant’s relationship with his mother in the breast-feeding passages, and 
the sound of ‘guggy gummy’ reproduces the sounds of the infant before the 
full acquisition of language. 
 Continuously, throughout The Ship’s Orchestra there is this flow 
between images, style and content that recalls Bell’s and Lland’s comments 
on ‘flow, seepage and permeability’. There is a real sense in which language 
and image in The Ship’s Orchestra have these qualities. Bell and Lland 
comment: ‘In both James and Fisher, being is fixed and objects or landscapes 
are solid only on a temporary and provisional basis, as a means of getting 
about, as points of departure’ (Bell and Lland, p. 114). This describes exactly 
the experience of reading The Ship’s Orchestra. 
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 I have already mentioned Clair Wills’s comments on ‘the 
impossibility of telling signs from coincidences’ (see above p. 196) in A 
Furnace and that comment can be applied to much of Fisher’s work. Fisher 
establishes these signs, coincidences, portents and accidents partly through 
the creation of patterns. Patterns serve to suggest that there might be some 
governing principle that controls their creation; a meaning that can be 
discovered by the correct interpretation of the pattern. However, if that 
governing principle is absent, what appears to be meaningful is in fact 
random coincidence and accident. 
 Recurring images, words phrases and categories, or what Marjorie 
Perloff calls ‘verbal clusters’, serve as pattern-forming devices in The Cut 
Pages (Perloff, p. 160). Indeed, the poem opens with a statement of this 
aspect of its organization: ‘Coil   If you can see the coil hidden in this pattern, 
you’re colour-blind’.99 The verbal patterns throughout the whole poem are 
clearly there for every reader to see. Perloff’s summary of these ‘verbal 
clusters’ is: ‘(1) references to ordering, control, containment; (2) references to 
movement, change, opening, journeying; and (3) images of vision and items 
that obscure vision – shade, shadow, shutter’ (Perloff, p. 160). Other 
groupings are possible, but the point is that we recognize the pattern. 
Significantly, though, Fisher links the perception of the pattern with a form of 
misperception: colourblindness. Yet the concern with pattern pervades the 
poem, not only in the patterns it creates, but also in explicit references to 
patterns. For example: ‘Summoning all the scratches into pattern’ (Fisher, 
2005, p. 92) is a line that supports Perloff’s contention that ‘the longing for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Fisher (2005), pp. 87-104, (p.88). 
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pattern’ is a major motivation for the actions that lead to their creation 
(Perloff, p. 160). Awareness of pattern is an activity of imagination since it is 
reasonable to assume that nature itself lacks such awareness. We see patterns 
then, firstly, because we have the imagination and linguistic ability to 
describe them, and secondly, because we want to see them. In this respect, 
patterns signify the element that we have repeatedly found in Fisher’s work of 
the suggestion that our experiences of the real world can reveal something 
beyond the simple impressions made on our senses, but always failing to 
identify what it is. Sean O’Brien describes this paradox in Fisher’s work: 
 
his modus operandi depends on rejecting the idea of ends and 
purposes. Yet his work also reveals the mind’s hankering after 
teleology – the gritty ghost in the machine, put there by language, 
which implies closure as well as ramification. No origin is available, 
but the mind is paradoxically engaged in a continual search. 
     (O’Brien, p. 112-3) 
 
 Interestingly, this concern with pattern in our experience of the 
external world is one which Fisher shares with Eliot. In East Coker, Eliot 
presents pattern as something which the human consciousness imposes on 
experience and which is therefore essentially false and constantly changing 
since the consciousness that creates it is constantly changing: 
 
 […] There is, it seems to us, 
 At best, only a limited value 
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 In the knowledge derived from experience. 
 The knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies, 
 For the pattern is new in every moment 
 And every moment is a new and shocking 
 Valuation of all we have been.100 
 
I would suggest that this passage would serve as a very good summary of 
Fisher’s handling of these themes in The Cut Pages. For Eliot, pattern is not 
the sign of a meaning; it is a distraction. Eliot finds divine meaning beyond 
pattern. Fisher identifies an urge towards patterning in the observing 
consciousness, and I believe he agrees with Eliot that it has no significance 
beyond itself. However, Fisher is fascinated by the possibility of the 
‘something’ that might exist behind these signs the external world leaves on 
our senses and by the thought that it is the weakness of our perceptions that 
prevents us seeing it, but he does not discover the certainty that Eliot goes on 
to find in Four Quartets in a spiritual apprehension of reality. 
 In conclusion, there are elements in Fisher’s work which I judge to be 
in accord with Olson’s conception of objectism and there are elements which 
I feel contradict objectism. Fisher shares with Olson the intense focus on, and 
respect for, the objects of the external world. Both Olson and Fisher present 
the view that this focus on objects can lead to new knowledge but I find 
Fisher is more uncertain about the reliability of whatever information he 
derives from sense perceptions. Perhaps the point on which the two writers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 T. S. Eliot, East Coker in The Complete Poems and Plays of T. S. Eliot (London: Faber and Faber, 1969), pp. 177-
183, (p.179). 
	   204 
diverge most noticeably, in my opinion, is on the issue of subjectivity. Olson 
argues for getting rid of subjective interference; Fisher is sceptical that this is 
possible: subjectivity is the condition under which we perceive. This leads 
Fisher to a position that is indeterminate, as we have seen, and that in turn is a 
possible explanation for the manner in which he sometimes turns to a form of 
abstract speculation that brings him closer to Eliot than Olson, at least in 
terms of approach, if not in his conclusions. 
 Finally, I would like to refer to some of Fisher’s comments in 
interview to show how his own words support the conclusion I have reached. 
Jed Rasula raised the issue of subjectivity and objectivity: ‘I wonder if there’s 
any connection between these kind of perceptions and your feelings about the 
subjective obstacle to objectivity?’ (Fisher, 2000, p. 67). To which Fisher 
replied that these were ideas he had, but that he did not ‘necessarily want to 
solve the problem´ (p. 67), and then continued: 
 
if you can steer a sufficiently agile course you may be able to see 
yourself coming, you may be able to see the back of your own head. I 
suppose I have this sort of objective in general. Insofar as the 
language will in the end defeat you, this seems to me a very 
honourable thing to do, to try to see what is outside the range of 
vision, to try to break or to catch time or the limits of the perceptive 
field at its tricks in limiting consciousness of the world.  
       (p. 68) 
 
	   205 
In a later interview with Peter Robinson, on the subject of ‘revelation’ and the 
use of sense perceptions, Fisher appears to make a categorical denial of 
access to ‘secret’, transcendental knowledge:  
 
The idea of revelation is, of course, a projection of the condition of the 
perceiving self – it’s not that I believe there to be a troupe of Beings 
behind a curtain, poking meaningful things through – and by this time 
I wanted to exercise a perception that felt itself to be in better shape[.]
       (p. 106) 
 
Fisher goes on to assert the importance of sense impressions: 
 
What I mean by ‘obligation’ is that we’re obliged by our senses, 
insofar as they’re not subjected by cultures to various quaint patterns 
of occlusion, to pay attention to the entire array, in order to find 
what’s safe and what’s not[.]     (p. 106) 
 
These comments are part of a reasoned discussion and that is something quite 
different to writing poetry. However, Fisher’s position here clearly leans 
towards the physical and material. Yet the suspicion that the material does not 
describe all of the external reality is hinted at in the phrase, ‘to see what is 
outside the range of vision’. I do not understand this to mean turning one’s 
head or using a microscope. In the second interview, the phrase, ‘it’s not that 
I believe […]’, is interesting. This common expression is typically used when 
a primary statement is going to be modified. For example: ‘it’s not that I 
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believe the plan won’t work, I simply feel it’s too expensive’. Fisher has left 
his modification of the primary statement unspoken but implied. I would like 
to give the final word to Fisher, but from a poem, not an interview: ‘No 
system describes the world’ (‘Metamorphoses’).101 
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Chapter Five 
 
Was Brownlee Innocent? 
 
5.1 The role of binary opposites in Why Brownlee Left 
 
In The End of the Poem, Paul Muldoon comments: 
 
The sense of the phrase “the end of the poem” on which I’ll 
focus here has to do with the influence of one poem on 
another within the body of work of a single poet, whereby the 
“gaps” or “blanks” in one poem are completed or perfected 
by another[.]102 
 
In other words, the point at which any particular poem reaches its final word 
is not the end of the poem since there is always the possibility that the poet 
will extend the poem’s existence through a future reference, or indeed, that 
another poet will do so. Conversely, the poem does not begin with its opening 
word since it may be an extension of an earlier poem, a re-working of themes 
or ideas that the earlier poem did not resolve. This is a good description of 
Muldoon’s method in Why Brownlee Left, where each poem refers back or 
forwards to other poems in the collection, enlarging on and developing 
aspects of the themes of the whole collection, sometimes picking up specific 
words or phrases in the process. The impression created by his comment is, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Paul Muldoon, The End of the Poem: Oxford Lectures on Poetry (London: Faber and Faber, 2006), p. 58. 
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amongst other things, one of almost endless possibility and openness. The 
reader has the impression that the poem is never finally decided. 
 Included within the phrase ‘the end of the poem’ is its opposite 
concept, the beginning of the poem. After all, the poem that ends must have 
had a start; beginning and end form a pair as salt and pepper, heaven and hell 
do, each implying its partner. Furthermore, the process of cross-referencing, 
allusion and influence described by Muldoon provides a picture of both 
beginnings and ends since it includes the concept of source material for later 
poems as well as continuation of earlier ones. This introduces the notions of 
conception and origin, ideas which recur throughout Why Brownlee Left. It 
also emphasises constructedness since beginning and end are concepts that 
apply to the construction of objects. 
 The notion of beginnings and endings is part of a larger structural 
pattern that is central to Why Brownlee Left: the collection is permeated by a 
set of binary opposites which can be collected under the umbrella term 
‘innocence and experience’. It should be clear from the outset that these pairs 
are not presented in an either/or sense. Ian Gregson draws attention to the 
hybrid quality of Muldoon’s imagery and forms and this quality also suggests 
the mixing of the terms of each binary pair. Gregson comments that Muldoon 
‘harps on hybrid imagery and deploys hybrid forms (like parody and the 
juxtaposition of diverse generic elements) in order radically to call into 
question the whole nature of identity’ (Gregson, p. 38). The effect of the 
hybrid aspect of language and perspective works precisely to destabilise the 
over-simplified ways of viewing identity and behaviour represented by binary 
pairs (p. 40). This chapter examines how Muldoon employs binary pairs and 
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the destabilising effect of hybridity to represent his concept of how we 
experience the world, what knowledge we might gain from that experience 
and how we might represent that knowledge. 
 A relatively simple example of Muldoon’s treatment of polar 
opposites occurs in the short poem, ‘Bran’. The poem divides into two halves, 
following the division of the stanzas, where adult love-making in the first 
stanza is contrasted with regret for the innocence of the child’s love for his 
dog, as described in the second stanza. Tim Kendall comments that ‘‘Bran’ 
mourns its [childhood’s] irretrievability’.103 Kendall goes on to contrast that 
childhood emotion with the adult lovers and states that the ecstasy of the 
lovers is ‘faintly ridiculous’. He concludes that this ‘detached’ judgement on 
the part of the protagonist ‘prompts only a misty-eyed nostalgia for the “pure 
joy” of the protagonist’s boyhood’(p. 78). 
 However, Kendall misreads the poem when he attributes ‘pure joy’ to 
the young boy since the stanza break and punctuation make it very clear that 
it refers to the lovers: ‘While they sigh and they moan | For pure joy, || He 
weeps for the boy on that small farm’.104 It is clear that the ‘pure joy’ is felt 
by ‘they’. Furthermore, I would argue that there is nothing inherently 
‘ridiculous’ about that, not even ‘faintly’ so. I do, however, pick up the tone 
in the poem that Kendall is referring to. That tone is produced by an earlier 
line: ‘women | Who have let themselves go’. It is the double meaning of this 
phrase, and more specifically, the nature of the two elements that are linked 
via that double meaning, that creates the sense of the ridiculous. The women 
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104 Paul Muldoon, Why Brownlee Left in Poems 1968-1998 (London: Faber and Faber, 2001), pp. 73-102, (p. 78). 
	   210 
have ‘let themselves go’ in the sense of surrendering to their passion, but also 
in the sense of ceasing to take care of their physical appearance. It is that 
incongruous linking of the two meanings that leads the reader’s lips to curl, 
just very slightly. But the awareness of that second sense, not caring about 
appearance, can only be the effect of a certain way of looking. The partner 
who lets him (or her) self go equally is so lost in the immediate experience 
that they have no attention to spare for ‘the detached gaze’ that Kendall refers 
to. But Kendall’s judgement is dependent on that detached gaze, and that 
applies equally to the protagonist in the poem and the reader. Thus the 
authority of the lyric self is undermined since that self has chosen one fixed 
point of view amongst several. The significance of this for my thesis is that it 
shows very clearly that what we see depends on how we look; similarly, that 
what we understand depends on how we read. In both cases language 
mediates and influences the nature of what is perceived. Judgements that 
might be expressed in the terminology of innocence and experience are 
invalidated. 
 It is important to be clear about these points because the ‘pure joy’ can 
validate the emotion in stanza one if one reads it that way, but it applies only 
to the women. The male counterpart does not share in it. He is watching the 
women with Kendall’s ‘detached gaze’, conveyed in the line ‘While he looks 
into the eyes of women’ (p.78), and Kendall’s reading of the poem would 
certainly be appropriate to the consciousness of the poem’s male protagonist. 
The reader might take a different perspective, though; the poem allows for 
that. These judgements are the result of perception; they are not inherent in 
the actors or their behavior. In this sense, the poem is a perfect illustration of 
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the point Gregson makes about hybridity: that it allows for a plurality of 
perspectives. 
 A final issue which I think will confirm that this poem is not so simple 
as its surface might at first suggest is the inaccuracy of its final line. The boy 
hugging his dog does not know all there is to know of rapture. That is 
precisely what the poem is demonstrating. The male protagonist’s belief that 
the boy (presumably his own younger self) ‘knows all there is of rapture’ is 
due to a falsifying idealisation. ‘Falsifying’, that is, if one accepts the 
validation of the ‘pure joy’, but not if one looks with the ‘detached gaze’ of 
the male protagonist. 
 
5.2 Muldoon in Newton’s universe 
 
Identifying themes that invite the use of the terms ‘innocence’ and 
‘experience’ calls up associations with Blake’s Songs. It is sometimes 
observed that Blake was in a sense anti-nature,105 but that what he really 
opposed was the mechanistic Newtonian view of the working of the natural, 
physical universe. Isaiah Berlin comments that the Newtonian concept of a 
universe governed by absolute and discoverable laws was most congenial to 
the Enlightenment way of thinking but anathema to Kant. For Kant, the 
problem with a universe in which all actions and events were subject to 
immutable laws of cause and effect was that it denied free will. If there was 
no free will in nature, and if humanity was a part of nature, then each person’s 
actions were predetermined and inevitable (Berlin, p. 75-6). This led Kant to 	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develop a philosophy that would return free will to humanity. The Romantics, 
and Blake, were more in sympathy with this vision of a universe where 
individuals had the power to determine their own actions and influence their 
own fates. A side effect of these developments, as Berlin observes, was that 
nature and humanity were no longer regarded as forming a single harmonious 
system. In some cases nature was seen as being in conflict with human 
culture (p. 76). The legacy of this train of thought is clear in Why Brownlee 
Left. 
 Muldoon explores the idea of a Newtonian universe operating 
according to natural laws, but without the Enlightenment optimism in the 
discovery of those laws and with an admixture of scepticism, which is not to 
deny the importance of historical events, but rather to question the accuracy 
of our knowledge of the past or our ability to draw correct conclusions. 
Muldoon even considers the possibility that human events are predetermined, 
but demonstrates that, if they are, we cannot read the course they will take. As 
Clair Wills comments, Muldoon 
 
is preoccupied with the ways in which departure or origin 
predetermines the nature of the journey and the place of arrival. One 
of the things Muldoon is saying in ‘October 1950’ is that he doesn’t 
know where he is going, since he doesn’t know where he has come 
from, and yet his destiny may be no less inescapable for being 
hidden.106 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Clair Wills, Reading Paul Muldoon (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Bloodaxe Books, 1998), p.69. 
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However, alongside this Newtonian view, Muldoon also shares with the 
Romantics their notion of the conflict between human culture and nature. 
 The poem, ‘Why Brownlee Left’,107 explores this issue of free will 
and man in nature and combines the theme of expulsion from paradise with a 
much wider concern with the issue of leaving home, a theme which develops 
further into a concern with finding a place of belonging, a new home. The 
first point that we note about the poem is that it never supplies an answer to 
the question of why Brownlee left. One of the ambiguities concerns the 
quality of the life that Brownlee left behind. The poem reasons that ‘if a man 
should have been content | It was him’ but this assessment is based on 
material considerations: the fields and farmhouse that Brownlee possessed 
(Muldoon, p. 84). That leaves open the question of mental and emotional 
aspirations and how far his rural existence satisfied these. His life may have 
been one of simple pleasures and contentment, or it may have been one of 
stultifying boredom. There is also the issue of nature versus culture to 
consider. Brownlee’s former way of life was not carried on in a pure state of 
nature; agriculture is culture of a kind. However, it was a lifestyle that was 
close to the land and the rhythms of nature. Brownlee’s disappearance might, 
then, have been either an expulsion from an idyllic, pastoral form of paradise 
or an escape from a virtual prison. He may have lost the good life in harmony 
with nature, or he may have made a grasp for freedom. Kendall summarises 
the two possible views of Brownlee’s disappearance thus: 
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the poem offers two alternative fates: that Brownlee heroically evades 
his destiny, and abandons his farm to set out for an inheritance other 
than that decreed by his name; or, crucially, that he has become so 
much a part of his environment that he is indistinguishable from the 
ploughed field which is his namesake.  (Kendall, p. 69) 
 
 One of the differences between these two possible views is free will. 
In the first scenario Brownlee is asserting his independence and freedom to 
act in a manner that reminds us of Romantic ideology as described by Berlin. 
In the second he is powerless to escape his predestined fate. In either case the 
natural world is seen to be inimical to human aspirations of individuality, 
either requiring the human subject, as an outcast from the original Eden, to go 
on a quest in search of an identity, a home and place of belonging, or denying 
individuality and difference between the human and non-human world. The 
latter provides not only an unattractive image of what it might mean to live at 
one with nature, but also a dramatisation of Morton’s criticism of 
‘ecomimesis’, a style of writing which aims ‘to undo habitual distinctions 
between nature and ourselves’ (Morton, p. 63). Which of these interpretations 
is correct is an impossible and unnecessary question. By raising the issue of 
‘why Brownlee left’ and then deliberately failing to answer it, Muldoon has 
indicated that the answer is not the point. The point is the range of 
possibilities and the absence of a single truth. Furthermore, Muldoon is 
drawing attention to the constructedness of the poem’s reality by, ironically, 
failing to construct it at this crucial point, and that in turn draws attention to 
the constructedness of our perceptions in the real world. 
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5.3 Innocence and experience 
 
A poem that pursues the notion of innocence and experience at a more 
complex level is ‘Cuba’.108 On a first reading, images of innocence seem to 
collect around the narrator’s sister, May. Her name suggests springtime and 
rebirth in the natural world. The ‘white muslin’ of her dress suggests purity 
and innocence and she seems to be the victim of the two fathers in the poem, 
whose bullying attitudes pose a threat to that innocence (Muldoon, p. 78). 
Tim Kendall makes the point forcefully: 
 
the poem’s fathers manipulate May, imposing their narrow prejudices 
on her; ‘Cuba’ is a parable of innocence destroyed, rather than 
preserved, by their sanctimonious codes.  (Kendall, p. 76) 
 
The white muslin dress which, as a piece of imagery, is so suggestive of 
innocence, is suggestive of the very opposite to the experienced eye of May’s 
biological father. He describes it as ‘next to nothing’, with the obvious 
connotations of promiscuous behaviour, but linking his complaints about her 
clothing to the Cuban missile crisis and the prospect of nuclear war and 
human annihilation is both naïve and inconsequential. The exaggeration of 
the comparison might serve to make May appear all the more innocent; 
however, the presentation of this part of the narrative serves at least partly to 
undermine any portrayal of her father as the representative of cynical 	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experience. It is actually comic. The pounding of the table gives the quality of 
caricature to the scene and the terminology of the lines ‘Those Yankees were 
touch and go as it was’, and ‘But this Kennedy’s nearly an Irishman | So he’s 
not much better than ourselves’, suggests a less-than-serious attitude to the 
father’s grasp of international politics (Muldoon, p. 79). In this way Muldoon 
casts doubt on the ‘experience’ of the father. 
 We do not hear May’s reply, but we do know that she heeded her 
father’s recommendation to ‘make your peace with God’. And we overhear 
her confession in which she describes her transgressions in language that 
suggests they are about as trivial as they could be, ironically so in a world on 
the brink of nuclear conflict. It is possible to read the final part of her 
confession – ‘a boy touched me once’ – as accidental contact from the way 
she phrases it. The religious Father’s salacious interest in this part of the story 
betrays his experienced attitude. 
 ‘Cuba’ is interesting, though, for how much it does not tell and I 
would suggest that how each reader receives the poem depends largely on 
how they supply the missing information in their understanding of the scenes 
and character that are shown. This, of course, mimics our experiences in the 
real world where our knowledge is partial, our understanding of events is 
fallible, and possible interpretations are multiple. For instance, when May 
arrives home in the morning she is wearing her evening dress, which prompts 
the question: where had she spent the night? The reader might also be very 
well aware that it is none of his or her business, yet still recognise that the text 
as it stands allows the possibility of asking. The answer to the question might 
be such as May’s father would consider ‘innocent’: May might have stayed 
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with a girlfriend. Her father does not ask where she spent the night; he 
focuses his attention on the style of her dress. Given the drift of his criticism, 
that suggests that he knows, or has been told, that she stayed with a girlfriend, 
family member, or some such. Is it true? Did May stay away overnight 
without taking a change of clothes for the morning? It is possible that May 
has hoodwinked her father. Is he more innocent than her, in fact, believing 
everything he is told? 
 As for the other Father, May tells him exactly what he wants to hear, 
as evidenced by his obvious interest. Actually, if May is knowing, she 
handles the situation with considerable psychological insight and acumen. 
Has she hoodwinked this Father as she may, perhaps, have hoodwinked the 
one at home? It is possible that May is simply managing male authority and 
exploiting the situation for her own advantage; namely, in this case, the 
freedom to do what she wants. Whilst many readers would not argue with her 
right to do that, the term ‘innocent’ would probably no longer apply to her in 
the sense that it might apply to the boy in ‘Bran’. 
 The poem does not answer the questions I have raised regarding May, 
but the questions circulate about the scenes and dialogue that the poem 
contains. The speculations that the reader might thus be drawn into ironically 
echo the Father’s prying imagination in the confessional. We are a bit like the 
curious younger brother, listening at the curtain. May could be leading us all 
on. On the other hand, she might simply be innocent; or innocence in the 
process of being destroyed, as Kendall suggests. Or perhaps May is already 
an adept at deceit before the poem begins. The use of the word ‘deceit’, with 
its highly pejorative tone, is an example of how language can be manipulated 
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to create another perspective. It is probably no coincidence that her name is 
May, thus conveying the uncertainty of that modal verb. 
 May, as mentioned earlier, is not only the name of the narrator’s 
eldest sister and a verb; it also signifies a part of the year associated with 
spring, a season that has been recurring for a good deal longer than the word 
has existed to name it. It is part of the annual cycle of nature and in this sense 
May might be said to symbolically represent that nature, here threatened by 
culture in the form of religion and paternalism, just as Cuba, the area of land 
and the ecological system it supports, is threatened by two belligerent 
governments. The uneasy relationship between man and nature is a recurring 
theme in Why Brownlee Left and Kendall’s phrase, ‘a parable of innocence 
destroyed’, could be adapted to give it an ecocritical slant: ‘a parable of 
nature besieged’. 
 ‘Innocence’ and ‘experience’ are terms that suggest Eden and the Fall. 
These two elements, plus the threat, again, of nuclear conflict, all appear in 
‘Early Warning’.109 The theme of Eden and the expulsion from paradise is 
introduced in its clearest form so far in this poem and, together with 
innocence and experience, becomes one of the organising principles of the 
collection. The title, ‘Early Warning’, refers ostensibly to a warning that 
apple-scab disease is ‘in the air’, but it is also a phrase strongly suggestive of 
systems to detect missile attack, especially nuclear attack, in time for 
defensive action to be taken. The idea of conflict is carried in the poem by the 
neighbours, who come from opposite sides of the sectarian divide and the 
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reference to ‘two sturdy Grenadiers’ in connection with the Protestant Billy 
Wetherall (p. 81). 
 The tree in the Catholic family’s garden ‘was bowed down more by 
children | Than by any crop’, which uses the cliché of the large family to 
identify their religion, but also introduces the theme of innocence in the 
image of the children playing in the tree. The image alludes to both the 
Christian symbol and Blake’s ‘The Echoing Green’.110 The nature of the 
children’s games, though, or rather the terms in which they are described, is 
more troubling. They ‘lay siege to the tree-house’, and the reference to 
playing at war connects with the implications of the title. The line ‘We would 
swing there on a fraying rope’ offers another example of the hybridity of 
language since the childish game of clinging to a rope and swinging is here 
made to serve also as an image of execution by hanging: ‘to swing’ being a 
common slang expression for ‘to be hanged’. The detail that the rope is 
fraying, which in its ‘innocent’ setting indicates that the family are poor and 
can only spare worn-out materials for children’s games, carries a much more 
sinister sense in its ‘experienced’ setting, suggesting that the corpse has been 
swinging for some time.  
 In their games, then, the children parody the world of experience, but 
are also preparing themselves for entry into that world, which is presented as 
comparable to the expulsion from paradise. The presence of the apple tree and 
the threat of disease to that tree focus attention on the theme of Eden and the 
Fall. The question arises of when the change from childhood innocence might 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 William Blake, ‘The Echoing Green’ in Songs of Innocence, (New York: Dover Publications, 1971), pp. 15-16. 
The poem does not refer directly to the children climbing in the tree, but the engravings that accompanied the 
original publication both include a tree and the second represents children in the branches (p.16). 
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take place; when does the content of the childish game become adult reality? 
And is that change inevitable? Inevitably, they will grow up, but do they have 
to grow into that particular reality? Does the parodying of the world of 
experience in the game constitute a pattern that means the children are 
predestined to enter that same world in reality? These questions will be seen 
to be directly relevant to the collection’s title poem and there is an oblique 
and witty reference in ‘Early Warning’ to the significance of this issue in 
relation to ‘Why Brownlee Left’. After the siege of the tree-house, the 
children ‘Draw up our treaties | In its modest lee’ (my italics). 
 
5.4 Man and the natural world 
 
Indeterminacy is a key quality of the poems in Why Brownlee Left and this 
applies also to the relationship between man and the natural world. As we 
saw in the title poem, there is a potential conflict between human aspirations 
towards individuality on the one hand and living in harmony with nature on 
the other, as well as uncertainty about which end of the spectrum is actually 
being revealed. These elements are present in ‘Whim’.111 A couple meet in a 
pub; the man invites the woman back to his place with a view to having sex, 
which, however, actually takes place in the Botanic Gardens. The location is 
an interesting one because a botanic garden can be said to be both natural and 
cultural. Its contents have been collected from the natural world but the 
environment in which they are growing is entirely artificial. One might say 
that a botanic garden is artificiality forced onto nature. That would be an 	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appropriate description, too, of the title of the book the woman is reading, Cu 
Chulainn and the Birds of Appetite, where ‘birds of appetite’ is a euphemism 
for sex drive which has an artificial tone beside the man’s more direct and 
earthy terminology, How Cu Chulainn Got His End.112 That metaphor, ‘birds 
of appetite’, consists of taking an element from the natural, non-human world 
and giving it a sense that refers to the human. It is intended to give a soft 
gloss to human sexual appetite through the culturally derived associations 
attached to birds: that they are gentle, soft and appealing. The two forms 
suggested for the title of the book are directly connected to the content of 
Muldoon’s poem, which also concerns sexual appetite and activity. This 
subject might be considered in terms of artificiality as opposed to naturalness 
since those terms have been raised by the location in the Botanic Gardens and 
the language of the two alternative titles. 
 Tim Kendall describes the encounter as ‘brutish’ (Kendall, p. 77). It is 
interesting that he should select a word which carries connotations of being 
‘animal-like’. Other adjectives that might reasonably be applied could include 
‘spontaneous’, ‘exploitative’, ‘impassioned’, ‘casual’, ‘natural’. Kendall 
treats ‘Whim’ rather briefly, but his assessment seems to rest on what he calls 
‘the dominant tone’ which is ‘merely cynical’. He supports this judgement by 
referring to the phrases ‘To cut not a very long story short’ and ‘Once he got 
stuck into her’. It is true that those phrases create the tone that Kendall 
identifies, although the phrases and the tone they denote are the product of the 
narrator’s consciousness; they reflect a way of looking. Kendall goes on to 
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describe the end of the poem as ‘a sour, mock-heroic joke at the couple’s fate’ 
(p. 77). As with the lovers in ‘Bran’, so much depends on how we read the 
relationship between the woman and the man. One cannot dispute that their 
encounter begins as a casual pick-up in a pub. The title of the poem 
underlines the casual nature of their encounter. But since they both appear to 
be willing actors, since there is a measure of affection, at least, in the phrase 
‘they held hands, and kissed’ and since, finally, it is easy to understand how 
‘one thing led to another’, the act they engage in does not have to be 
exploitative or ‘brutish’. They are simply following their instincts and 
passions. There is also some ambiguity as to the timeframe of the events. It 
certainly appears that the pick-up, visit to the Botanic Gardens and 
subsequent embarrassment all happen in fairly rapid succession on the same 
day, but the grammatical structure: ‘They would saunter through the Botanic 
Gardens’ may be read as the past habitual, thereby opening the possibility that 
what had started as ‘whim’ has developed into something more lasting and 
serious. Kendall has also drawn attention to Muldoon’s experimental use of 
verb tense and the uncertainty it can give rise to (p. 66). There is even an 
element of sympathy towards the lovers’ ridiculous position at the end, when 
‘gently, but firmly | They were manhandled onto a stretcher’ (Muldoon, p. 
75). The sympathy expressed in ‘gently, but firmly’ is slightly undermined by 
the brusqueness of ‘manhandled’, so nothing is absolute here. 
 The final line, ‘Like the last of an endangered species’, should alert us 
to the issue of the relationship between the human and non-human worlds. 
We have already observed how the natural world is made to carry symbolic 
meaning. Here is a case where the tables are turned in the sense that the 
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human couple have come to represent an endangered nature. The extent of 
that endangering is conveyed by the last line of ‘Whim’ and also through a 
further development of the subject and imagery in ‘The One Desire’.113 In the 
latter poem, the Botanic Gardens make another appearance where the palm-
house represents humanity’s urge to dominate and control nature: ‘That iron 
be beaten, and glass | Bent to our will’ (Muldoon, p. 93), the purpose of 
which is to contain some part of the natural world. The palm-house is 
presented as a kind of prison for nature, where, thanks to a missing pane, 
‘some delicate tree […] Would seem at last to have broken through’ (p. 94). 
The ‘delicate tree’ tries to escape from the human world in the same way as 
Brownlee, perhaps, tried to escape from the natural. On that reading, 
Muldoon appears to reject both the Newtonian and Enlightenment aim of 
controlling and exploiting nature and the Romantic ideology of being at one 
with nature. This does not indicate an indifference to nature, but perhaps 
something closer to Morton’s belief in acknowledging the separation between 
the human and non-human worlds as the first step in a responsible attitude to 
the environment (see above, pp. 160 and 214). The final line of ‘The One 
Desire’, which reflects on humanity’s relationship with the non-human world, 
is far more cynical and bitter than the final line of ‘Whim’: ‘We have excelled 
ourselves again’. By contrast, the couple in ‘Whim’ are metaphorically 
transformed into that part of nature that is ‘endangered’, suggesting the 
possibility of learning through imaginative identification. 
 The role of the couple in ‘Whim’ is not so simple or straightforward. 
The elements that Kendall discovers are present, but so are other, 	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contradictory elements. In addition to the theme of the relationship between 
humanity and nature, the couple also raise the issue of sexuality, which 
clearly has a place in a collection that takes innocence and experience as one 
of its organising principles. Tim Kendall’s reaction that the encounter is 
‘brutish’ is part of the point of the poem. As in ‘Bran’, it is the experienced 
eye that forms that judgement. There is a species of child-like innocence in 
the way the couple themselves ‘lay there quietly until dusk’. To conclude this 
discussion, I would say that rather than disagreeing with Kendall’s 
description of the ‘dominant tone’ of ‘Whim’, I would propose what might be 
called a more ecocritical reading of it: the cynicism is not directed toward the 
locked lovers but toward the quality of humanity’s relationship with the non-
human world. 
 
5.5 In search of home 
 
Brownlee’s departure signals a possible journey in search of identity if we 
read that poem as an act of free will and assertion of individuality. ‘Promises, 
Promises’ offers a possible sequel to Brownlee’s story.114 The narrator is ‘on 
a farm in North Carolina’ where ‘There is such splendour in the grass | I 
might be the picture of happiness’ (Muldoon, p. 85). The setting and the 
prospects for contentment in a rural idyll are reminiscent of Brownlee’s life 
before he left, but the narrator is overcome by a sense of loss and missed 
opportunities: ‘Whatever is passing is passing me by.’ And this is the problem 
for the figures in so many of the poems in this collection: the impossibility of 	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being satisfied with what is given; the ever-present suspicion that there is 
something more, a better way to live and a better place to do it; the feeling 
that we might once have led an idyllic (innocent) existence, but that now we 
have lost it, left it or been cast out. In several poems, that sense of loss is 
connected to a broken relationship; the sense of yearning connected with the 
desire not only for a home but for the person who will share it with us. In 
‘Promises, Promises’ that relationship is first suggested by the phrase, ‘for the 
love of marijuana’, which signifies not simply the drug. There is a play in the 
sound of ‘marijuana’ on the names Marie and Juanita, and this hinted-at 
figure is echoed in the next stanza by the Indian girl with a strand of fair hair 
and blue eyes, descended from one of Raleigh’s colonialists and a local 
Indian. The third stanza returns to the present and the longing ‘For the love of 
one slender and shy’, which might sound like rather stereotypical 
characteristics of the Indian Marie-Juanita, but also refers to a remembered 
lover in Bayswater whom the narrator has ‘kissed Goodbye’. The title, 
‘Promises, Promises’ is typically used in speech as an indication that a 
promise has not been, or is unlikely to be, kept, thus adding unfaithfulness to 
the narrator’s list of self-accusations. 
 ‘Promises, Promises’ is a melancholy poem, full of dissatisfaction, 
regret and loss. The narrator seems to be trying to make sense of his own 
position and emotions and there is the feeling that he wonders how far he has 
himself been responsible for the course his life has taken. The image in stanza 
three of a figure who ‘stirs within my own skeleton | And stands on tip-toe to 
look out | Over the horizon’ could be read either as a possible, unrealised 
future: the path that was not taken to the partner that was never met; or as the 
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past still influencing the narrator’s life and identity: the same old Brownlee, 
living the same life that he thought he had escaped. Jefferson Holdridge 
draws attention to the second of these elements: 
 
Home in Paul Muldoon’s poetry is a place one wants to leave and can 
never leave. It is an identity, in fact, rather than a place. It can’t be left 
behind, no matter how many personas one puts on.115 
 
In addition to commenting on the theme of home and trying to leave it, 
Holdridge here also raises the issue of predestination or self-determination. 
 ‘Immram’ echoes and develops many of the themes, images, concerns 
and even specific words of the first part of the collection.116 The narrator 
begins his quest to discover the truth about his father, and by implication 
himself – ‘Your old man was an ass-hole. | That makes an ass-hole out of 
you’ (Muldoon, p. 94) – by driving ‘west to Paradise’. In addition to being a 
search for origins, the logic of both this quest and the comment linking the 
narrator and his father implies that identity is determined by genealogy. 
‘Paradise’ is a nursing home where ‘people go to end their lives’. The 
narrator’s mother has recently attempted suicide and is unable to speak. 
Kendall points out that her action was an attempt to assert free will and take 
control of her destiny, its failure leaves her more dependent than before 
(Kendall, p. 85). A second visit, though, provides the narrator with 
information about his father’s debt to Redpath. This knowledge destroys the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Jefferson Holdridge, The Poetry of Paul Muldoon (Dublin: The Liffey Press, 2008), p. 43. 
116 Muldoon (2001), pp. 94-102. 
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narrator’s hopes that ‘All might have been peace and harmony | In that land of 
milk and honey’ (Muldoon, p. 97). His return to paradise is blocked by 
Redpath’s drug empire, which ‘ran a little more than halfway to Hell’. 
However, the narrator admits that even without this impediment, paradise 
would still be unobtainable because of ‘the fact that our days are numbered’. 
The fact of death, the most basic fact of nature and the terms of existence, 
prevents us from returning to a lost Eden. So once again, nature and humanity 
are in conflict; nature thwarts humanity’s hopes and desires. 
 Redpath is based in the Park Hotel, where ‘Steel and glass were held 
in creative tension’, the same construction materials that had been mentioned 
in connection with the Botanic Gardens palm-house in ‘The One Desire’. 
There the construction expressed the human ‘will, | That heaven be brought 
closer still | And we converse with the angels’, though the attempt was a 
signal failure (p. 93). In Redpath’s world, paradise and the angels have been 
replaced by cocaine: ‘This was angel dust, dust from an angel’s wing’ (p. 99). 
Bolivia, Peru, ‘the slopes of the Andes’ are exploited by the drug barons, 
‘everyone taking their cut’. In this state of experience, paradise means 
exploiting nature for huge profits, an attitude that had been described, albeit 
in a very different context, in ‘The Geography Lesson’: ‘all that greenness 
turned to gold’ (p. 77). And this commercial activity is in opposition to the 
desire for home and authenticity: ‘bananas were harvested while green | But 
would hanker after where they’d grown’. It would seem that humanity’s 
expulsion from paradise is self-imposed. 
 In conclusion, Why Brownlee Left leaves the question of why 
Brownlee left totally unclear. The collection examines the concepts of 
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innocence and experience and finds them highly ambiguous. In western 
culture innocence and nature are connected, as are experience and culture. 
However, the division between them is so uncertain that from one critic we 
can read that ‘There is no nature’117 and from another that ‘The contention 
that everything is nature is surely difficult to dispute’.118 Muldoon’s handling 
of the innocence / experience dichotomy and its ambiguities can thus be read 
as an exploration of the ambiguities of the division between nature and 
culture. The sense of time passing that comes with experience brings in its 
wake a sense of loss and yearning for the past, which is associated with a 
state of innocence. From a distance, that past innocence appears as our true 
place of belonging, our origin and, therefore, our identity. Cast out from this 
original home, this Eden or paradise, the experienced individual searches for 
a new place to belong and tries to understand who (s)he really is. But this 
search also raises doubts about the true nature of that past, the true quality of 
innocence and the validity of the lost Eden. With knowledge of time and the 
lost past comes knowledge of death, making the search for the ideal all the 
more urgent while at the same time lending a sense of futility to the whole 
enterprise. 
 In ‘Palm Sunday’119 Muldoon expresses a wish that echoes Fisher’s 
desire ‘to believe I live in a single world’ (Fisher, 2005, p. 43). 
Characteristically, Muldoon uses a less direct expression than Fisher’s ‘I want 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Alan Liu, Wordsworth: The Sense of History, quoted by Jonathan Bate in ‘From “Red” to “Green”’ in The Green 
Studies Reader, pp. 167-72 (p.171). 
118 Jhan Hochman, ‘Green Cultural Studies’ in The Green Studies Reader, pp. 187-92 (p. 189). 
119 Muldoon (2001), p.88. 
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to believe’ when he asks ‘I was wondering if you’d bring me through’, and 
then goes on to ask for: 
 
 […] a world where everything stands 
 For itself, and carries 
 Just so much weight as me on you. 
 My scrawny door-mat. My deep red carpet.  (Muldoon, p. 88) 
 
But in a world where innocence and experience are undecideable (is May 
innocent or devious?), where language has become so debased that ‘Paradise’ 
means a place where you go to die, this would appear to be an impossibility. 
Jefferson Holdridge comments on the absence of this envisaged world in 
terms that echo both Mottram and Olson (see above, pp. 161 and 164): ‘Once 
the object stands for more than itself, or when something disrupts that perfect 
assessment where “everything stands […] for itself”, then secrets are 
unlocked, identity disrupted’ (Holdridge, p.54). This process is the equivalent 
of losing innocence; experience consists in the knowledge of connections and 
the inevitable disruption of identity that it brings in its wake: 
 
In Muldoon’s world to grow up is to know more facts, to have more 
experience, to see more of the conjunctions and resemblances that 
could link anyone to anything. It is not, however, to learn how the 
world makes any final, stable sense.120 
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In fact, ‘Early Warning’ has already given an early warning against this hope: 
‘We would depend on more than we could see’ (Muldoon, 2001, p. 81); a 
(religious) faith in what cannot be perceived, the kind of innocence that 
cannot survive into adulthood. Even the act of expressing the wish raises new 
uncertainties. Are we to read ‘door-mat’ in the sense of ‘to treat someone like 
a door-mat’? Why Brownlee Left presents a world where we never know what 
anything means, or even whether it means anything. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Conclusion 
 
6.1 The paradox in Prynne 
 
This study has shown that Bishop, Fisher and Muldoon are all deeply 
concerned with the nature of perception and how to understand, interpret and 
represent it. They all employ a variety of styles and techniques from the 
simple and plainspoken diction of Bishop in ‘Arrival at Santos’ and Fisher in 
‘The Memorial Fountain’, and Muldoon’s use of plain idiomatic speech in 
‘Whim’ and ‘Cuba’ or the seemingly simple diction of ‘Bran’ to the more 
complex abstract writing of Fisher in some sections of A Furnace or the mass 
of similes in ‘The Square House: April’, Bishop’s complex use of images in 
her early work or Muldoon’s use of wordplay and double meanings. A 
stylistic study of the work of these poets would certainly be of interest and 
would offer far more detailed information about these matters of style and 
language use than the present study can claim. 
 A further element in the work of all three of these poets, and an aspect 
which adds to the complexity of the writing, is the sense of indeterminacy and 
contradiction which I understand to be an integral part of each poet’s attempt 
to ‘tell the truth’ about their experience of the world. In the case of Bishop 
and Fisher, that has also included an element which verges on the mystical, or 
at least the possibility of the mystical; both are willing to consider a non-
material element in experience and that element is associated with 
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imagination and artistic creation. This mystical element would seem, on the 
face of it, to be lacking in Why Brownlee Left. However, the issue of 
predestination and free will opens an area of speculation in which a possible 
truth – the course that a life which is predestined might take – exists, but is 
not accessible. Muldoon does not commit himself to this belief, but he raises 
the possibility of it and as such, it constitutes the possibility of the existence 
of something in human life and experience which is beyond perception yet 
directly influences events. 
 In the introduction to the critical part of this dissertation I referred to 
Edward Larrissy’s comments on J. H. Prynne’s ‘chains of imagery that might 
begin to assert themselves with an air of inscrutable self-evidence’ and the 
‘drift toward coherent views’ (see above, section 2.3). Larrissy described this 
aspect of Prynne’s work as a paradox, and evidence of a ‘doubleness’. It is 
now time to consider how far the strategies of my chosen poets have resulted 
in anything comparable to the quality that Larrissy finds in Prynne. The 
extent to which these strategies coincide with the paradox in Prynne’s writing 
can best be demonstrated by showing that Prynne’s examinations of 
perception and experience give rise to the same issues we have observed in 
Bishop, Fisher and Muldoon. Prynne confronts these issues much more 
directly. He is a philosophical poet in a way that the other three are not, which 
means that the arguments that Prynne has under consideration are introduced 
as material in his poems. The issues, though, are the same, as I hope to 
demonstrate by an examination of Prynne’s early work, which will provide a 
useful tool that can be applied to the other poets. I have drawn only on work 
published up to, and including, The White Stones (1969). 
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 The call to ‘take knowledge | back to the springs’ announces Prynne’s 
interest in authenticity and origins.121 It also suggests that something has been 
lost from humanity’s experience of its world and that we should repossess 
that which has been lost. The same sentiment appears in some form in all 
three of my poets. Later, Prynne represents that project in a discouraging 
light: 
 
    The fact is that right 
 from the springs this water is no longer fit 
 for the stones it washes: the water of life 
 is in bottles & ready for invoice.      (p. 15) 
 
Prynne is highly critical of commerce in ‘Die A Millionaire’ and here shows 
commercial activity in direct conflict with nature, as Muldoon does in ‘The 
Geography Lesson’ or ‘The One Desire’. But despite the apparent pessimism 
in these lines, the poem eventually works its way to hold out the possibility of 
‘What runs | back, or could be traced upstream by simply | denying that 
conspiracy of “cause”’ (p.16). Hope, if that is what this is, seems to reside in 
language, in ‘naming’, and it is associated with ‘mysteries’. It is ‘the question 
of names’ that ‘runs back’: ‘And the back mutation is knowledge’. The goal 
here is strongly suggestive of Bishop’s search for knowledge in ‘At The 
Fishhouses’. For Prynne, it is the failure in the act of naming that makes 
possible the delusions of the modern age. The poem’s subtitle, ‘(pronounced 
“diamonds in the air”)’, underlines the slipperiness of language and its 	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potential for misrepresentation, and thus casts ironic doubt on the process the 
poem appears to be encouraging. This is Prynne’s answer to Jarrell’s 
question: ‘how can you find a language so close to the world that the world 
can be represented and understood in it?’ Prynne explains how language and 
naming might achieve that in ‘A Note on Metal’ (1968).122 
 Published in the same year as Kitchen Poems, ‘A Note on Metal’ 
traces the development of the coinage system and the mercantile activity it 
made possible, which form the embryonic beginnings of capitalism. It is with 
the development of metallurgy, Prynne states, that ‘the theory of quality as 
essential’ originates, displacing ‘the magical forms through which property 
resided in substance’ (p. 128). Prynne considers the magical properties of 
objects during this period of change: 
 
For a long time the magical implications of transfer in any shape must 
have given a muted and perhaps not initially debased sacrality to 
objects of currency-status, just as fish-hooks and bullets become 
strongly magical objects in the societies formed around their use. 
       (p. 129) 
 
However, as coinage developed, the coin became a metonymic unit ‘where 
the magical resonance of transfer is virtually extinct’ (p. 130). The demise of 
magic continued with the introduction of a bi-metallic currency ‘where even 
the theoretic properties of metal are further displaced […] We are almost 
completely removed from presence as weight’ (p. 130). 	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 As Prynne recounts these developments, there is a sense of loss and 
exclusion from a knowledge of ‘substance’, the concrete elements of the 
external world. That this has a religious significance is clear not just from the 
associations of magic with early forms of religious observance but also from 
the religious diction Prynne uses, not only here in ‘A Note on Metal’, but 
throughout these early collections. Words with a religious sense or 
connotation occur with sufficient regularity to be noticeable: sacred, sacral, 
spirit, holy, the soul, angels. It is clear that the phenomenon of religious belief 
is an issue of concern in these poems. 
 Names have lost their magic; the language itself is debased and that is 
the root of the problem. This is the message that can be deduced from ‘A 
Note on Metal’ and ‘Die a Millionaire’. The poem ends on a note of hope: 
‘Know | the names. It is as simple as the purity | of sentiment’ (p. 16). Prynne 
is endorsing Olson’s belief in the ‘literal’.123 That endorsement, however, is 
not unequivocal; Prynne expresses a degree of scepticism regarding the extent 
to which the literal can answer his ‘prayer’ for purity of naming: ‘The literal 
is not magic’, he states in ‘A Note on Metal’, but adds, ‘for the most part’, 
thereby leaving the door open for the possibility of some magic (Prynne, p. 
131). 
 The process that Prynne is describing here also describes the 
movement of Bishop’s poem, ‘At The Fishhouses’, or Fisher’s poems, ‘The 
Memorial Fountain’ and ‘Kingsbury Mill’. One might object that Fisher’s 
movement is much more a forward one in search of experience that is 
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authentic because it is not derived from past knowledge, and that would be a 
valid comment. However, the fact of the search and the ultimate goal of 
experiencing the world directly and finding the language in which to present 
that experience; these are the points of convergence. Bishop and Fisher enact 
that search while Prynne describes the nature of the search. The fact that 
Fisher’s image uses movement in an opposite direction does not alter the 
essential sameness of their projects. Furthermore, Prynne also questions the 
notion of the return to an earlier, ideal state in ‘Numbers in Time of Trouble’ 
(see below, p. 237). 
 ‘Sketch for a Financial Theory of the Self’124 continues the themes of 
‘A Note on Metal’ by addressing the issue of ‘qualities’ and names, and like 
‘Die a Millionaire’ it portrays naming as debased in the modern era, but also 
considers the possibility that language can provide the means to a more 
genuine experience of the external world. The word ‘pure’, also in the form 
‘purity’, is a key concept. It appears in both poems and in ‘A Note on Metal’. 
In the latter, the phrase, ‘a “purer” and more abstract theory of value’ (p. 
129), links purity to abstraction and thus to the displacement of ‘the magical 
forms through which property resided in substance’ by ‘the theory of quality 
as essential’ (p 128). Via the concept of value, purity is linked to commerce 
and the debased conditions of the modern age - ironically, a debased purity. 
In ‘Die a Millionaire’, ‘purity is a question of names’, the means by which we 
might ‘take knowledge | back to the springs’. So ‘purity’, as a word, can have 
both positive and negative applications. ‘Sketch’ plays on the possible senses 
of ‘pure’, so that the name of the material, ‘silk’, is pure in the sense that it is 	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an abstraction, what Prynne calls ‘the sidereal display’: ‘it is what we know 
we cannot now have’ because names have become displaced from substance 
(p.19). The poem expresses a hope for the recovery of ‘pure’ names and 
qualities: ‘The qualities then are a name, corporately, | for the hope that they 
will return to us’ (p. 20). The final section of the poem concludes, however, 
that the hope is already a function of commercialisation and ‘count’, by which 
abstract value replaces the present quality of the substance, and that therefore 
‘the star & silk of my eye, that will not return’ (p. 20). I take the phrase, ‘of 
my eye’, to refer to direct perceptual access to the actual substance, the 
equivalent of Olson’s ‘literal’. The final line of this poem, then, contradicts 
the optimism of ‘Die a Millionaire’. What Prynne is confronting here is very 
much the same issue that Roy Fisher confronts in much of his work, of which 
‘Introit’ from A Furnace is a good example. 
 This discussion of Kitchen Poems and ‘A Note on Metal’ has made 
reference to the past and historical processes. ‘Numbers in Time of Trouble’ 
introduces the idea of the ‘time standard’, or relativity of history, suggesting 
that we might ‘come off it’.125 Despite historical processes, Prynne states that 
‘we are | underlaid by drift’, suggesting the absence of a controlled direction. 
The purpose of ‘com[ing] off the time standard’ is ‘to move | right out of the 
range of those sickening and | greasy surities – like “back to our proper | 
homes”’ (p. 17). This is an interesting development because it seems to deny 
the notion that a return to an earlier state might be the solution to 
contemporary degradation. As already indicated, that solution is not presented 
in an unequivocal light, but this call to reject ‘the time standard’ would seem 	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also to render impossible any notion of return to a lost golden age in its denial 
of historical process. However, as Mellors points out, the ‘greasy surities’ of 
‘our proper | homes’ is a comment ‘directed against the consumer society, 
which wants “home” to be something that can be attained by mere material 
purchase’ (Mellors, p.154). Mellors’s comment can apply equally to the 
building one inhabits, the concept of home as a place of belonging, and the 
myth of an earlier state, all of which are capable of being commercialised and 
sold. Mellors goes on to suggest that Prynne does recognise the possibility of 
attaining ‘home’ but that the search for it is linked to a nomadic spirit and to 
moving forward rather than back in time. This is now a view that coincides 
with Fisher’s forward movement. Home, in fact, is a place that we have to 
leave in order to find our place in the world: 
 
    home is easily our 
 idea of it, the music of decent and proper 
 order, it’s this we must leave in some quite 
 specific place if we are not to carry it 
 everywhere with us.   (Prynne, p. 100) 
 
These lines from ‘Thoughts on the Esterházy Court Uniform’126 clearly 
endorse the idea of leaving home and as such, strongly echo the sentiments 
we found in Bishop’s and Muldoon’s poems of travel. This urge to depart in 
search of a new place of belonging is the equivalent of the movement 
described in ‘Die a Millionaire’: 	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   the true expansion 
 is probably drift, as the Scythians 
 being nomadic anyway for the most part 
 slipped sideways right across the Russian 
 steppes    (p. 14) 
 
As mentioned above (see p. 237), since it lacks any controlled direction this 
‘true expansion’ by ‘drift’ is distinguished from imperialist expansion, which 
Prynne had characterised a few lines earlier as: 
 
 […] Imperialism was just 
 an old, very old name for that 
 idea, that what you want, you by 
 historic process or just readiness 
 to travel, also “need”[.]   (p. 13) 
 
In fact, Prynne provides an answer here to Bishop’s doubts in some of her 
Brazil poems. There is also a sense of the absence of directed intention in the 
expression ‘slipped sideways’ which connects to the phrase ‘we are | 
underlaid by drift’, so that leaving home and ‘com[ing] off the time standard’ 
are linked. Furthermore, ‘Moon Poem’127 makes it clear that it is the act of 
seeking hopefully which is the main purpose, not the arrival at a new place: 
‘we go in this way | on and on and the unceasing image of hope | is our place 	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in the world’ (p. 53). There is this sense in Prynne’s early work that the ideals 
that he identifies are always out of reach and may in fact be illusory, a point 
of view which he shares with Bishop, Fisher and Muldoon. 
 Prynne frequently repeats words, images and concepts across several 
poems: religious terminology; hope, need and desire; rising and falling; hills; 
and the words ‘drift’ and ‘slip’. This technique creates a pattern in Prynne’s 
early work and that pattern suggests both design and meaning. It is a 
technique that we have observed in Fisher and Muldoon, and with the same 
effect. The reader naturally begins to look for reasons to explain this 
patterning and in the same way, the poems look to the external world to try to 
identify a meaning there, or at least to consider the possibility of such. The 
repeated use of religious terminology is one indication of Prynne’s interest in, 
and speculation about the possibility of, a divine presence in the universe. 
The hope for a place of belonging is the expression of another element that 
can give meaning to human existence, although as indicated above, Prynne 
expresses scepticism about attaining it, as he does about the other elements. 
The investigation of the hope and desire for this idealised existence recurs 
throughout the early poems. ‘The Wound, Day and Night’ confesses a belief 
in an ideal state: ‘I am born back there, the plaintive chanting | under the 
Atlantic and the unison of forms’ and expresses the hope that ‘It may all flow 
again’.128 The stress placed on ‘may’ by the use of italics in Prynne’s text 
hints at the uncertainty of this hope ever coming to pass. 
 There is an irony in this desire to go back to an ideal state in that it 
contradicts the desire to leave home, to move forward, to ‘go in this way | on 	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and on’. It also contradicts the judgement that repetition is a process that 
limits humanity’s capacity for perception and experience. ‘Thoughts on the 
Esterházy Court Uniform’ makes the point that there can be two kinds of 
repetition; one that blunts perceptions and another that is a coming home to a 
true perception of ‘literalness’, the ideal ‘unison in forms’: ‘Again is the 
sacred | word, the profane sequence suddenly graced, by | coming back’ (p. 
100). The kind of experience and perception that Prynne is imagining here 
might be similar to that which Bishop describes when Crusoe, returned to 
England, remembers his relationship with the objects that carried intense 
meaning for him when he was on his island. 
 
6.2 The importance of choice 
 
Robert Rowland Smith comments that: ‘the poem itself is a textual object that 
depicts real objects like urns, but those real objects are then manifested in the 
poem as images which endure and so achieve a quasi-objectal status of their 
own’ (Smith, p. 43-44). Furthermore, objects do not find their place in the 
poem by chance; they are chosen by the poet, and the fact of choice is also 
significant in a way similar to Crusoe’s knife being significant. Choice also 
introduces an element of exclusion: ‘the choosing marking a point at which 
an otherwise endless series of numbers or choices is arrested’ (p. 43). In other 
words, choice is a function of Barthes’s referential illusion by which realism 
is released from the impossible requirement of describing every feature of an 
object, landscape, experience and so on. Choice performs another important 
function in that it is an expression of free will, whereas predetermination 
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means an absence of choice. This notion is particularly relevant to the work 
of Bishop and Muldoon. Ironically, though, the act of choosing represents the 
removal of choice. You cannot have your cake and eat it too.  In addition, the 
act of choosing not only singles out the chosen object for special attention, it 
also draws attention to the chooser: ‘if I choose a certain object this proves in 
turn how special I am, that I am special to it’ (p. 40); the object becomes the 
medium through which the poet expresses his or her self. Repetition can be 
viewed as the removal or negation of choice in the sense that repetition 
assumes that choice is pre-determined. Choice thus becomes the tool by 
which meaning, or value, can be created. Crusoe’s knife is important because 
he chose it and this act of choosing lends meaning to the knife in the same 
way as William Carlos Williams describes the meaning of ‘sky’ for the 
farmer or fisherman (Williams, p. 19). In her earlier and mid-period work, as 
we saw, this aspect of perception seems to trouble Bishop. In her later work 
she seems to have resolved, or at least accepted, these difficulties. The 
contradiction which choice and choosing contains within its very nature 
becomes an expression of the indeterminacy we have found in all three poets. 
The conditions of existence are such that by choosing, we remove choice; 
commitment to one path shuts off other possibilities - the path not chosen. 
Thus it becomes unclear whether choice is genuine or not. 
 The issue of the limitations of science and scientific investigations and 
the notion that science is dehumanised because it fails to take into account an 
element that escapes scientific measurement has an obvious connection with 
Romanticism. One of the elements in human experience which seems to defy 
scientific measurement is imagination. The role of the imagination in 
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understanding our experience of the external world is an important issue. It is 
also important in terms of creativity. William Carlos Williams focuses on the 
role of the imagination in artistic productions in Spring and All, where he 
emphasises that the purpose of art should not be to attempt to reproduce 
elements from nature but to use the imagination to produce a new object, the 
work of art, that takes its place in the world: 
 
Imagination is not to avoid reality, nor is it description nor an 
evocation of objects or situations, it is to say that poetry does not 
tamper with the world but moves it – It affirms reality most 
powerfully and therefore, since reality needs no personal support but 
exists free from human action, as proven by science in the 
indestructibility of matter and of force, it creates a new object, a play, 
a dance which is not a mirror up to nature[.]  (Williams, p. 91) 
 
This is another way of reading the elements in a poem that Morton criticises 
as ‘ambient poetics’. According to Williams, these elements are not ‘a mirror 
up to nature’. Neither, according to Williams, is the function of the creative 
imagination to serve as an escape from the external world into the ideal 
interior state of Romanticism. The creative imagination, through the act of 
choosing, generates the meaning that objects in the external world have for 
the poet and expresses this in language. Such a meaning must necessarily be 
subjective, but it is nonetheless an element in the poet’s experience of those 
objects; an element that is not accessible to science. It is the generation of this 
meaning that I identify in the production of my own poetry and which I find 
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in the work of the poets in this study. This is the issue which was discussed in 
relation to Bishop’s work (see above, pp. 146-47 and 153). Bishop had her 
own reservations about the validity of human choice in perception, but the 
fact remains that the experience is genuine. For Williams, the guarantee of 
meaning is the poem’s presence in the world of objects. 
Williams develops his argument in confident style, though he does 
introduce the notion of ‘great works’ which must necessarily limit the 
applicability of his ideas:  
 
we are beginning to discover the truth in the great works of the 
imagination A CREATIVE FORCE IS SHOWN AT WORK 
MAKING OBJECTS WHICH ALONE COMPLETE SCIENCE AND 
ALLOW INTELLIGENCE TO SURVIVE 
     (p. 37; Williams’s capitals) 
 
For all three of the poets in this study, Soloman’s account of 
Heideggerian Being, quoted in the introduction, would seem to hold true: 
‘Being is not derivative of our knowledge of particular beings’. Factual 
information, or scientific knowledge, will not reveal the ‘truth about things’, 
whether the ‘thing’ is Crusoe’s knife, Kingsbury Mill or the reason that 
Brownlee left. Rather, it is the ‘making of objects’, like Bishop’s moose, 
Crusoe’s knife and Brownlee’s disappearance, which ‘complete science’ by 
their demonstration of the imagination’s ability, through the process of 
choice, to create presence in the external world and thereby to show that the 
imagination and the external world are not separate entities. In order to 
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achieve this, the language that the poet employs must be vitally connected 
with the external world to which it refers, as with the sky for Williams’s 
farmer and fisherman or ‘naming’ as Prynne defines it. Williams and Prynne 
describe the process that I believe Bishop’s, Fisher’s and Muldoon’s poetry 
illustrates. The uncertainty over the free exercise of choice, though, creates 
the quality of contradiction and indeterminacy that pervades the work of these 
poets. And if it is the act of choosing that generates value and meaning then 
doubts about free choice undermine faith in that meaning. This description of 
the situation agrees with my experience of reading these poets. This is the 
‘truth about things’ as they have told it. 
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